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ABSTRACT
CLERICS IN ARMS: MILITANT CATHOLICISM AND RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE
IN FRANCE, 1584-1598
Gregory D. Bereiter, Ph.D.
Department of History
Northern Illinois University, 2016
Brian Sandberg, Director
This dissertation examines the participation of Catholic clergy in religious violence and
sectarian conflict at the height of the French Wars of Religion, a series of protracted armed
conflicts that ravaged the kingdom of France between 1562 and 1629. It aims to produce a
cultural history of clerical militancy at the height of these disastrous wars, when a “Holy
League” of extremist Catholics formed across France with the twin goals of eradicating French
Protestantism and preventing the crown from passing to a Protestant “heretic,” Henri de Navarre.
The dissertation investigates the violent practices of militant Catholic clergy in the 1580s and
1590s using manuscript correspondence, administrative documents, religious treatises, polemical
pamphlets, and other rare archival sources. Its findings demonstrate patterns of clerical
involvement in religious violence and suggest new ways of conceptualizing sectarian conflict.
Extremist clergy actively engaged in sectarian conflict by arming themselves, serving in civic
militias, concocting assassination plots, and orchestrating violent collective action against their
religious and political opponents. The martial practices of Catholic clerics shaped confessional
politics and influenced the outcomes of the broader religious conflict in France. The bellicose
actions of militant clerics prompt a reconsideration of the possibilities for religious coexistence
in early modern France, challenging the prevalent notion that meaningful coexistence between
Catholics and Protestants was possible at this time.
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INTRODUCTION

In early March 1589, a theologian and regent of the University of Toulouse, Pierre de
Lanes, informed the members of Toulouse’s city council that an armed contingent of “the
politiques” had attacked the nearby château de Coubirac and driven out the Leaguer garrison that
had been installed there several weeks before. Toulouse had been a bastion of zealous Catholicism
in one of France’s most religiously mixed provinces since the early days of the French Wars of
Religion (1562-1629), but Toulouse had only recently become a power base for the Catholic
League in southern France. The Sainte Union (Holy Union), also known as the Catholic League,
consisted of numerous aristocratic and urban ligues that coalesced in the 1580s around the twin
goals of eradicating French Protestantism and preventing the crown from passing into the hands
of a Calvinist “heretic,” Henri de Navarre. French Catholics were far from united, however.
Militant ligueurs condemned Catholic moderates and royalists who continued to support the
beleaguered Henri III or who recognized Navarre as the legitimate heir to the throne, and used the
term “politique” in derision of anyone belonging to this coalition.
Lanes was determined that the château de Coubirac not become a base for politique forces
in the Haute Garonne valley between Agen and Toulouse. The nearby Cistercian abbey of NotreDame de Grandselve in Bouillac was threatened by the seizure of the château, and Lanes’s office
of prior at the abbey provided him with a means to oppose politique aims in the Toulousain region.
He therefore purchased twelve arquebuses and four heavy muskets from Toulouse’s municipal
arsenal, requesting the immediate issue of “these weapons for the defense of this place and to
maintain the premises in obedience to the Catholic faith and religion.” According to municipal
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deliberations, Toulouse’s councilors approved Lanes’s request for the urgent delivery of these
firearms, enjoining him “to keep the said place de Coubirac under obedience to the Catholic
religion,” by which they meant under the League’s control.1 Interestingly, there is no indication
in extant sources that Lanes requested soldiers or townsmen to wield these weapons. In light of
his position as prior and the monastery’s proximity to the château, Lanes likely arranged for a
handful of Cistercian monks from Notre-Dame de Grandselve to defend the structure with the
arquebuses and muskets. The Toulousain councilors’ directive to Lanes to preserve the château
for the League suggests that he himself planned to command the structure’s defense until a more
permanent garrison could be reestablished. Lanes, a prominent cleric in Toulouse, was arming
himself and his followers to engage in religious war.

ARMED CLERGY

This dissertation examines the participation of Catholic clergy in religious violence and
sectarian conflict at the height of the French Wars of Religion, a series of protracted armed
conflicts that ravaged the kingdom of France between 1562 and 1629. It seeks to produce a
detailed cultural history of clerical militancy at the height of these disastrous wars, when a “Holy
League” of extremist Catholics formed across France in open rebellion against the crown.
Throughout the turbulent and divisive Catholic League period, from the coalescence of local ligues

1

City council deliberations, 3 March 1589, AM Toulouse, BB 16, fº 268: “les politicques”; “lesdites armes
pour la déffance dudict lieu et maintenir ladicte place en l’obeyssance de la foy et religion catholicque appostolicque
et romaine”; “tenir ladite place de Coubirac soubz l’obeyssance de la relligion catholicque.”
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upon the premature death of the Catholic heir apparent to the throne in mid-1584 until the ultimate
dissipation of these associations following the promulgation of the 1598 Edict of Nantes, zealous
Catholics took up arms not only against Protestants but also against royalist or politique Catholics,
significantly widening a civil conflict that had hitherto mainly pitted Huguenots (French
Protestants) and Catholics against each other.2 France experienced near continual military conflict
and civil upheaval during the 1580s-1590s, which represented the longest and arguably the most
intense phase of the protracted religious wars. In this period, Catholic militancy produced a vast
revolt against the French crown, the ultimate expression of which was the unprecedented
assassination of King Henri III in August 1589 by a Dominican friar.3
My central argument in this dissertation is that Catholic clerics were crucial advocates of
and active participants in the intense religious violence and sectarian conflict that devastated
France during the tumultuous Catholic League era. Clergy provided vital leadership and support
for the League, offering religious justifications for armed rebellion against Henri III and Henri IV,
as well as for more rigorous efforts to subjugate the Huguenots. Yet clerics did far more than
sanction violence and rebellion with words alone, as violent and destructive as words and speech
acts can be.4 Clergy at virtually all levels of the ecclesiastical hierarchy actively participated in
2

The most comprehensive overview of the Catholic League period of the French Wars of Religion is JeanMarie Constant, La Ligue (Paris: Librarie Arthème Fayard, 1996). Insightful analyses of the League in the capital city
of Paris include Ann W. Ramsey, Liturgy, Politics, and Salvation: The Catholic League in Paris and the Nature of
Catholic Reform, 1540-1630 (Rochester: Rochester University Press, 1999); J. H. M. Salmon, “The Paris Sixteen,
1584-1594: The Social Analysis of a Revolutionary Movement,” in J. H. M. Salmon, Renaissance and Revolt: Essays
in the Intellectual and Social History of Early Modern France (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 235266; Denis Richet, “Sociocultural Aspects of Religious Conflicts in Paris during the Second Half of the Sixteenth
Century,” in Robert Forster and Orest Ranum, eds., Ritual, Religion, and the Sacred: Selections from the Annales
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 182-212. See also Mack P. Holt, The French Wars of Religion,
1562-1629, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 123-155.
3

For the most recent scholarly analysis of Henri III’s assassination, see Nicolas Le Roux, Un régicide au
nom de Dieu: L’assassinat d’Henri III (1er août 1589) (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 2006).
4

On the potential of words and speech acts to enact violence and abuse, see Catharine A. MacKinnon, Only
Words (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996). For critical theories of performative utterance, see Judith Butler,
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the religious warfare and sectarian conflict that ravaged France in the 1580s and 1590s and left
thousands of French women and men dead, maimed, destitute, or displaced.5 From archbishops,
bishops, and abbots to cathedral canons, parish priests, and friars of various religious orders,
Catholic clerics took up arms and battled against Huguenots and politique Catholics alike, enacting
religious violence and perpetuating practices of bloodshed and destruction that reinforced the deep
sectarian divisions within French society.
The martial practices of Catholic clergy during the League era highlight the figure of the
armed cleric, revealing the leadership of militant activism, the dynamics of religious violence, and
the limits of confessional coexistence in early modern France. Historian Ann W. Ramsey has
employed the analytic concept of the “armed cleric” to interpret the martial activism of Parisian
clergy during Henri IV’s siege of the capital in 1590 as a performative fusion of civic and sacred,
one which permits analysis of such clergy “as citizen[s] and defender[s] of civic values.”6 Yet
Ramsey’s interpretation of the “armed cleric” may be expanded and reconceptualized as a broad
cultural phenomenon encompassing a range of militant Catholic clergy that embraced practices of
violence and arms-bearing in this period in order to advance diverse religious and political goals.

Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative (London: Routledge, 1997); Andrew Parker and Eve Kosofsky
Sedgwick, eds., Performativity and Performance (London: Routledge, 1995). On language as a medium of power,
see Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, trans. Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1991).
5

Although measuring the precise impact of sectarian violence on French society during the Wars of Religion
is somewhat difficult, scholars seem to agree that France suffered both demographic and economic declines as a result
of violence equivalent to those experienced during the final phases of the Hundred Years’ War (1337-1453). See
Holt, The French Wars of Religion, 199-216; James B. Wood, “The Impact of the Wars of Religion: A View from
France, 1581,” Sixteenth Century Journal 15 (1984): 131-168. Holt in particular affirms that the Catholic League era
“stands out as an especially uncertain period, where not only was the bloodshed and loss of life of the fighting at its
apex, but the vagaries of economic change threatened the subsistence of many” (Holt, The French Wars of Religion,
208).
6

Ann W. Ramsey, Liturgy, Politics, and Salvation: The Catholic League in Paris and the Nature of Catholic
Reform, 1540-1630 (Rochester: Rochester University Press, 1999), 121.
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Armed clerics were central historical actors in the 1580s and 1590s, one of the most complex and
fraught periods of early modern French history, providing fascinating insight into attributes of
clerical culture and modes of sectarian conflict in late sixteenth-century France.
This study of religious violence and sectarian conflict takes as its subject the Catholic
clergy, both regular and secular, who formed an important social and cultural group in sixteenthcentury French society. The largest and most populous country in western Europe, France was
home to a monarchy that drew extensively upon the ritual, ceremony, and imagery of the Latin
Christian church as an authoritative source of royal legitimacy.7 The spread of Reformation beliefs
and practices into France, a process that had begun around 1520 and then intensified in the ensuing
four decades, drew perhaps ten to fifteen percent of French men and women—out of a population
of roughly eighteen to nineteen million—into the Protestant fold, as well as about one-third of the
nobility.8 Some two million French people abandoned the Latin faith of their ancestors for
Protestantism, creating deep religious divisions that erupted into full-scale military conflict in
1562. Nonetheless, the vast majority of inhabitants remained firmly Catholic and viewed
Protestants as an heretical “infection” plaguing the social body.9 The Catholic ecclesiastical

7

Ronald G. Asch, Sacral Kingship between Disenchantment and Re-enchantment: The French and English
Monarchies 1587-1688 (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2014); Colette Beaune, The Birth of an Ideology: Myths and
Symbols of Nation in Late-Medieval France (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Marc Bloch, Les rois
thaumaturges: Étude sur le caractère surnaturel attribué la puissance royale, particulièrement en France et en
Angleterre (Paris: Librairie Istra, 1924).
8

Raymond A. Mentzer and Andrew Spicer, “Introduction: Étre protestant,” in Raymond A. Mentzer and
Andrew Spicer, eds., Society and Culture in the Huguenot World, 1559-1685 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2002), 1-9; E. William Monter, Judging the French Reformation: Heresy Trials by Sixteenth-Century
Parlements (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999); Mark Greengrass, The French Reformation (Chichester:
Wiley-Blackwell, 1991); Janine Garrisson, L’homme protestant (Bruxelles: Éditions Complexe, 1986).
9

On the intensification of religious antagonism in France in the 1550s and early 1560s, including Catholic
perceptions of Protestantism as a grievous threat to the social and political order, see Holt, The French Wars of
Religion, 40-54; Barbara B. Diefendorf, Beneath the Cross: Catholics and Huguenots in Sixteenth-Century Paris
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 49-63.
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organization in France included 120 dioceses, containing upwards of 32,000 parishes—where
Catholic clerics of all ranks and status were highly visible members of the social fabric and played
influential roles in civic and religious life.10 Secular clerics were without question the largest
contingent of France’s clergy at this time, yet members of the diverse religious orders were
publicly active in French cities and towns, where they preached, catechized, administered the
sacraments, and performed other pastoral tasks alongside their secular counterparts.11
Although some scholars restrict the use of the terms “clerics” and “clergy” only to members
of the ecclesiastical hierarchy that administered the sacraments or assisted in their provision, this
study follows the approach of Joseph Bergin and other historians who apply this terminology to
both secular clergy and regular clergy. By far the largest contingent of France’s clergy, the secular
clergy comprised all clerics not bound by a particular rule (regula). The members of this expansive
group ranged from cardinals, archbishops, and bishops down to lower-ranking canons of cathedral
and collegiate chapters, curés of parish churches, and chapellains stationed at countless smaller
chapels. The regular clergy included abbots, monks, nuns, novices, and other clerics who followed
a formal rule and took vows of poverty, celibacy, and obedience.12 Despite important differences
in their legal status, their manner of life, and their respective activities, the distinction between

10

For estimates regarding late sixteenth-century France’s population, see Robert J. Knecht, The French Civil
Wars, 1562-1598 (London: Routledge, 2014), 6-7; Benoît Garnot, La population française aux XVIe, XVIIe et XVIIIe
siècles (Gap: Éditions Ophrys, 1988), 11; D. B. Grigg, Population Growth and Agrarian Change: An Historical
Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 102-114.
11

Joseph Bergin, Church, Society and Religious Change in France, 1580-1730 (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2009), 106.
12

Julia Barrow, for instance, restricts the term “cleric” to only “those members of the Church who perform
sacraments, or assist in their performance” (Barrow, The Clergy in the Medieval World, 3-4), thereby excluding monks
and friars. For a less restrictive use of the terms “cleric” and “clergy,” see Bergin, Church, Society and Religious
Change in France, 64-67.

seculars and regulars “was not always watertight,” as Bergin points out.13
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Members of long-

established religious orders (Benedictines and Augustinians), mendicant orders (Franciscans and
Dominicans), and new Counter-Reformation orders (Jesuits and Capuchins) all appear to have
served as regular clergy in France. Some cathedral chapters in the sixteenth and early seventeenth
centuries were comprised of either monks or canons-regular, even though cathedral canons
remained in principle subject to their bishops, a surprising number of which were in fact members
of religious orders.14 Moreover, both secular and regular Catholic clergy were obligated to take
vows of celibacy, signaling the moral and spiritual superiority of the clerical estate as well as
clerics’ readiness for the seemingly imminent end of the temporal world.15 The many similarities
between secular and regular clergy in this period suggest the appropriateness of considering them
as a distinct group that operated on a particular social and cultural terrain.
The active participation of Catholic clergy in arms-bearing and religious violence during
the French Wars of Religion is perhaps even more striking on account of confessional differences
over the precise “status” and role of clerics with regard to both the Christian community and
society as a whole. While leading Protestant reformers like Martin Luther and Jean Calvin
desacralized the clerical office and truncated much of the clergy’s traditional power and privileges,
the Council of Trent (1545-1563) upheld the sacral character of the ordained and hierarchical
13

Bergin, Church, Society and Religious Change in France, 61.

14

J. Michael Hayden and Malcolm R. Greenshields, Six Hundred Years of Reform: Bishops and the French
Church, 1190-1789 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), 10; Joseph Bergin, The Making of the French
Episcopate, 1589-1661 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 265-269; J. Michael Hayden, “The Social Origins
of the French Episcopacy at the Beginning of the Seventeenth Century,” French Historical Studies 10 (1977): 27-40.
15

For a helpful analysis of the evolution of ideas about clergy and sexuality from the Middle Ages to the
early modern era, see Helen Parish, Clerical Celibacy in the West: c.1100-1700 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2013). On
Protestant critiques of and alterations to the Church’s emphasis on clerical celibacy, see Marjorie Elizabeth Plummer,
From Priest’s Whore to Pastor’s Wife: Clerical Marriage and the Process of Reform in the Early German Reformation
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2012); Helen Parish, Clerical Marriage and the English Reformation: Precedent, Policy, and
Practice (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000).
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priesthood as crucial to reinforcing papal authority and defining Catholicism. The Council
reiterated the cultic role of clerics and their pre-eminence in protecting, nurturing, and governing
the Catholic Church.16 In response to specific criticisms, Trent required priests to be trained in
diocesan seminaries, reside in their parishes, administer the sacraments, and instruct parishioners
through catechesis and preaching. The Council also enhanced the bishop’s role as chief pastor of
his diocese, promoting a model of episcopacy focused on pastoral responsibilities, of which
preaching was paramount. Additionally, Trent attempted to renew confidence in the religious
orders by mandating that each strictly adhere to their respective rule (regula) and, in the case of
women’s orders, submit to full enclosure.17 However imperfectly implemented at the local level
in the many regions of Catholic Europe, the Tridentine reforms reiterated the spiritual primacy of
clerics for Catholic religious life and more strictly regulated who could and could not assume such
a sacred office.
Although the French church resisted official adoption of the decrees of Trent in protest
against the Council’s apparent infringement on Gallican liberties, many clerical elites in France
agreed with the reforms approved at Trent and imposed them on the clergy under their jurisdiction.
The Tridentine reforms reinforced conceptions of Catholic clerics as spiritual and moral examples
to the Christian laity, influencing French clerical reform. The deliberations of numerous French

Alister E. McGrath, Reformation Thought: An Introduction, 4th ed. (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012),
210-212; Carter Lindberg, The European Reformations, 2nd ed. (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 153, 155; John
W. O’Malley, Trent: What Happened at the Council (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2013),
99-102; Alison Forrestal, “The Church in the Tridentine and Early Modern Eras,” in Gerard Mannion and Lewis S.
Mudge, eds., The Routledge Companion to the Christian Church (London: Routledge, 2007), 85-105; Michael Mullett,
The Catholic Reformation (London: Routledge, 2002), 29-68.
16

17

O’Malley, Trent, 238-240; Martin Elbel, “The Making of a Perfect Friar: Habit and Reform in the
Franciscan Tradition,” in László Kontler and Jaroslav Miller, eds., Friars, Nobles, and Burghers: Sermons, Images
and Prints (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2010), 275-283. On numbers of dioceses and parishes, see
Bergin, Church, Society and Religious Change in France, 18, 28; Gérald Chaix, ed., Le diocèse: Espaces,
représentations, pouvoirs (France, XVe-XXe siècles) (Paris: Cerf, 2002).
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cathedral and collegiate chapters during the 1580s and 1590s touch on issues such as clerical dress
and comportment, the discharging of liturgical and pastoral duties, and the avoidance of immoral
pursuits and occupations. In January 1584, for example, an aide of the bishop of Mâcon in southern
Burgundy complained to the officers of the city’s Saint-Vincent cathedral that several canons and
habitué priests were defying regulations to keep the crowns of their heads shaved (commonly
known as the tonsure) and their faces clean-shaven, and were wearing coats over their clerical
robes when going about town, “something entirely repugnant to the ecclesiastical estate.”18
Chapter officers reminded all clergy in July 1585 to refrain from conduct tending to “scandal and
[the] detriment of the ecclesiastical estate,” presumably in response to further cases of clerical
misbehavior.19 To underscore the seriousness with which they approached clerical misconduct,
chapter officials sentenced a priest named Benoît Desroches to fifteen days in the episcopal prison
on bread and water for “keeping a woman of bad reputation in his house, where many young men
debauch themselves.”20 While these varied examples reveal underlying concerns about the
sexuality and masculinity of clergy, as well as the precise relationship of clerics to their fellow
townspeople, the overriding assumption on the part of Mâcon’s bishop and chapter officers was
that Catholic clergy must be conspicuous and uncompromising models of pious living.
As exemplars of piety, Catholic clerics had typically been expected to refrain from violent
behavior as well as from the possession and use of weapons, since bloodshed was deemed
incongruous with the clerical profession. Canon law from the mid-twelfth century onwards had

18

Chapter deliberations, 23 January 1584, AD Saône-et-Loire, G 201, fº 1: “chose répugnant entièrement à
l’estat ecclésiastique.”
19

Chapter deliberations, 13 July 1585, AD Saône-et-Loire, G 201, fº 33: “scandalle et destriment à l’estat
ecclésiastique.”
20

Chapter deliberations, 23 January 1586, AD Saône-et-Loire, G 201, fº 79: “tenant en sa maison une femme
mal famée, où plusieurs jeunes hommes se desbauchent.”
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prohibited clerical involvement in violence, forbidding clergy to bear arms and participate in
wars—even if fought in a “just” cause.21 Many prelates, especially German bishops and abbots,
violated such restrictions and led armed retinues into battle, incurring the criticism of colleagues
for setting a poor example to other clergy.22 Canonists relaxed the Church’s absolute ban on
clerical arms-bearing around the turn of the fourteenth century, holding that clergy might use arms
in unavoidable personal self-defense or against “infidels” only on the order of their superior.23
Pope Clement V confirmed this exception to canon law in the early fourteenth century, affirming
that clerics inflicting defensive bloodshed no longer incurred “irregularity,” a canonical
impediment to entering and exercising holy orders.24 The bellicose activism of Pope Julius II
(1503-13), who launched campaigns of territorial reconquest in the Papal States and personally
directed the siege of Mirandola during the War of the League of Cambrai, provides an especially
significant example of the chasm between the ideals and the reality of clerical behavior. Julius’s
martial exploits drew the censure of humanists like Desiderius Erasmus, who in 1517 stressed the
incompatibility of prelates’ pastoral mission with arms-bearing and warfare: “What do miters and
helmets have in common? What has a crosier to do with a sword? What has a Bible to do with a

21

Peter Clarke, “The Medieval Clergy and Violence: An Historiographical Introduction,” in Gerhard Jaritz
and Ana Marinković, eds., Violence and the Medieval Clergy (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2011),
3-16, at 5; Lawrence G. Duggan, Armsbearing and the Clergy in the History and Canon Law of Western Christianity
(Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2013), 134-146; James A. Brundage, “Crusades, Clerics and Violence: Reflections on a
Canonical Theme,” in Marcus Bull and Norman Housley, eds., The Experience of Crusading, I: Western Approaches
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shield?”25

11
Erasmus likely also penned the satirical dialogue Julius Excluded from Heaven (Julius

exclusus de caelis), which depicts the warrior pope being denied entry to heaven by Saint Peter for
wearing “the dress of a priest on top, while underneath it you’re all bristling and clanking with
blood-stained armor.”26 Reformer Martin Luther, a former Augustinian friar, likewise held that
recourse to armed force was opposed to clerics’ vocation as ministers of Christ. According to
historian Heiko Oberman, the death of pike-wielding pastor Huldrych Zwingli during the battle of
Kappel, fought between Switzerland’s Protestant and Catholic cantons in October 1531,
“confirmed Luther’s negative attitude toward the Zurich reformer” and reinforced his conviction
that it was against God’s will “to draw the sword with the knights of the empire, to hurl a firebrand
with the peasants, [or] to call to arms.”27 A lively debate thus developed regarding whether or not
it was appropriate for clergy to take up arms.
Post-Tridentine ecclesiastical attitudes toward clerical violence and arms-bearing appear
to have been complicated and at times contradictory, though reformist prelates generally tried to
stamp out such conduct at the local level. Carlo Borromeo, archbishop of Milan from 1564 to
1586, led important ecclesiastical reforms that considered clerics and arms. Borromeo convened a
provincial council in 1565—two years after the Council of Trent’s final session—at which
delegates agreed that “clerics are not to bear weapons of any sort for offense or defense, excepting
little knives designed for domestic use, unless by chance they must undertake a journey outside a
city in suspect places.” To further restrict the kinds of arms clergy could carry when traveling, the
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council “forbid entirely crossbows, spears, arquebuses, daggers, and other weapons of this sort,”
which it clearly saw as offensive, military-grade weaponry.28 The implication of this ruling was
that a cleric could not justly use armed force except in special cases of imminent physical harm,
and then only with weapons not associated with warfare and the martial arts.29 Borromeo’s reforms
influenced ecclesiastical authority and clerical practices across Europe.
After the French Wars of Religion broke out in 1562, many Catholic bishops in France
took up arms and participated in warfare, often leading troops in the recapture of towns and
churches that had been occupied by the Huguenots.30 The sheer number of Catholic clerics who
took part in sectarian violence and military conflict during the League era, the focus of this study,
could suggest that reformist impulses regarding clerical militancy had not penetrated France in the
way they had in other regions of Catholic Europe. Yet an example from Mâcon in 1585 indicates
otherwise. In November of that year, a priest named Scipion Garil informed officials of the SaintVincent cathedral chapter that he had seen another canon and priest, Jean Bruin, “accompany the
artillery, which was being driven down to Lyon, [while] carrying his weapons,” for which Garil
recommended that Bruin be deprived of his distributions, the tithes provided to canons after their
attendance at each Divine Office. When asked by chapter leaders if he had indeed armed himself
and helped transport ordnance to the nearby League city of Lyon, Bruin admitted to doing so,
asserting that he “should not be deprived of his distributions” because he had participated in the
undertaking “at the request of monsieur de Marbé,” one of the city’s military commanders.
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Chapter leaders reprimanded Bruin, commanding him to “never again commit such acts, upon pain
of deprivation of his benefices, given that a man of the church is prohibited from going to war and
carrying arms.”31 In this specific case, the cathedral chapter’s leadership deemed arms-bearing
and participation in warfare decidedly inappropriate activities for Catholic clergy, even though it
directed its clerics to shoulder arms in civic militia operations and in defensive actions at the
numerous châteaux under its direct control throughout this entire period.
The militant practices of Catholic clerics at the height of the French Wars of Religion raise
many important questions about the complex interconnections of clerical culture, religious politics,
and sectarian violence: How did armed clergy enact religious violence during the Wars of
Religion? What was the relationship between clerical activism and sectarian conflict? How
exactly did clerics justify their participation in religious violence? What types of clerical violence
and militancy characterized the pervasive religious warfare in this period and how did this violence
shape not only the contested religious politics of late sixteenth-century France but also the
outcomes of the broader sectarian conflict of the League era? Can the emergence of armed clerics
during the League period be comprehended as part of a general militarization of French society?
Lastly, did expressions of clerical violence help legitimate the intense sectarian conflict between
extremist Catholic ligueurs, royalist or politique Catholic moderates, and Protestants at this time?
This dissertation examines these questions by investigating diverse manuscripts and rare
printed sources conserved in the Bibliothèque Nationale de France, various Archives
Départementales and Archives Municipales, and other archival collections in France. Letters and
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reports from royal officials and nobles offer remarkably detailed accounts of sectarian conflict and
religious politics in cities and regions that joined the Catholic League. Instructions, minutes, and
correspondence writted by Henri III and Henri IV as well as their officers permit us to assess royal
responses to clerical militancy and confessional violence.

City council deliberations and

contemporary journals afford exceptional glimpses into the dynamics of sectarian conflict. The
records of cathedral and collegiate chapters reveal the religious and political causes that motivated
clerics’ militant activism and guided their participation in sectarian violence. This extensive body
of sources provides significant new evidence of militant Catholic clerics’ martial practices and
their immersion in religious warfare and confessional conflict.

CLERICAL ACTIVISM AND RELIGIOUS MILITANCY

This study provides a unique perspective on religious militancy and sectarian violence
during the French Wars of Religion by combining aspects of the fields of cultural history, religious
history, and violence studies. Utilizing a cultural approach to religious warfare, the dissertation
develops a distinctive perspective on the production of sectarian violence as well as its impact on
French society. The diverse ways in which Catholic clerics both advocated and enacted sectarian
violence in this period offer an intriguing glimpse of a culture of violence and reveal much about
the nature of early modern religious antagonism. This study of sectarian conflict also suggests the
possibilities and limitations of religious pluralism and confessional coexistence in early modern
France.
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Three interrelated lines of historical research on religious coexistence, clerical violence,
and Catholic militancy inspire this analysis of clerical violence and religious conflict in late
sixteenth-century France. A broad historiographical debate centers on the actual possibilities for
religious coexistence in early modern European societies, considering the extent to which people
of different faiths—or different strands of a particular faith—could or would live in harmony with
each other day by day within communal, civic, or national contexts.32 A more specialized area of
research focuses on clerical violence, assessing the precise roles that clergy played in the
production of violence in late medieval and early modern Europe.33 Lastly, historians of early
modern France continue to debate the nature of Catholic militancy, focusing especially on the
character, goals, and legacy of the extremist Catholic League movement.34
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First, the bellicose actions of Catholic clerics during the League period require historians
to reconsider the possibilities for religious coexistence in early modern European societies. A
significant new literature on religious coexistence and conflict has emerged in recent decades,
supplanting older triumphal histories of religious toleration that had portrayed Protestant dissidents
and pre-Enlightenment intellectuals as the inventors of modern toleration.35 Much of this new
scholarship has effectively challenged the classic notion of the emergence of toleration in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by exposing the intolerant character of Reformation state and
legal institutions, confessionalized politics, religious warfare, and social conflict.36 Far from
ushering in a new era that celebrated religious pluralism and codified acceptance of confessional
difference, the religious reformations of the sixteenth century produced horrifying divisions,
persecution, and violence to a degree previously unknown in European societies.37
One emergent strand of this new historiography of religious conflict and coexistence does
not attempt to refute outright the classic account of the rise of toleration but rather to shift analytic
focus from influential thinkers and theories to popular beliefs and practices, in order to demonstrate

parisienne, 1585-1594 (Bruxelles: Nauwelaerts, 1980); Denis Richet, “Aspects socio-culturels des conflits religieux
à Paris dans la second moitié du XVIe siècle,” Annales: économies, sociétés, civilisations 32 (1977): 764-789.
35

For a defense of the conventional interpretation of religious toleration’s emergence in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, see Perez Zagorin, How the Idea of Religious Toleration Came to the West (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2003).
36

See, for example, Heiko A. Oberman, “The Travail of Tolerance: Containing Chaos in Early Modern
Europe,” in Ole Peter Grell and Bob Scribner, eds., Tolerance and Intolerance in the European Reformation
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 13-31; Bob Scribner, “Preconditions of Tolerance and Intolerance
in Sixteenth-Century Germany,” in Grell and Scribner, eds., Tolerance and Intolerance in the European Reformation,
32-47.
37

Eamon Duffy, Fires of Faith: Catholic England under Mary Tudor (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2010); Andrew Cunningham and Ole Peter Grell, The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Religion, War, Famine and
Death in Reformation Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Barbara B. Diefendorf, Beneath the
Cross: Catholics and Huguenots in Sixteenth-Century Paris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); Denis Crouzet,
Les guerriers de Dieu : La violence au temps des troubles de religion (vers 1525–vers 1610), 2 vols. (Seyssel: Champ
Vallon, 1990).

17
how early modern people in specific contexts devised boundaries that permitted them to live
peaceably with neighbors whose opposing beliefs they deemed abhorrent. Recent work by
Benjamin Kaplan and Keith Luria, in particular, stresses daily interfaith cooperation and religious
coexistence in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, exploring what “tolerance”
ostensibly meant in numerous local contexts. Kaplan, in his wide-ranging survey, argues that for
people who lived in religiously mixed communities, tolerance was “a form of behavior: peaceful
coexistence with others who adhered to a different religion.”38 Similarly, Luria’s study of crossconfessional interaction in France after the 1598 Edict of Nantes optimistically points to
“numerous examples of peaceful coexistence between people of the two confessions,” even as he
admits that there was “at least occasional violence between the two sides.”39 While studies like
these are to be commended for their nuanced approach to analyzing interfaith relations, they too
often deemphasize the overt and constant nature of sectarian violence in the sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries. This dissertation examines the dynamics of religious violence and sectarian
conflict directly, questioning Kaplan’s and Luria’s narratives of coexistence and tolerance and
offering a more complete picture of the most turbulent and divisive period of the disastrous Wars
of Religion. The sustained production of violence and coercion by Catholic religious elites during
the League era of the religious wars reinforced the sharp sectarian tensions within French society
and made the Edict of Nantes all the more difficult to implement, particularly in the most
confessionally mixed regions of the kingdom.40
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Second, examining Catholic clerics’ extensive participation in the bloodshed and upheaval
of the League era augments our understanding of the precise relationship between clergy and
violence in the early modern era. The historical study of violence has developed from its initial
focus on collective social violence towards analysis of the cultural dimensions of violence, owing
largely to cultural and linguistic “turns” in the humanities and social sciences as well as the rising
influence of anthropological methodologies.41

This shift away from modernist approaches

paralleled the “return of religion” as an important topic of scholarly inquiry. Following the seminal
work of Natalie Zemon Davis, whose 1973 study of “the rites of violence” became central to the
formation of a new cultural approach to history, an entire generation of historians has explored the
social and cultural meaning of violence to discover how patterns of violence grew out of communal
beliefs and values.42 Yet until quite recently, this scholarship rarely devoted substantial attention
to clergy, owing at least in part to the lasting effects of the historiographical shift to “history from
below” in the 1960s, the practitioners of which sought to restore agency to the subordinate social
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classes in early modern and modern history.43
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One could also attribute this omission to an

impression on the part of at least some scholars that, because canon law and ecclesiastical tradition
forbid Christian clergy from engaging in violence, clerics rarely if ever did so.44
The dramatic resurgence of religious extremism and terrorism at the turn of the millennium
reinvigorated academic interest in the connections between religion and violence, prompting a
growing number of scholars to investigate the precise role of religious leaders in the actualization
of violence against individuals and groups holding divergent beliefs as well as their motivations
for doing so. Recent anthropological, sociological, and historical studies of religious violence in
the Middle East and Asia, in particular, provide useful models for examining how French clergy
produced religious violence during the Wars of Religion.45 Mark Juergensmeyer, a sociologist
who comparatively studies sectarian violence and religious terrorism, envisions religious
“warriors” as possessing a distinct status and strengthened by “symbolic empowerment,” a sense
of power that activists obtain merely by “waging the struggle.”46 Similarly, historian R. Scott
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Appleby identifies various types of “religious actors,” arguing that only some actors may be
considered extremists, or individuals that employ violence “as a privileged means of purifying the
community and waging war against threatening outsiders.”47 The martial actions of Catholic
clerics during the religious wars in France demonstrate that clergy were key actors in the intense
military violence and sectarian conflict that devastated the French kingdom, as they contested
sacred space, intimidated religio-political opponents, and carried out acts of violence against
persons they considered heretics.

Militant Catholic clerics appear to have regarded their

participation in sectarian violence as both a religious and civic duty, vital for the defense of the
Catholic Church and local Catholic communities against determined and diabolical enemies.
Third, historians of early modern France continue to debate the precise nature, goals, and
legacies of the extremist Catholic League movement. The most important scholarship on the
League in the 1970s and early 1980s downplayed its religious characteristics in favor of social or
socio-political interpretations, reflecting the influence of the Annales School and social history
more generally.48 Denis Richet’s 1977 article in Annales attempted to fundamentally reorient the
historiography of the League, arguing that the religious program of the Leaguers was as important
and likely more influential than their failed political rebellion.49 Elie Barnavi disagreed, seeing
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the League chiefly as a Paris-based political force, the key goal of which was seizing power from
the crown to create a totalitarian regime based on ideology and terror.50 For Robert Descimon, the
excesses of the League evoked the medieval past, as Parisian elites tried to restore the “golden
age” of the medieval commune.51 A work co-authored by Barnavi and Descimon, which examined
the 1591 assassination of the premier président of the Parlement de Paris, Barnabé Brisson, also
argued against placing too much emphasis on the League’s religious aspects, which cloaked the
more veiled conflicts of social and political forces.52 Both Descimon and Barnavi largely excluded
Catholic clerics from their analysis of League leaders, though they conceded the significance of
Catholicism to the movement as a whole.53
In response to these social and political interpretations, many historians have foregrounded
religion in their cultural analyses of the League by stressing both the centrality of religious belief
to ligueur activism and the profound spiritual legacies of this activism in ensuing decades. Philip
Benedict’s study of Rouen during the religious wars shows the connections between the religious
and socio-political content of the League. He depicts the ligueurs of Rouen as “penitents as well
as militants,” and their processional and devotional activities as valid expressions of the League’s
purpose and not subsidiary to its political aim.54 In his massive study of the era of the Wars of
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Religion, Denis Crouzet argues that pervasive belief in the immediacy of the Last Judgment
necessitated the violent purging and purifying of God’s enemies. This “eschatological anguish”
reached its apex in the League, which Crouzet sees as a “prophetic and mystical union with God.”55
He also contends that the clerical League and the Seize are indissociable, the latter having “the
very same sacral power that the preachers possess.”56 Ann Ramsey’s study of Parisian ligueurs
and their liturgical culture owes much to Crouzet’s work, though she finds that the League “was
not a unitary or static phenomenon.”57 Barbara Diefendorf has taken a slightly different approach
by assessing the ways in which the experience of the League in Paris led many women to lifelong
practices of penitential and ascetic piety.58 While these important studies have touched on militant
Catholic clerics’ involvement in Leaguer activism and violence, however, they do not devote
sustained investigation to Catholic clergy as key political and military actors or as crucial
orchestrators of and participants in the fierce sectarian conflict that rocked France in this volatile
period.
More recent scholarship continues to assess the religious militancy at the heart of the
League, with increasing focus on the ecclesiastical and aristocratic elites that galvanized popular
support for the uprising and orchestrated sectarian violence against their Huguenot and politique
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opponents. Robert Descimon and José Javier Ruiz Ibáñez have examined the fates of Leaguer
nobles who chose exile in Spain and the Netherlands over submission to Henri IV, whose
conversion to Catholicism in 1593 they could not comprehend as anything other than an elaborate
feint.59 Scholars like Megan Armstrong, Benoist Pierre, and Thierry Amalou have probed the
League’s appeal to regular and secular clerics in Paris as well as the prophetic activism of the
Parisian preachers.60 Nicolas Le Roux has analyzed the shocking assassination of Henri III by a
Dominican friar, Jacques Clément, in August 1589, considering the motives for this regicidal act
and its far-reaching consequences.61 Taking a rather different approach, a new collective volume
edited by Sylvie Daubresse and Bertrand Haan examines the Catholic nobles, clergy, and
municipal elites that refused to align themselves with either the radical ligueurs or the moderate
Catholics openly supportive of Henri III and Henri IV.62
My dissertation both complements and extends much of this recent research, approaching
late sixteenth-century Catholic clerics’ practices of militancy and violence through three
interconnected analytical and methodological concepts: religious activism, performative violence,
and holy war. These related concepts guide my analysis of clerical militancy during the League
and explain important dimensions of the religious and political culture of ligueur clergy in this
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period. Although this study is not organized explicitly around these three concepts, each chapter
draws on one or more of them to interpret the violent practices of Catholic clergy and the dynamics
of sectarian conflict during a critical transitional period in early modern French history.
The religious activism of Catholic clerics during the League was a multivalent
phenomenon that included both violent and nonviolent forms of action motivated by religion,
whether construed ideologically as an amalgam of ideas and doctrines or socio-culturally as a
practicing community of believers.63 As religious activists, clergy confronted their sectarian
opponents and sought to counter their influence in the body politic. Their extremist interpretation
of French Catholicism, which held that Protestants as well as Catholic moderates unwilling to
exterminate the Huguenots were dangerous threats to Catholic communities, motivated clerics’
vigorous engagement in the contentious religious politics and bitter sectarian warfare of the late
sixteenth century.64 The activism of militant clergy set them apart from other adherents of their
religion, who likely held many of the same beliefs as ligueur clerics but did not take such
determined action in pursuit of their religious and political aims.
Militant clergy enacted performative violence against their ostensible enemies, symbolic
rituals of confrontation that communicated their aggression, expressed their identities as militants,
and provoked or reinforced the actions of coreligionaries. Anthropological and sociological
theories of performative or performance violence underscore the communicative and potentially
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transformational aspects of such acts, in the sense that violence “is both produced and
consumed.”65 Ligueur clerics engaged in performative violence before audiences of their fellow
clergy as well as lay Catholics, signaling their commitment to bellicose action and their opposition
to sectarian opponents. Whether brandishing weapons from church pulpits, occupying city streets
while armed, or directing troops on the battlefield, clergy’s performative acts both exhibited and
gave meaning to their participation in sectarian violence.
In combating their sectarian opponents, Catholic clergy participated in what they
considered to be holy war, a divinely sanctioned struggle against the diabolical enemies of God.
While Mark Juergensmeyer employs the analytic concept of “cosmic war” to consider the
symbolic framing of earthly religious conflict, his model contains a distinctly eschatological or
apocalyptic component, in that militants typically wage cosmic war because they believe it will
hasten the ultimate victory of Good over Evil and the end of the present age.66 Holy war more
aptly describes the martial activities of late sixteenth-century Catholic clerics, whose concerns,
though informed by religious belief, were overwhelmingly local, regional, and national. Militant
clergy engaged directly and indirectly in warfare and military operations against Huguenot and
politique forces, not only on fields of battle but in cities, properties, and fortified structures under
their control. Clerical holy warriors also undertook to kill Henri III and Henri IV, contemptable
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and heretical rulers unfit to bear the exalted title of “Most Christian King.”67
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Combating the

enemies of God and of his faithful followers was a sacred duty; compromise with such enemies
was inconceivable.

ORGANIZATION

The two parts of this dissertation seek to fashion a detailed history of clerical militancy at
the height of the French Wars of Religion in order to reveal the leadership of militant activism, the
dynamics of religious violence, and the limits of confessional coexistence in early modern France.
Part I examines clerics’ active engagement in religious politics and their forceful projection
of political agency. Chapter 1 considers how Catholic clergy employed preaching to influence
public opinion, denounce sectarian opponents, and encourage militant collective action throughout
the League. Militant Catholic preachers in cities and towns across the French kingdom utilized
preaching as an operative mode of confrontational action to legitimate the League’s armed
rebellion against Henri III and Henri IV as well as attack a vast range of religio-political opponents.
I argue that Catholic clerics in the 1580s and 1590s politicized their preaching to an extent
previously unseen in France, molding the complex religious politics of these chaotic decades and
motivating sectarian violence against Protestant “heretics” and Catholic politiques alike. Despite
customary norms regulating appropriate subject matter for post-Tridentine Catholic sermons,
clergy throughout France used the sacred space of the pulpit to disparage the king, nurture popular
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fear of politique and Huguenot subversion, and sacralize violence toward local authorities they
perceived as hostile to the League’s cause or insufficiently zealous in their defense of French
Catholicism. To heighten the expressive power of their preaching at particular moments of acute
political crisis, as in the southern ligueur city of Toulouse in both 1589 and 1595, clergy sometimes
concluded sermons with dramatic displays of weapons, signaling their personal participation in
religious violence and imbuing their hearers’ subsequent violence with a sacred character or
quality. Preaching of this nature created serious problems for municipal leaders and noble officers,
even those allied with the League, who were responsible for maintaining civic order in the cities
and towns under their jurisdiction. Thus, militant preaching intensified sectarian antagonism in
both League-controlled and royalist towns, shaping the contours of the severe confessional conflict
and civil disorder that afflicted France at the height of the Wars of Religion.
In Chapter 2, I examine the energetic participation of Catholic clergy in conspiracies
intended to undermine civic authorities and subvert their control of urban areas. Militant clerics
in cities and towns dominated by municipal leaders and royal officials loyal to the beleaguered
Henri III took it upon themselves to bring about a seizure of power on behalf of the League. In
the wake of the assassinations at Blois of Henri duc de Guise and Louis cardinal de Guise by royal
bodyguards, Catholic clergy in municipalities across France played key roles in the formulation
and execution of plots designed to subvert royal authority and push their cities into the hands of
the League. Once these plots were set in motion, clerics urged their co-conspirators on through
performative acts of militancy, as the case of the city of Laon demonstrates. In Mâcon, cathedral
clergy armed themselves and barricaded the streets around their cloister, refusing to disarm until
the town’s political and military leaders agreed to align themselves more closely with Charles de
Lorraine duc de Mayenne, titular head of the Catholic League from December 1588 onward, and
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authorize the introduction of a large contingent of ligueur troops into Mâcon. The armed
demonstration of Mâcon’s clerics created an urgent crisis that forced civic authorities and regional
nobles into drawn-out negotiations that resulted in the coerced withdrawal of a royalist noble from
the city and a formal revision of the Oath of Union that all citizens had sworn several weeks before.
Yet while clergy were by and large instinctive supporters of the radical League movement, which
sought to eradicate Protestant “heresy” and prevent the French crown from passing to the Calvinist
prince Henri de Navarre, a handful of clerics in League-controlled cities appear to have
subsequently voiced hostility to the League and taken an active part in efforts to undercut its
authority. While the precise motivations of clerics who opposed the League’s dominance are
difficult to determine, their subversive activism fixed the attention of local authorities and thereby
complicated leaders’ efforts to maintain control of their respective cities. Taken together, the
subversive activism of urban Catholic clergy in support of the League and that of some Catholic
clerics opposed to League control of their communities illuminate the diverse possibilities for
clandestine activism open to politically-minded clerics in this volatile period.
Chapter 3 explores the religious opposition of Catholic clergy toward French Protestants
in particular. Despite the crippling effect of the gruesome Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre of
1572, in which 5,000-6,000 Huguenots were killed and thousands more fled the kingdom or
abjured, Protestantism retained adherents in practically all regions of France.68 This was especially
the case in the “Huguenot crescent,” which stretched from Poitou south through Guyenne,
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eastward through Languedoc, and back up into Dauphiné.69
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Yet Huguenot churches persisted even

in thoroughly Catholic provinces like Brittany and Burgundy, under the protection of powerful
nobles who had converted to the new faith. At the premature death in June 1584 of François duc
d’Anjou, the childless Henri III’s younger brother and heir, Catholic clergy were horrified to learn
that the heir presumptive was the king’s Protestant cousin, Henri de Navarre, who was also the
chief Huguenot military leader. Clerics at all levels of the ecclesiastical hierarchy led renewed
efforts to suppress the Protestant faith and coerce its adherents to converting. Catholic prelates
increasingly pressured Henri III to exclude Navarre from the succession and to nullify prior edicts
that granted the Huguenots freedom of conscience and limited rights of worship. In predominantly
Catholic cities and towns, cathedral and collegiate clergy deployed a range of exclusionary and
coercive practices, intensifying religious hostility toward Huguenots as well as their social and
cultural exclusion. In Languedoc, members of new Counter-Reformation religious orders defied
official directives to conduct public prayers for Henri IV, whose ceremonious abjuration of
Protestantism in July 1593 only widened divisions within the wider League movement.70 These
confrontational practices represented the Huguenots’ spiritual exclusion from the true community
of Catholic faithful, and reinforced the sense of Protestant separateness in late sixteenth-century
French society.
Part II focuses on the production of sectarian violence and the enactment of religious
warfare. Chapter 4 probes the multifaceted ways in which Catholic clergy involved themselves
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both directly and indirectly in warfare and military operations at the height of the Wars of Religion.
Clergy at all levels of the ecclesiastical hierarchy became important military actors during the
intense sectarian warfare of the 1580s and 1590s. Some clerics performed battlefield roles as
military chaplains, working to publicly sacralize specific military operations and entreat divine
intervention on behalf of ligueur forces ostensibly engaged in “holy war” against the enemies of
God. Clerics at both the local and provincial level also endeavored to fund troop mobilization
costs, as well as to procure the wages and rations needed to keep ligueur armies in the field. Many
clergy participated more directly in sectarian warfare by fortifying defensible structures, providing
weapons and logistics services, and even personally commanding troops and managing military
operations. Clerics’ wide-ranging involvement in the organization and prosecution of sectarian
warfare in the League period demonstrates that Catholic clergy had rather unexpected relationships
to organized violence, thereby altering our understanding of the military dynamics of the French
Wars of Religion.
Chapter 5 analyzes the active involvement of Catholic clerics’ in civic defense initiatives
in many League-controlled cities and towns, exploring the unprecedented ways in which regular
and secular clergy took up arms and participated in organized efforts to defend their communities
against external and internal threats during this turbulent period. As historians such as Michael
Wolfe and Pierre-Jean Souriac have shown, the outbreak of the Wars of Religion in 1562 prompted
a burst of urban fortification construction that transformed existing medieval curtain walls and
towers into more sophisticated bastioned traces developed during the Italian Wars of 1494-1559,
which in turn required more men and more armaments to protect the new defensive works.71 By
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the later 1580s, many fortified towns had become centers of militant Catholicism and raised the
League standard in outright revolt against the crown. Clergy in key ligueur cities like Toulouse,
Narbonne, Aix-en-Provence, Lyon, Mâcon, Beaune, and Dijon performed new and vital roles in
civic defense operations during the pervasive conflicts of the 1580s and 1590s, bearing weapons
of all kinds and conducting round-the-clock militia and patrol activities usually seen as
incongruous with the clerical profession. Clerical participation in defensive arms-bearing was not
limited to the ramparts and gates of municipal fortifications but extended to fortified châteaux in
which clergy were sometimes based or which stood on church lands. The fortification and defense
of ecclesiastical châteaux often formed part of local military leaders’ overall defense strategies,
especially when these structures were situated in the immediate vicinity of a ligueur town, as was
the case for Mâcon in southern Burgundy. Clerics’ extensive participation in the armed defense
of both cities and châteaux during the League era signaled their intimate connection to a culture of
armsbearing that urged resort to arms and displays of weapons capability in preparation for the
enactment of sectarian violence.
Chapter 6 examines clerical involvement in a vast range of assassination plots targeting the
successive French kings Henri III and Henri IV. In the fierce sectarian conflict of this era, the
concept of regicide accrued immense significance for militant Catholic clergy, who saw
themselves as valorous pastoral defenders of the Catholic faithful against the scourges of “tyranny”
and “heresy,” embodied respectively in the figures of Henri III and Henri IV. I first explore the
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extensive support on the part of Catholic clergy for Dominican friar Jacques Clément’s killing of
Henri III in August 1589, as well as the specific reasons that clerics as a distinct social and cultural
group supported such extreme violence against the Valois king. Next, I turn to consider the wideranging participation of clergy in a range of ventures to assassinate Henri III’s Protestant cousin
and successor, Henri IV, who immediately claimed the crown upon his predecessor’s death.
Inspired by the self-sacrificial act of Clément, numerous secular and regular clerics personally took
part in an array of regicidal plots against the Bourbon king, whose initial refusal to abjure the
Protestant faith confirmed to ardent ligueurs that he was unwilling and unable to maintain the
Catholic character of the French crown and thus the French state itself. The dramatic expansion
of clerical immersion in regicidal conspiracies coincided with the emergence of new cultural
associations that closely linked Catholic clerics—the members of religious orders in particular—
with the phenomenon of regicide. Clerics’ participation in and support for regicide shaped the
acute sectarian antagonism and confessional violence of this turbulent period while simultaneously
altering the fundamental character of the French monarchy.

Catholic clergy emerge as critical actors in the prolonged armed conflict and societal
upheaval of one of the most violent and destructive periods in the history of early modern France.
Regular and secular clergy clearly shaped the armed confrontation and sectarian hostilities of this
tumultuous era. Analyzing Catholic clerics’ participation in militant activism, arms-bearing, and
warfare during this period of intense sectarian conflict reveals how an important group within
sixteenth-century French society responded to political instability and religious differences.
Rather than promoting a climate of tolerance or helping create preconditions for coexistence, the
extensive participation of clergy in violence and confrontation encouraged social and political
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chaos, triggered opposition, and perpetuated conflict in France’s most divided localities. A
detailed examination of the complex and multifaceted ways in which Catholic clergy mobilized
and enacted religious militancy provides a unique perspective on attributes of clerical culture and
modes of sectarian conflict, while also exposing the actual limits of religious coexistence in early
modern France.

PART I. CLERICAL MILITANCY AND RELIGIOUS POLITICS

CHAPTER 1
‘SERMONS AGAINST … PEACE, PUBLIC TRANQUILITY, AND AUTHORITY’:
PREACHERS AND PREACHING

In a lettre patente issued from Lyon in November 1595, the French king Henri IV decried
the apparent role of Catholic preachers in using their pulpits to motivate the League’s ongoing
rebellion against his authority. The king particularly denounced the way in which Catholic clerics
throughout France had “given regular sermons against the peace, public tranquility, and authority
both of the late king [Henri III] my predecessor and myself, seducing and misleading the simple
people by their artifices, under the pretext of piety and religion.” The king went on to accuse the
preachers of “provoking [the people] with their blasphemies into revolt and sedition, taking away
from them their obedience, which both God and nature has commanded of them.”1 This language
reflects Henri IV’s understanding of Catholic clerics’ roles in the severe religious and political
conflicts of the 1580s and 1590s. The king and his advisors regarded clergy as actively fomenting
openly rebellious acts by League partisans across France.
This chapter considers how Catholic clergy employed preaching to influence public
opinion, denounce religio-political opponents, and encourage militant collective action during the
turbulent League period. Scholarship on Reformation-era Europe has often equated preaching
1
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with Protestantism, assuming that preaching was rarely, if ever, undertaken by Catholic clergy—
except for a few members of newly-founded religious orders like the Jesuits.2 Recent work on
sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century religious life by historians such as Emily Michelson, John
Frymire, Larissa Taylor, and Megan Armstrong has problematized the notion that preaching was
somehow a distinctively Protestant phenomenon and has demonstrated the broad scope of Catholic
preaching in the period of the Reformations.3 In the case of sixteenth-century France, research by
Larissa Taylor and Barbara Diefendorf shows that Catholic preachers, particularly those in Paris,
were swift to respond to the growth of Protestantism through preaching in the decades preceding
the outbreak of religious war, criticizing royal inaction against “heresy” and cultivating popular
resentment of the crown’s negotiation with leading Protestants after 1562.4 Diefendorf has also
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shown that Catholic preachers in Paris played a key role in motivating popular religious violence
in the years immediately preceding the horrific Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre of 1572.5
Additionally, Megan Armstrong’s work on Franciscans in Paris, especially during the middle and
later decades of the Wars of Religion, indicates that this order’s members pursued radically
political activism after 1588 through militant preaching and the writing of polemical and
devotional treatises.6
As this chapter seeks to demonstrate, however, militant Catholic preachers in cities and
towns across the French kingdom utilized preaching as an effective mode of political action to
legitimate the League’s armed rebellion against Henri III and Henri IV as well as attack a vast
range of religio-political opponents. Utilizing archival records such as municipal registers,
cathedral chapter deliberations, and manuscript correspondence in addition to contemporary
memoirs and published documents, I argue that Catholic clerics in the 1580s and 1590s politicized
their preaching to an extent previously unseen in France, molding the complex religious politics
of these tumultuous decades and motivating sectarian violence against Protestant “heretics” and
Catholic politiques alike. Despite customary norms regulating appropriate subject matter for postTridentine Catholic sermons, clergy throughout France employed the sacred space of their pulpits
to disparage the king, nurture popular fear of politique and Huguenot subversion, and sacralize
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violence toward local authorities they perceived as hostile to the League’s cause or insufficiently
zealous in their defense of French Catholicism. To heighten the expressive power of their
preaching at specific moments of political crisis, as in the southern ligueur city of Toulouse in
1589 and 1595, clergy concluded sermons with a dramatic display of weapons, signaling their
personal participation in religious violence and imbuing their hearers’ collective mobilization with
a sacred character or quality. Preaching of this nature created acute problems for municipal leaders
and noble officers, even those allied with the League, responsible for maintaining a semblance of
civic order in the cities and towns under their jurisdiction.

Militant preaching, therefore,

intensified sectarian antagonism in both League-controlled and royalist cities, shaping the contours
of the severe confessional conflict and civil disorder that afflicted France at the height of the
protracted Wars of Religion.

PERCEPTIONS OF PREACHERS AND PREACHING

Catholic clergy took to their pulpits during the tumultuous League period with fairly
distinct notions of what preaching should entail and what topics were permissible according to
Catholic doctrine and tradition. Admitting the apparent failure of many Catholic clergy—prelates
in particular—to regularly instruct their parishioners in Christian doctrine and practice, the midsixteenth-century Council of Trent declared that preaching the gospel was the “chief duty” of all
Catholic bishops, who were hereafter to preach on Sundays and feast days at the bare minimum,
or to appoint a competent preacher in their stead if obligations related to their episcopal duties
temporarily prevented them from preaching. Trent also made clear that a bishop was expected to
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ensure that all of the clergy residing within his diocese, whether regular or secular, preached
correct doctrine, preached when required to, and did not preach without a license.7 The leaders of
new religious orders such as the Jesuits and Capuchins also formulated strict rules for their
preachers, who gave sermons in cities and towns as well on rural missions to minimally
Christianized peasants.8 Yet many Catholic clerics in France seem to have had their own ideas
about what preaching was supposed to accomplish in general and what topics their sermons should
concern, expressing these opinions in letters and official requests for preaching engagements.
Similarly, contemporaries such as municipal authorities expressed personal notions of what
preaching could effect among local congregations, and frequently requested that clerics say certain
things from the pulpit that they might not normally otherwise articulate in an expository sermon.
This evidence confirms the existence of widespread cultural norms and perceptions regarding the
evangelical nature of preaching as well as the capability of preachers to both inspire and persuade
their hearers.
Most Catholic preachers in this period conceived of the act of preaching as communicating
and explaining the “word of God” to the ordinary Catholic faithful. The “word of God,” or verbum
Dei, was a customary term for the Christian Bible, though debates continued to rage among
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reformers and theologians of all confessions as to what God’s word actually said.9 French Catholic
clerics’ conceptions of preaching as communicating the word of God are evident in the written
requests they sent to civic leaders seeking employment as official preachers on special occasions.
For instance, the prior of the Jacobin convent in Beaune, Abel Verdins, wrote to the échevins of
nearby Dijon in early 1593 requesting the opportunity to preach in the city during the upcoming
season of Lent, an especially important period for intensive preaching in sixteenth-century
Catholic culture.10 Verdins communicated to Dijon’s authorities his desire “to proclaim the word
of God … to your people, with as much zeal as this charge requires.”11 Another of Dijon’s clerics,
a Cordelier named Jacques Cognatus, testified in a handwritten receipt of April 1587 to having
received four écus from the city of Dijon’s receveur, or tax officer, “for having declared the word
of God in the convent of Saint Francis [during] the most recent Lent.”12 Statements such as these
can be usefully compared with a formal request for remuneration sent to Dijon’s city council by a
Carmelite theologian, Edmond Matherot, who attested in 1581 to having “proclaimed and
preached the word of God in a most Catholic manner to the people of this city of Dijon in the
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church and parish of Saint-Michel.”13
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While one might cynically view such turns of phrase as

formulaic attempts to sway prospective employers or retain their good graces, these expressions
suggest that regular clergy in particular—who seem to have been preferred to secular clerics—
regarded the teaching of Scripture as central to their missions as preachers.
Preaching the word of God to the Catholic faithful ideally involved not just biblical
exegesis and doctrinal exposition but also an emphasis on examining one’s conscience and striving
for moral improvement. As historian Megan Armstrong demonstrates, the successive postTridentine administrations of popes Pius V (1565-72), Gregory XIII (1572-1585) and Sixtus V
(1585-90) promoted the mendicant model of preaching, due to its emphasis on moral reform.14
Papal preferences with regard to preaching exerted a formidable influence in France, where new
religious orders like the Capuchins and Jesuits operated alongside—often in competition with—
existing mendicant orders such as the Dominicans and Franciscans in conducting Catholic pastoral
missions.15 The Jesuits’ recognition of preaching’s moralistic aim was underscored by Claudio
Acquaviva, superior general of the Society of Jesus from 1581 to 1615, whose rules for preaching
on rural missions were sanctioned in 1593 by the order’s highest governing body. Aquaviva
instructed Jesuit preachers to question the local curate in each town or village they visited about
“the most common sins among the people,” so that “they can direct their sermons and work with
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more light and usefulness.”16
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In urging their hearers to repentance and pious conduct, regular and

secular preachers were to stress the grave dangers of sin and heresy as well as the importance of
confessing one’s sins to a priest at least once per year.17
Since preaching was regarded as the communication of God’s holy word and its moral
requirements, clerical elites worked to ensure its continual performance in the churches of Catholic
cities and towns throughout this period. Their efforts were especially crucial in municipalities
with minimal numbers of licensed preachers. Secular clergy in smaller League cities such as
Mâcon and Beaune, for example, often engaged the services of both itinerant and local Capuchin,
Jesuit, Minim, and Cordelier preachers, and provided them with food and lodging. The officials
of Saint-Vincent cathedral in Mâcon employed a Capuchin preacher in the Lenten season of 1592,
supporting him in conjunction with funds provided by the city’s militant yet persistently absent
Franco-Italian bishop, Luca Alemanni.18 Similarly, in October 1590 the leaders of Beaune’s
Notre-Dame collegiate church engaged a Jesuit from nearby Dijon to preach during the upcoming
Advent and Lent seasons, directing their treasurer to set aside “two small bottles of wine, three
bichets of grain, and twenty écus for this Jesuit’s subsistence costs.”19 By late 1593 chapter
officials had appointed a resident canon-theologian, or théologal, named Pierre Cheyrac, who was
16
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to expected to preach on Sundays and feast days as well as give public lectures in theology three
times per week.20 Cheyrac’s repeated failure to reliably carry out his preaching duties prompted
Notre-Dame’s leaders to hire Denis Brecin, a Dominican, to preach during both the Advent and
Lenten seasons, at the latter of which a rather slighted Cheryac attacked the friar with “slanderous
words.”21 Although chapter officials must have pondered the likelihood of a confrontation
between the théologal and Brecin, their understanding of preaching’s centrality to religious life in
Beaune impelled them to ensure the uninterrupted proclamation of the word of God from the pulpit
of Notre-Dame during the church’s two most significant devotional seasons.
As the case of Beaune’s problematic théologal suggests, ecclesiastical officials sometimes
took it upon themselves to enforce clerical respect for preaching during religious services. The
chapter officials of Lyon’s numerous churches, for example, confronted disruptive and irreverent
behavior during religious services on the part of younger canons, most of whom had were
presumably not licensed to preach. In January 1594, the officers of Saint-Paul’s collegiate church
in Lyon prohibited all resident clerics from walking around “during divine service and the
preaching of God’s word,” an assertion implying that chapter leaders regarded both the Mass and
preaching as equally fundamental elements of post-Tridentine Catholic worship.22 At the same
time, Saint-Paul’s officers forbade all of their canons “to either say or celebrate Mass in this church
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during the sermon,” a practice that artful clerics seem to have undertaken in the church’s many
side chapels as a way of bolstering their personal income.23 Acquisitive behavior by some canons
in Lyon is corroborated by the records of the city’s cathedral of Saint-Jean, whose chapter regularly
deliberated on problems relating to preaching and services. The chapter met in January 1589 to
discuss a report that three or four of its priests had repeatedly celebrated masses “in the chapels on
Sundays and solemn feast days during the parochial High Mass and … during the sermon,” actions
the chapter’s leadership deemed both “contrary to the holy decrees and statutes of this church” and
“exceedingly scandalous.”24 In proscribing such activities, the leaders of both Saint-Jean cathedral
and Saint-Paul collegiate church underscored the importance of regard for preaching on the part
of all clerics, however poorly or uninterestingly some junior ecclesiastics may have thought it was
being performed.
The necessity of holding the attention of laypersons as well as of fellow clergy during
sermons prompted clerical and social elites to think carefully about the desired qualities of a
preacher. According to a memorandum drafted in 1570 by Louis de Gonzague duc de Nevers, a
prominent Catholic nobleman, clerics aiming to become preachers must possess several specific
qualities: “great knowledge, a good memory, perfect discernment, refined and subtle eloquence,
boldness, and, finally, grace and [a] pleasant manner.”25 Such qualities were necessary, Nevers
asserted before launching into a lengthy examination of each characteristic, “for anyone wishing
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The ideal qualities

of a preacher were not only contemplated in personal writings but actively discussed among
clerical and civic leaders with oversight of preaching at the local level. Chapter officials of SaintJust cathedral in Narbonne, for instance, complained during a meeting in November 1592 that all
of the preachers then giving sermons in the city were not “of the quality required,” implying that
they were inarticulate, unlearned, or insufficiently pious.27 Widespread concern for personal piety
in particular may be seen in the deliberations of municipal leaders in Carcassonne, who discussed
at meeting in mid-1593 their need “to find someone sufficient to preach the word of God in this
city during next Advent and Lent.” On this occasion, their two favored candidates seem to have
been a Capuchin and a Franciscan, both of whom had formerly preached in the city and were
considered to be “persons learned and of good character.”28 To effectively deliver God’s word
from the pulpit, then, one had to possess a range of oratorical and intellectual competencies as well
as constitute a model of Christian piety in the eyes of all those around him.
Municipal authorities and royal officials in Catholic towns clearly recognized the civic
importance of ensuring that competent and well-liked preachers filled their churches’ pulpits.
Shortly after the parlement de Paris’s expulsion of the Society of Jesus from their jurisdiction in
1595, rumors began to circulate that Henri IV was planning to expel the Jesuits from the rest of
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the kingdom.29
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While such rumors appear to have been false, the king took a hard line in mid-

1598 against allegations of seditious preaching by Jesuits in the royalist stronghold of Bordeaux,
sending a strongly worded dispatch to the judges of the city’s parlement. Guillaume Daffis,
premier président of the parlement de Bordeaux, replied to the king in a letter emphasizing the
city’s need for preachers and the great esteem in which the town’s inhabitants held the Jesuits.
Since “at Lent the main pulpits of this city were filled by preachers of their Society and great
crowds of people heard them,” Daffis explained, “the vicars-general [of the city’s churches] protest
that they cannot stop them or remove them for fear of subsequent outrage and … that there are no
[other] preachers in this city to take their place.”30 While underscoring the Jesuits’ utility in filling
church pulpits, Daffis also assured the king of the order’s loyalty, contending rather exaggeratedly
that “those most devoted to the well-being of your state could not, Sire, render greater testimony
to their fidelity and devotion to Your Majesty’s service.”31 After this seemingly requisite nod to
the order’s faithfulness to Henri IV, Daffis returned to the issue of the Jesuits’ preaching prowess,
asserting that “they have since continued to preach regularly and no one of quality has refrained
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from hearing them.”32
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By underscoring the Jesuits’ capacity to draw substantial numbers of people

to their sermons, Daffis also argued for their effectiveness in promoting Catholic renewal and
attracting new converts in one of the most confessionally mixed regions of the French kingdom.
Yet local authorities also discerned preachers’ capacity to influence their hearers’ political
convictions, a key consideration during the intense civil conflict and political instability of the
League period. Prominent regional nobles exploited this shared perception of preachers, especially
when recommending candidates for particular bishoprics. When Henri I duc de Montmorency
wrote to King Henri IV in 1592 attempting to persuade the monarch to grant the southeastern
bishopric of Lodève to one of his clients, a Franciscan cleric and doctor of theology named Simon
Pibris, the duc stressed the cleric’s ability to fill churches and enthrall his hearers with eloquent
preaching, as well as his reputation for maintaining his hearers in their allegiance to the king.
Montmorency emphasized “the fact that the people have been drawn to his sermons in the grand
and extended services that he has conducted for the late king and for Your Majesty during the
troubles … having retained many cities and their inhabitants in their duty under obedience and
recognition of [you].”33 On account of Pibris’s preaching exploits in the royalist stronghold of
Montpellier—where he was also gardien of the Cordelier friary—and his perceived ability to
convince parishioners of their duty to obey the king, Montmorency urged Henri IV to formally
divest the current holder of the diocese, Christophe de Lestang, and install Pibris in his place.34
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Lestang, he charged, “is a ligueur and has negotiated with Spain and [committed] many other
capital crimes,” on account of which the duc had banished Lestang from Lodève some years
before, though he continued to retain the title of bishop.35 As “a meritorious and honorable
recompense” for Pibris’s learned preaching and loyalty to the crown, Montmorency pressed the
king to formally install the Franciscan as bishop and thus provide “great consolation to all the
residents of Lodève.”36 Evidently, Montmorency believed that attesting to the Franciscan’s
communicative abilities and faithful royal service would bolster his case and secure Pibris’s
nomination as bishop of Lodève.
Municipal leaders in contested cities sometimes urged preachers to apprise townspeople of
critical developments and impress upon them the necessity of civic order and deference. An
episode that transpired in Toulouse in September 1590, shortly after civic elites had deposed their
radical Leaguer governor and made provisional peace with the province’s lieutenant general,
Guillaume II vicomte de Joyeuse, illustrates local leaders’ perceptions of preachers’ capacity to
effect civic obedience. Following their ousting of Saint-Gelais, who was also bishop of the nearby
see of Comminges, authorities in Toulouse thwarted a plot by a lawyer named Tournier and some
collaborators to seize the châtelet in which Saint-Gelais was imprisoned and capture all judges of
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the parlement de Toulouse that they deemed politiques.37
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Several days after suppressing

Tournier’s plot, Toulouse’s city councilors—commonly known as capitouls—organized a special
day of religious services to thank God for “his divine bounty, given to us in the discovery of the
plot … against the government of this city and its bons catholiques by the lawyer Tournier and his
accomplices.38 Part of the capitouls’ strategy for publicizing the failure of the plot centered on the
city’s preachers, who “shall be summoned here, where they will be apprised of the conspiracy …
[and] admonished to inform the people of [it] and … to exhort them to live in peace, union, and
concord.”39

The capitouls evidently thought this course of action might forestall future

conspiracies, since they urged the clerics as well to “emphasize [to their parishioners] the
obedience they owe to the magistrates.” If some parishioners “have imbibed any erroneous
opinions by the ideas and evil intentions of these or other conspirators,” preachers must “assure
them to the contrary, that the judges, capitouls, bourgeois, and other good citizens … desire
nothing more than to let them live in peace, to defend and preserve them with all of their power,
and to live and die for the protection of the Catholic religion and Holy Union.40 In directing their
preachers to discuss the Tournier plot and its implications from the pulpit, the leaders of Toulouse
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considered them to be far more than expositors of sacred scripture or theological doctrine.
Preachers might play a direct role in convincing an urban populace of the futility of subversive
undertakings and the prudence of submitting to civic and political authorities.
Robust perceptions of preachers and preaching in the late sixteenth century therefore
shaped Catholic clerics’ approach to this multifaceted communicative act. As the ostensible
mouthpieces of God, preachers considered the act of preaching as delivering God’s holy word to
their hearers, in whom this word should produce a variety of tangible results. Clerical elites and
local authorities viewed preaching as central to civic and religious life, working to ensure that
church pulpits were consistently filled with respected preachers that effectively transmitted God’s
word to the maximum number of congregants. Yet even as they communicated this divine word,
preachers might simultaneously function as political agents that shaped their hearers’ political
convictions or reminded them of civic obligations.

MILITANT PREACHING AND RELIGIOUS POLITICS

The intense sectarian violence and political conflict of the League era provided Catholic
clerics with profuse material on which to pronounce from the pulpit. From the coalescence of
Catholic associations at François duc d’Anjou’s premature death in 1584 until the promulgation
of the Edict of Nantes in 1598, clergy throughout the kingdom politicized their preaching to an

extent previously unseen in France.41
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Leaguer clerics’ political activism in the pulpit stemmed, at

least in part, from their understanding of the sacral nature of the French body politic, which seemed
to be threatened on all sides by Huguenots and the politique Catholics that were unwilling or unable
to decisively subdue these heretics. Militant preachers provided critical support for the Catholic
League, offering religious justifications for armed rebellion against Henri III and Henri IV as well
as for more rigorous efforts to subjugate the Huguenots. Clerics’ bellicose sermons also intensified
popular fears of politiques and Huguenots, which created severe problems even for League
authorities struggling to maintain some semblance of civic order. Such aggressive and politicized
preaching frequently put clergy in conflict with local and regional authorities, and sometimes
resulted in their being banned from preaching for a specific period of time or, in some instances,
being ejected from a particular city. Preaching of this tenor exacerbated confessional conflict and
reinforced the acute sectarian divisions among ligueurs, politiques, and Huguenots.
Politicized preaching in the initial stages of the League period often criticized royal policies
regarding the Huguenots, which Catholic clerics seem to have viewed as at best uneven and at
worst duplicitous. While Henri III had—under pressure from League leaders Henri duc de Guise
and Charles cardinal de Bourbon—issued the Edict of Nemours in July 1585, revoking prior edicts
of pacification and outlawing Protestantism, Huguenots maintained control of fortifications and
towns in central and southern France and soon opened negotiations with Elizabeth I of England
and Johann Casimir of the Palatinate for military aid.42 The king’s reluctance to exclude his
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Protestant cousin and presumptive heir, Henri de Navarre, from the succession further intensified
Catholics’ distress, especially in Paris.43 As news of ongoing talks between Navarre and Henri
III’s close aide, Jean Louis de Nogaret de La Valette duc d’Épernon, spread through the capital in
mid-1587, preachers forcefully denounced the negotiations.

According to the Savoyard

ambassador René de Lucinge, whose letters kept Charles Emmanuel I duc de Savoye abreast of
developments, one Parisian preacher decried the king’s apparent duplicity from the pulpit in no
uncertain terms:
Aha, poor Parisians! You think that you have a Catholic king, but you are utterly deceived,
because he is with the Huguenots; he flatters them; he entreats them; and, instead of using
44
the money he has raised for war, he employs it for their pleasure.

Such incendiary language represented Henri III’s overtures to Navarre as incompatible with
sincere devotion to Catholicism and thus indicative of the king’s secret inclination to heresy. It
also resulted in the unnamed cleric’s arrest, Lucinge asserted, though the outcome of his detention
is unclear. Yet preachers continued to lambast these negotiations. In a subsequent letter, Lucinge
affirmed that “the preachers complain about this connivance alone in their sermons,” prompting a
series of nocturnal arrests by royal officers, some of which were repulsed by armed supporters of
the clerics in question.45
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Persistent reports of inflammatory, politicized preaching in cities across the kingdom from
mid-1587 onwards troubled Henri III and his officials, who were only occasionally in a position
to adequately investigate such reports. Royal agents detained three preachers at Orléans in
November 1587 and transported them to nearby Jargeau, where the king himself questioned them
about accusations that they were preaching against “my state as well as my person and those who
are close to me.”46 Similarly, a dispatch from René de Tournemine sieur de la Hunaudaye, the
lieutenant-général of Brittany, where the League had by late 1587 begun to mobilize popular
support, apprised Henri III of troubling developments in the city of Rennes as well as the wider
province.47 While authorities in Rennes—one of Brittany’s chief cities and the seat of a royal
parlement—remained loyal to the king, planned changes to the command structure of the town’s
militia would make its leadership “much easier to win over [to the League].” Although he claimed
to have the situation in hand, “this innovation is to be feared,” since in the wider province of
Brittany “many changes have occurred, the people there having been greatly stirred up by
sermons.” On account of pro-League preaching, Hunaudaye admitted to the king “that the
inhabitants of your cities have in the course of six months become more disobedient than before.”48
Given the climate of discontent and rebellion created by ligueur preachers in Rennes as well as in
other Breton cities, Hunaudaye feared that the province could very easily fall to the League, an
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eventuality that ensued just over a year later when news of the Blois assassinations catapulted
many provincial cities and towns into outright rebellion.49
Doubtless owing to these and similar accounts, Henri III deemed politicized sermons to
have played a critical role in the rapid escalation of the League’s revolt. A few months after his
desperate attempt to recover his authority by having Henri duc de Guise and Louis cardinal de
Guise assassinated during the Estates-General at Blois in December 1588, Henri III issued a
declaration from Tours that denounced the rebellion and suggested that ordinary people had been
motivated to revolt through the preaching of extremist clerics. Decrying the agents who “have
principally endeavored to render [my] actions abhorrent,” the king singled out “the preachers who,
having been won over and corrupted by the enemies of His Majesty, have misused the chair of
truth, leading the people to sedition and disobedience instead of announcing to them the word of
God.”50 Using contemporary notions of the pulpit as the place where the “truth” of God’s word
was announced and from which it penetrated the hearts and minds of its hearers, the king accused
Catholic clerics of violating their sacred responsibilities.51 Rather than expounding biblical
passages and urging their hearers to repentance and pious living, ligueur clerics preached revolt,
“from which proceeded the rebellions, disobedience, bloodshed, extortions, thefts, and countless
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other evils, the contagion of which is so great among the people of this realm.”52
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While such

language is admittedly exaggerated, it underscores a common perception on the part of Henri III
and his advisers that militant Catholic preachers had radicalized prospective ligueurs from the
pulpit and thereby shored up support for the League’s rebellion against the crown in cities and
towns across France.
While some dispatches described in rather general terms the increasing politicization of
sermons, noble officers also provided Henri III with startling accounts of preaching that explicitly
sacralized violence and rebellion. A report from Louis de Gonzague duc de Nevers in April 1589,
for instance, apprised the king of radical insurrectionist language in a sermon preached by a
Dominican friar during Easter Week services in Nevers that prompted a short-lived takeover of
the city. The chief municipality of the province of Nivernais as well as the duc de Nevers’s base
of operations, Nevers had remained loyal to the crown even as neighboring cities like Bourges
rallied to the League.53 Yet the duc de Nevers feared that militant preachers would now induce
the town’s inhabitants to decisively revolt. According to the duc, this Dominican said “several
times” during a single sermon on the Tuesday after Easter Sunday that it was necessary “to bring
about a holy uprising in order to preserve the honor of God.” Whether the friar spoke in general
terms about French Catholics as a whole or more specifically about the citizens of Nevers, his
explicit sacralization of violent rebellion “greatly moved the common people, who had never
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before taken up the sword,” and prompted a general mobilization in which armed townspeople
took control of the city’s defenses and managed to capture the large courtyard of the ducal palace.
After a tense period of several hours, the duc convinced the insurgents to lay down their arms,
though not without first “soften[ing] my words in order to not give them opportunity to effectuate
the Jacobin’s holy sedition.”54

Nevers’s lengthy description of this event underscores the

preacher’s role in effectively imbuing rebellion with a sacred character or quality, motivating the
people of Nevers to mobilize, however abortively, against the king’s authority.
The suppression of subversive preaching was a key priority for municipal leaders in towns
still loyal to Henri III, as they attempted to uphold their own as well as royal power. Accordingly,
they investigated allegations of seditious sermons and refuted any that seemed erroneous. For
instance, the consuls of Le Puy-en-Velay, the largest municipality in the Velay region of southcentral France, wrote to Henri III in late January 1589 to contest a report that some unnamed
residents of the city had sent the beleaguered monarch, which alleged “that we are tolerating in
this town a seditious preacher who is persuading the people to rebel against and abandon the
obedience due unto him.”55 The individuals who sent the report, the consuls asserted, were “illinformed of the truth … as there is not one resident of this city who can truly say that the preacher
did not preach most Christianly, having in all his sermons—or in most—exhorted the people to
live together in the fear of God, in obedience to your commands, and in deference to him whom it
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has pleased you to give them as governor.”56
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Le Puy’s military governor, Antoine II de La Tour

seigneur de Saint-Vidal, supported the consuls’ assertions in a letter written one week later, in
which he assured the king that the cleric in question “preached in a most Catholic manner and at
all times encouraged the people to keep themselves within the obedience due to Your Majesty.”
While he had not attended the cleric’s sermons in person, Saint-Vidal heard reports “from several
theologians, ecclesiastics, judges, consuls, and elites of this city who were regularly there.”57
Clearly, both the consuls of Le Puy and its governor were at pains to convince Henri III that they
had done nothing so irresponsible as tolerating seditious preaching within the city during a period
of widening civil conflict.
Judicial authorities in towns that had already been taken over by League partisans called
on civic leaders at times to rein in local preachers and keep them from inciting further acts of
sedition. This was particularly the case in Dijon, where the formation of the League in December
1588 and January 1589 had been relatively peaceful but exacerbated existing tensions between the
city council and the parlement de Dijon.58 While Leaguers were firmly in control of Dijon’s city
council, the loyalties of the parlementaires were more polarized. Several royalist judges fled the
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city in early January at the arrival of Charles de Lorraine duc de Mayenne, brother of the murdered
duc de Guise and the League’s titular head, and those that remained were imprisoned in the maison
du roi with other suspected politiques.59 Despite these purges, many ligueurs in Dijon continued
to suspect the parlement of conspiring against the League. In April 1589, the parlement issued a
stern warning to the city council, apparently prompted by antagonistic preaching that was
emanating from Dijon’s many churches. While emphasizing that judges were “more eminent” and
worthy of deference, the parlementaires also urged councilors “to restrain the preachers, so that in
their sermons they do not concern themselves with topics that could excite the people to
sedition.”60 Curiously, the city council’s deliberations from March and April 1589 make no
mention of inflammatory sermons, which could suggest that councilors were content to allow
preaching that aggressively denounced the politiques and crypto-Huguenots that seemed to
threaten Dijon’s security.61 From the viewpoint of the parlementaires, however, preaching that
openly attacked anyone suspected of loyalty to the king or touched too closely on matters of local
politics was dangerously inappropriate and therefore needed to be curtailed.
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Clergy in royalist cities sometimes coordinated to preach militant sermons at the exact
same time in all local churches, in an effort to touch off a popular uprising that would enable
ligueurs to seize the city by force. In the southwestern city of Bordeaux, which was under royalist
control but contained a sizeable faction of League sympathizers, preachers on at least on occasion
coordinated their preaching in an attempt to orchestrate an insurrection.62 Writing from Bordeaux
in January 1592, Jacques II de Goyon maréchal de Matignon, the city’s mayor as well as the
governor of the province of Guyenne, informed Henri IV of recent preaching in the city “that could
bring great prejudice to Your Majesty’s service.”63 Matignon explains how four Catholic clerics
“preached on Christmas Day all at the very same hour and in different locations of this city most
seditiously,” in order to “move the people to sedition and divert them from the obedience they owe
you.” He perceived a substantial degree of collusion in the synchronized actions of these clergy,
who had “taken the subject of their sermon from the writings [that] a théologal from Saintes, who
resides in this city, had given them.” Owing to his strong suspicions, Matignon arrested all four
preachers as well as the théologal, a cleric named Jean Baril, about whom little is still known.
While he himself planned to interrogate the théologal, Matignon expressed to Henri IV his hope
that “today the court of parlement will pronounce their judgment, and that [the four preachers]
will—at the very least—be banished from the city,” a statement suggesting as well that the
parlement de Bordeaux was in a position to police the city’s clergy.64 Much of Matignon’s account

62

For an overview of Bordeaux during this period, see Camille Jullian, Histoire de Bordeaux depuis les
origines jusque’en 1895 (Bordeaux: Feret et Fils, 1985); Robert Boutruche, Bordeaux de 1453 à 1715 (Bordeaux:
Fédération historique du Sud-Ouest, 1966).
63

On the maréchal de Matignon’s superintendence of the province of Guyenne during the League era, see
François Gebelin, Le gouvernement du maréchal de Matignon en Guyenne pendant les premières années du règne de
Henri IV, 1589-1594 (Bordeaux: Mounastre-Picamil, 1912).
64

Jacques II de Goyon maréchal de Matignon to Henri IV, Bordeaux, 4 January 1592, BNF, Dupuy 61, fº
230: “qui pourroit apporter trop de prejudice au service de votre Majesté”; “le jour de Noël dernier qui prescherent
tous à mesmes heure et en divers lieux de ceste ville fort seditieusement”; “pour esmouvoir le peuple à sedition et le

60
is corroborated by another contemporary record, which confirms that the théologal in question was
expelled from Bordeaux several days after Matignon penned his letter to Henri IV.65 The
fascinating details of these accounts underscore both the capacity of militant preachers to
cooperatively incite their parishioners to insurrection and the urgency with which some royalist
authorities could apprehend subversive preachers and eject them from the city.
The strident opposition of preachers in Leaguer cities to Henri IV often prompted
individuals to warn the king that the sentiments expressed in aggressive sermons could easily
motivate persons to carry out an attempt on his life. Writing in January 1595 from Toulouse,
which together with other Leaguer towns in Languedoc and Guyenne still refused to recognize the
Bourbon king despite increasing support for submission, the former Leaguer cleric Jean Gincestre
apprised Henri IV of the vehement hostility of Toulouse’s preachers.66 According to Gincestre,
the city was full of “frenzied” clerics “who preach … for God’s judgment [upon you],” a situation
that evidently so troubled the one-time ligueur that he urged the king “be prudent as to your
person.” This warning reflects Gincestre’s concern that the preachers of Toulouse’s cathedral and
many parish churches were so adamant about the need for divine vengeance on Henri IV that it
would be virtually impossible for one of their devout parishioners not to be prompted to carry out
an attempt on the king’s life. Gincestre intended to take measures to counteract such inflammatory
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preaching, although he conceded that doing so would be difficult, since “I am not permitted to
preach in this city because I am excommunicated.” While the precise circumstances of Gincestre’s
excommunication are unclear, senior clerics in Toulouse likely judged his loyalty to Henri IV as
utterly incompatible with their vision of ligueur Catholicism and thus were not prepared to tolerate
his articulation of an opposing viewpoint from any pulpit within the city. Despite this opposition,
Gincestre still hoped “to preach here, in an effort to do away with the false impressions against
Your Majesty that these despicable individuals have imprinted on the head of the people,” a
statement that perhaps overstates his own capacities as a preacher even as it underscores the critical
role of ligueur preachers in shaping Toulousains’ impassioned opposition to Henri IV.67
The hostility of Toulouse’s preachers toward Henri IV appears to have been mirrored by
Catholic clergy throughout the wider region of Haut Languedoc. According to Gincestre, “there
is not a single preacher in this entire region that preaches for you except three or four that I have
won over through reason,” somewhat exaggerated language that nevertheless emphasizes the
wide-ranging support for the League’s resistance to the Bourbon king emanating from pulpits
across the southern provinces. To illustrate this point, Gincestre informed the king that he had just
been asked by Toulouse’s royalist sénéchal to confer with municipal leaders in the nearby town of
Beaumont-de-Lomagne, which had just “dismissed their preacher, who had done great harm to
everything and everyone.” Gincestre does not detail the circumstances of this preacher’s dismissal,
though it seems likely that the authorities of Beaumont-de-Lomagne had recently recognized Henri
IV as their legitimate king while the cleric responsible for preaching in the town’s massive church
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of Notre-Dame denounced anyone who countenanced submission and threatened them with
excommunication or other religious punishments.68 While confrontational preaching in a small
town halfway between Toulouse and Agen may not have been among the most pressing of
concerns for royal authorities, the situation only underscored Gincestre’s concerns about the
radical politicization of sermons and the extent to which such preaching fortified urban populations
in their enthusiasm for the League. Accordingly, Gincestre would travel to Beaumont-deLomagne with Méry de Vic, the king’s intendant recently sent to southern France to persuade the
ligueur judges of the parlement de Toulouse as well as Henri duc de Joyeuse to submit to Henri
IV, “and will visit your cities in Agenais” to discover firsthand the general tenor of preaching in
these traditionally Catholic strongholds.69
As Méry de Vic would himself soon conclude, militant clergy in the League-held cities of
southern France had by mid-1595 launched a comprehensive preaching offensive, persistently
denouncing Henri IV’s abjuration as an elaborate ruse orchestrated by a depraved excommunicate
to whom Pope Clement VIII would never consider granting absolution. Writing from the royalist
town of Castres in June 1595, Vic informed the king that his clerical enemies in the ligueur cities
of Languedoc and Guyenne—Toulouse, Albi, and Agen in particular—never cease disparaging
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him from their pulpits.70

63
“The regular sermons that they preach,” Vic asserted, “[now] are held on

irregular days and hours, [and] no longer comprise the interpretation of the Gospel but all sorts of
slander and misrepresentations that one could possibly imagine against your person.”

As

disturbing as the prospect of round-the-clock sermons filled with incendiary language and
subversive rhetoric may have been for royal officials, what troubled Vic most was the fact that
such preaching “was being done … in the presence of the chiefs of the rebellion,” thereby
legitimating and even sacralizing the continued revolt of Languedoc’s foremost ligueurs against
Henri IV in the presence of hundreds of ordinary Catholic townspeople.71 Furthermore, Vic
reported that the clergy “also argue in public and private that the pope cannot possibly give [you]
absolution,” a contention proved erroneous when Pope Clement VIII formally pronounced Henri
IV’s absolution three months later.72 Regardless of the eventual discrediting of many of these
clerics’ declarations, their untiring public encouragement of the League’s ongoing rebellion
against the king provided critical support to the revolt while also reinforcing extremist Catholics’
perceptions of royalist Catholics as “defenders of heretics and their mortal enemies.”73
Judicial authorities and other royal officers considered the suppression of militant
preaching an integral component of the reimposition of royal authority in regions that had long
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been controlled by the League. The premier président, or presiding judge, of the parlement de
Toulouse, Pierre du Faur de Saint-Jory, provided Henri IV with a number of recommendations in
February 1596 for the effective reestablishment of his authority in the province of Languedoc,
where numerous Leaguers had still not submitted to the king.74 Among other suggestions, Du Faur
de Saint-Jory urged the king to pressure François cardinal de Joyeuse, who was due at court within
the next few weeks, to suppress seditious preaching within the city of Toulouse. “I have realized,
Sire, that it would be most expedient for the establishment of your allegiance in Toulouse,” Du
Faur de Saint-Jory explained, “to admonish him to only fill the pulpits of his churches with
preachers that are peaceable and lovers of the well-being, honor, and tranquility of France.” Yet
beyond simply filling church pulpits with royalist preachers, Du Faur de Saint-Jory insisted that
clergy “preach nothing contrary to the Pragmatic Sanction and concordats of this realm, or against
your ordinances, as they have done in the past, trying to diminish the authority of your sovereign
court under the pretext of the bull they call In coena domini.”75 Du Faur de Saint-Jory judged
militant clerics’ advocacy of ecclesiastical prerogative in light of the wide-ranging papal bull of
1568 known as In coena domini, which constituted an attempt by the post-Tridentine papacy to
reassert the ancient rights of the Church vis-à-vis secular authorities, as a dangerous affront not
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only to royal power but also to the civil stability of this contested region.76
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While his position as

premier président of the parlement de Toulouse meant that Du Faur de Saint-Jory was concerned
to prevent Toulouse’s clergy from publicly challenging his own authority and honor as well as that
of his fellow judges, his conviction that incendiary sermons within the province’s chief city should
be suppressed reveals much about authorities’ perceptions of the connection between preaching
and active insurrection.
Catholic preachers also created serious problems for authorities in former League-held
provinces by representing France’s Catholic enemies in a favorable light. This was especially the
case regarding Spain, whose king, Philip II, had provided military and financial aid to the League
since December 1584, when he signed a treaty with the Guises at Joinville requiring both parties
to work towards the extirpation of Protestantism in France and the Low Countries as well as other
initiatives.77 Spain intervened militarily on the League’s behalf chiefly in 1589 and the early 1590s
in the frontier provinces of Picardy, Normandy, Brittany, and Languedoc, though Henri IV’s
declaration of war against Spain in early 1595 brought Spanish troops once more into northern
France, where they captured Calais in 1596 and Amiens in the spring of 1597.78 Some Catholic
clerics seem to have celebrated the arrival of Spanish soldiers in their sermons, suggesting that
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occupation by the Spanish was preferable to the reign of a former heretic. For instance, the maître
des requêtes of Henri IV’s privy council, François de Clary, informed the king in May 1597 of
reports that he had obtained regarding the mobilization of thousands of troops in Spain for the
purpose of invading the southern provinces of Languedoc and Guyenne. Clary lamented that a
successful Spanish invasion of these provinces was a distinct probability, as “the frontiers are
inadequately munitioned and in a poor state of defense.” While the substandard condition of
military defenses along the southern border was a strategic problem in Clary’s view, worse still
was his assessment that “the people here decry Spanish domination so little, or better to say, the
preachers … make them out to be so agreeable that we will have much difficulty containing them
in their duty [to you] if the Spaniard gains entry into this region.” Catholic preachers’ acclaim for
the soldiers of Catholic Spain was even more alarming as he had just received “news that there are
4,000 Spanish [troops] two leagues from Saint-Béat,” a small municipality near the border whose
citadel controlled access to the Garonne valley.79 Clary had not yet been able to verify this
intelligence, but the report was nonetheless troubling, especially if the seditious preaching was
achieving its desired effect. Yet, if Catholic preachers in the towns of Languedoc and Guyenne
attempted to persuade their parishioners of the religious and political advantages of a Spanish
military conquest of southern France during Henri IV’s war against Philip II, such activities posed
significant challenges for the king’s agents and local officeholders charged with upholding royal
authority in their jurisdictions and defending these regions from foreign invaders.
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Thus, while it cannot be denied that politics and political thinking in the sixteenth century
was heavily bound up with religious ideology, throughout this turbulent period Catholic clergy
across France politicized their preaching to an extreme and unprecedented extent. In expressing
impassioned political opposition to the king and royal officials, sacralizing insurrection against
local authorities, welcoming invasion by foreign Catholic armies, and otherwise stoking local
tensions, preachers strayed far from the idealized norms of Catholic preaching described by many
of their contemporaries and subsequently reiterated by leading ecclesiastical figures like François
de Sales, whose 1604 exposition On the Preacher and Preaching counseled French clerics above
all to explain the gospel and expound sacred scripture from the pulpit.80 Preachers’ eagerness to
immerse themselves in the religious politics of the League era shaped the tenor of civil conflict in
diverse contexts, while underscoring the utility of preaching as a political act that could reinforce
sectarian divisions and engender determined opposition to royal and local authorities.

PREACHING AND THE DISPLAY OF ARMS: THE CASE OF TOULOUSE

To heighten the emotional response of their audiences and demonstrate the intensity of
their religious and political fervor, Catholic clergy sometimes took up arms in the pulpit or
preached while armed.

These dramatic armed performances visibly communicated clerics’

militancy to sizeable groups of people, galvanizing popular support and sanctioning force of arms
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at specific moments of acute political tension. The display of arms in connection with the act of
preaching and the physical space of the pulpit both modeled and legitimated the collective action
that militant preachers urged and imbued such action with a sacred character.81

The

communicative and sacralizing effect of clerics’ armed gestures may be comprehended not only
in the enactment of these gestures from the pulpit but also in the presence of numerous spectators,
who immediately rallied to the armed cleric and joined him in the performance of collective acts
of violence or militancy.
Two dramatic instances of armed preaching in the ligueur city of Toulouse present a
fascinating case to examine clerics’ performative display of weapons from the pulpit as well as the
consequences of their militant acts. The first such episode occurred in late 1589, as Urbain de
Saint-Gelais, the bishop of Comminges, attempted to regain his short-lived rule over the city after
it had been decisively undermined by Guillaume maréchal de Joyeuse and several judges in the
parlement de Toulouse. The second incident, involving a Cordelier preacher named Père Maurel,
transpired in April 1595 as serious negotiations were taking place within the city between the new
League commander of Languedoc, Henri duc de Joyeuse, and Méry de Vic, whom Henri IV had
sent to the region in an effort to consolidate his authority in Languedoc once and for all. In both
of these intriguing episodes, prominent clergy employed armed preaching to initiate popular
uprisings that confronted their political opponents and enacted collective violence.
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Urbain de Saint-Gelais, 1589

Like many other staunchly Catholic cities in France, Toulouse remained nominally loyal
to Henri III over the latter half of the 1580s even as support for the Valois king progressively
eroded. The chief city of the province of Languedoc, which along with Guyenne constituted the
most confessionally mixed region of the French kingdom, Toulouse experienced several eruptions
of religious violence against its small Protestant community, most notably in 1562, 1568, and
1572.82 The last of these occurred in the wake of the horrific August 1572 Saint Bartholomew’s
Day Massacre in Paris, the bloodshed of which spread to numerous provincial cities.83 As
historians like Kevin Gould, Robert Scheider, and Mark Greengrass have shown, Catholic clergy
and judges in the parlement de Toulouse were largely responsible for the organization in 1563,
1568, and 1576 of Catholic “leagues,” somewhat ill-defined associations that appear to have
prefigured—at least in part—the more comprehensive League movement of the mid-1580s.84
Forms of Catholic activism in the city also included widespread participation in penitential lay
confraternities, which were organized concurrently with the “league” of 1576.85 Yet the relative
confessional unity of Toulouse overlay significant political divisions among its many
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parlementaires and capitouls, most of which were allied with either the province’s royalist
governor, Henri I de Montmorency duc de Montmorency, or his ligueur rival, Guillaume de
Joyeuse maréchal de Joyeuse.86 Shifting political allegiances as well as Toulousains’ propensity
for religious and political mobilization helped create the conditions in which Urbain de SaintGelais would both seize power in early 1589 and then—after the maréchal de Joyeuse effectively
challenged his hold on power some months later—incite a general uprising through armed
preaching.
Urbain de Saint-Gelais’s rise to power in Toulouse coincided with the severe political
disorder that broke out in the city following the assassination of the duc and cardinal de Guise by
Henri III’s bodyguards at Blois in December 1588. As one of Toulouse’s two delegates to the
Estates General, Saint-Gelais helped confirm news of the king’s treachery to a meeting of
municipal and judicial officials on 6 January 1589 upon returning from Blois, after which those
assembled opted to form an emergency bureau d’état composed of six clerics, six parlementaires,
and six former capitouls. While Saint-Gelais’s role in the creation of this Leaguer bureau is not
altogether clear, his activism in the ensuing weeks brought him into conflict with moderate
members of the bureau as well as the parlement—where he was one of three clerical delegates, or
conseiller clercs—and demonstrated the extensive support he commanded among ordinary
Toulousains. During the third week of January, Saint-Gelais presented a set of demands to the
parlement calling for a city-wide meeting and the imprisonment of all suspected Huguenots and
politiques. The parlement’s premier président, Étienne Duranti, first rebuffed these demands, but
gave in after Saint-Gelais argued—perhaps ironically—that not doing so would inflame popular
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violence. When a crowd that had gathered attacked Duranti’s coach and began to set up barricades,
Saint-Gelais and two other members of the bureau organized them into a militant procession to a
priory outside the walls, where many of the crowd spent the night. The next day, Saint-Gelais led
the processors to Saint-Étienne cathedral, where he was elected governor of the city, a position
that gave him command of the civic militia.87 As Mark Greengrass argues, this position was
“without immediate precedent … for the town had specific privileges against having any individual
with military authority within its walls.”88 Saint-Gelais’s acceptance of this unusual position was
intended to be provisional, though subsequent events would suggest otherwise.
Saint-Gelais seems to have established some degree of control over Toulouse as governor.
He was aided in this by the resignation in early February of several capitouls, who were upset at
the violation of civic privileges involved in his election as governor.89 The elimination of
unsympathetic parlementaires was also a priority. Either Saint-Gelais’s guards or agents of the
bureau intercepted incriminating letters by Étienne Duranti and his brother-in-law, Jacques Daffis,
the parlement’s advocate general, resulting in their arrest and imprisonment. Four days later,
Duranti was hauled before an armed crowd to answer for his “treason” and then shot, after which
the crowd dragged his body to the Place Saint-Georges and—after affixing a portrait of Henri III—
hanged it. Militants also took Daffis from his cell and murdered him. Henri III took two months
to respond to the killings, but in mid-May declared the city guilty of treason and formally relocated
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its parlement. However, many of the judges, including the new premier président Jean de Paulo,
refused to abandon their offices and continued to support Saint-Gelais’s insurrection.90 SaintGelais also made changes to the civic militia, reducing the number of captains from eight to six
and mandating that militiamen prepare themselves to operate both within and without the city
walls.91 Although his authority does not appear to have been absolute, Saint-Gelais left a distinct
imprint on aspects of the city’s administration.
While a combination of factors conspired to gradually erode Saint-Gelais’s control of
Toulouse in the confusion and uncertainty that engulfed the kingdom following Henri III’s
assassination in August 1589, the entry of Guillaume maréchal de Joyeuse into the city in late
September 1589 effectively precipitated the cleric’s downfall. The powerful maréchal, whose
twenty-eight-year old son François had been named archbishop of Toulouse the previous year, had
declared for the League several months prior but was viewed by many ligueurs in Toulouse as an
opportunist and an agent of the crown.92 To make matters worse, Joyeuse’s army suffered a major
defeat at Carcassonne in August 1589 to the forces of the royalist duc de Montmorency, and the
maréchal was forced to cede control of the citadel in a humiliating truce.93 Joyeuse entered
Toulouse without ceremony during the last week of September, and on 30 September attended a
meeting of the parlement to pressure its members to register the truce he had concluded with
Montmorency. The judges refused to register the truce, which prompted Joyeuse to surround the

90

Greengrass, “The Sainte Union in the Provinces,”

91

City council deliberations, 8 March 1589, AM Toulouse, BB 16, fº 277-278.

92

Greengrass points out that Languedoc’s provincial Estates of the League, which met in both April and July
of 1589, failed either to settle Joyeuse’s debts for the previous year’s campaigns or to release substantial new resources
for him to fight the provincial campaign with any real strength (Greengrass, “The Sainte Union in the Provinces,”
492).
93

HGL, 11: 787-788.

73
palais de justice with troops. In addition to registration of the truce, Joyeuse demanded that the
court outlaw Saint-Gelais’s newly founded Confraternity of the Holy Sacrament, about which little
is known but whose membership doubtless included many of the city’s principal ligueurs. In
response to Joyeuse’s coercion, the judges decided to depose Saint-Gelais, close the confraternity
to new recruits, expel all non-Toulousains from the city, and declare Joyeuse its governor.94 SaintGelais reacted by retreating to the defensible island on the Garonne’s right bank—the Île de
Tounis—with a large group of armed partisans from the nearby quartier, to regroup and plot his
next move.95
Saint-Gelais appears to have decided that the most effective way to recover his authority
was to inspire his followers to collective violence with a dramatic and performative display of
pious militancy. The next day, 1 October, a Sunday, Saint-Gelais and his retinue—which included
the Minim provincial, Père Richard, and several Jesuits—made their way to the nearby NotreDame de la Dalbade church, where they preached a serious of successive sermons to an immense
audience of Toulousains, the final and most important sermon being reserved for Saint-Gelais. His
turn to preach having arrived, Saint-Gelais mounted the church’s pulpit and, according to one
contemporary chronicler, “preached oaths and blasphemies” in an effort to publicly discredit
Joyeuse and the parlement.96 Near the end of his sermon, the bishop “held up a crucifix in one
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striking display both sanctioned the immediate use of armed force in the name of Christ while
visibly linking the cause of Saint-Gelais and militant ligueurs in Toulouse to Christ’s redemptive
and historical work.98 At the same time, Saint-Gelais seemed to suggest to his hearers that Christ’s
prophesied Second Coming was imminent and could be inaugurated by taking up arms against
Joyeuse and the parlementaires, in a way reminiscent of the apocalyptic Anabaptist takeover of
Münster in 1534-35.99 His performance of this dramatic gesture from the physical space of the
Dalbade church’s pulpit, with its sacral association with the Word of God, implied that God
himself was directing those in attendance to arm themselves and join Saint-Gelais in the collective
defense of his righteous cause.
The confrontational and destructive crowd action that immediately ensued reveals the
provocative and compelling character of Saint-Gelais’s militant display. The bishop stepped down
from the pulpit still carrying the sword and the crucifix, followed immediately by the Minim
provincial, Père Richard, who was likewise armed, and four other clerics described in a
contemporary account simply as “preachers.”100 The tocsin of the Dalbade church’s belltower
sounded, announcing a state of civic emergency, and the throng of people to whom Saint-Gelais
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and the other clerics had preached “began to exit onto the streets crying ‘To arms!’”101
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assembled in the street, Saint-Gelais apparently held up a document and declared to those
surrounding him that it was irrefutable proof that Joyeuse “desires to admit” Huguenots into the
city “to sack and massacre them,” a startling assertion that only underscored the necessity of armed
revolt against Joyeuse and the Toulousain elites that had just recognized him as governor.102 SaintGelais then led the crowd to the city’s hôtel de ville, the outer gate of which “he attempted to open
by striking it with the aforementioned crucifix,” a particularly symbolic and communicative
gesture that may be variously interpreted as articulating the inherent opposition between religious
and civic authority or as underscoring the actual punitive violence waiting to be justly enacted
upon all politique opponents of Christ and his Church.103 Saint-Gelais’s physical enactment of
this demonstrative act of violence in a civic space before an audience of countless spectators
visualized his divine prerogative to govern the city—as he had done for the past eight months—
and hence his power to confront all those that challenged his supremacy.104
While sources do not indicate the extent of damage done by the crowd to the hôtel de ville,
the violence revealed the intensity of popular support for Saint-Gelais and thus the tenuous nature
of Joyeuse’s authority. The maréchal and his lieutenants, who were attending services at the
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cathedral of Saint-Étienne, received word of the tumult and dispatched a contingent of armed men
to halt the destruction. Yet things moved from bad to worse for Joyeuse, who awoke the next
morning to find the archiepiscopal palace—his temporary place of residence in the city—
surrounded by a crowd of between 500-600 Toulousains headed by Saint-Gelais and Père Richard,
the former now armed with a pertuisane, or spear-headed polearm, and the latter wearing a
protective cuirass over his white linen surplice, signaling their readiness to personally engage in
sectarian violence.105 Appreciating the peril they now faced, Joyeuse and several parlementaires
and capitouls hastily withdrew to the château de Balma, two miles outside the city walls. When
many of those who initially comprised the crowd had retired, the most belligerent of the assembly
joined with Saint-Gelais and Père Richard “to pillage the archbishop’s palace, the sieur de
Joyeuse’s dwelling, and from there the houses of all royalists and others who had accompanied the
sieur de Joyeuse or who were of his party.”106 After destroying and plundering their opponents’
homes, the crowd moved to the dwelling of Saint-Gelais, which they blessed “with holy water …
praising God that he had preserved them from the Huguenots that the sieur de Joyeuse had wanted
to introduce there.”107 Although Robert Schneider has interpreted the pillage of Joyeuse’s
residence and subsequent consecration of Saint-Gelais’s as “symboliz[ing] Toulouse’s unity,
however ephemeral, and … exemplify[ing] the sacred nature of that unity,” these dramatic events
may also be comprehended as an outpouring of the emotional intensity so effectively galvanized
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by Saint-Gelais’s striking combination of provocative preaching and armed display from the pulpit
of the Dalbade church just one day prior.108
Saint-Gelais’s reacquisition of power was admittedly short-lived. Joyeuse’s withdrawal to
Balma enabled him to regroup and amass a rather sizeable force of troops, augmented by soldiers
on loan from his son, Antoine-Scipion duc de Joyeuse. The maréchal soon blockaded the city,
creating hardship for all those within the walls and intensifying pressure on the elites who still
supported Saint-Gelais. Some members of the bureau and the parlement wrote to one of the
League’s commanders at Agen, Emmanuel-Philibert des Prez marquis de Villars, for military
assistance against Joyeuse, while others began to ponder the necessity of negotiating with the
maréchal. Villars arrived at the end of October with two hundred cavalry and a regiment of
infantry. He then, apparently, refused an offer from some Toulousain elites to take over as a
military governor, though he pledged to help them negotiate a peace agreement with Joyeuse.109
Delegates from the city opened formal negotiations with Joyeuse in November 1589 at the
provincial estates of the League in nearby Lavaur. With the assistance of a commissioner from
the duc de Mayenne as well as a papal mediator, the Toulousain delegates signed a treaty on 27
November that recognized Joyeuse “as governor of the region of Languedoc” and stipulated that
Saint-Gelais must withdraw “to his bishopric.”110 No doubt realizing that this treaty represented
his ultimate undoing, the prelate seems to have quietly departed Toulouse for Saint-Bertrand-deComminges in the ensuing days.111 As Greengrass points out, Saint-Gelais later emerged in 1592
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in the unexpected position of lieutenant to Charles de Guise duc d’Aumale in Picardy, but the
prelate would never again regain power in Toulouse.112
Although his dominance of Toulouse lasted little more than nine months in total, SaintGelais’s utilization of armed preaching to launch a collective uprising against the maréchal de
Joyeuse and his ostensible allies in the city in early October 1589 illustrates the expressive and
stimulative potency of this militant, gestural act. During a moment of especially heightened
political tensions, the bishop’s combination of bellicose preaching and display of arms from the
pulpit triggered an armed revolt in which crowds of hundreds of Toulousains attacked residences
and public buildings, and prompted one of the region’s most powerful nobles to flee the city and
undertake preparations for a large-scale military blockade. While the uprising that Saint-Gelais
ignited would ultimately contribute to his downfall, zealous Catholic clerics in Toulouse took
notice of the capacity of armed preaching to mobilize ordinary Catholics to violent demonstrations
of confessional militancy.

Père Maurel, 1595

The expulsion of Urbain de Saint-Gelais from Toulouse in late 1589 only temporarily
calmed politico-sectarian tensions within the city. Joyeuse and his allies effectively suppressed a
plot by supporters of Saint-Gelais, led by lawyer Étienne Tournier, to return the bishop to power
not long after his departure.113 With his father in control of the city and his delegation to the papal
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court in Rome concluded, François cardinal de Joyeuse arrived in January 1590 and began to play
a somewhat active role in civic affairs, though he seems to have departed again by early 1591.114
Municipal records from the early 1590s give little evidence of serious conflict or unrest, though at
least one Catholic cleric, a monk named Frère Suger, was expelled from the city for unspecified
reasons.115 Despite the absence of severe internal disorder, Toulouse remained a city on edge, as
suggested by municipal directives mandating that all citizens must “immediately take up arms
should they be commanded [to do so] by the capitouls and captains assigned to lead them.”116
Toulousain elites also concentrated their efforts on shoring up the city’s defenses, while the civic
militia regularly searched residences for suspected Huguenots and “others belonging to the
contrary party.”117 As in other League cities, word of Henri IV’s abjuration of Protestantism in
July 1593 generated new divisions among ligueurs inclined to accept the sincerity of the Bourbon
king’s conversion and those who regarded it as little more than a sacrilegious pretense.118 That
summer, a Cordelier preacher named Père Maurel began to make a name for himself in Toulouse
on account of his religious fervor as well as his strident opposition to Henri IV and all other
individuals he considered royalists or politiques. Like Saint-Gelais, Maurel eventually employed
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armed preaching to mobilize Toulousains in support of Henri de Joyeuse duc de Joyeuse’s
aggressive takeover of the city on behalf of the provincial League in April 1595.
Père Maurel first came to the attention of authorities in Toulouse for making claims in the
pulpit of Saint-Étienne cathedral, where he usually preached, that unsettled Toulousains and stoked
fears of an enemy incursion. In October 1593, the city council was disturbed by a report that
Maurel had on the previous Sunday morning announced from the cathedral pulpit that illicit
assemblies “are being held in three or four houses in this city,” suggesting that a small but
determined group of anti-League conspirators was covertly plotting a coup.119 To make matters
worse, Maurel apparently “repeated [this claim] … in a sermon he preached that afternoon, and
consequently [the capitouls] have found the inhabitants of this city to be very frightened.”120
Concerned that there might be some truth to Maurel’s allegations, the capitouls dispatched search
parties to sweep the city in an effort to ascertain whether illegal gatherings were taking place in
connection with some kind of conspiracy. Having discovered no evidence of such meetings or
plots, the council determined to ask the cardinal de Joyeuse, briefly back in the city, “to urge the
preachers to tell [us] the locations where the assemblies are occurring and to not spread such alarm
from the pulpit without having first informed the magistrates.”121 Their concern stemmed, it
seems, as much from the alarming nature of Maurel’s repeated claims as from the cleric’s implicit
criticism of their ability to protect the citizens of Toulouse from would-be conspirators.
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Furthermore, by declaring this from the pulpit before apprising the capitouls or anyone else in a
position of civic authority, Maurel may have intended to prompt some kind of popular mobilization
targeting individuals in the city reputed to be less than enthusiastic in their support for the wider
League movement.
Intriguingly, Père Maurel does not surface again in extant archival records from this period
until late 1594, just as Toulouse’s parlementaires and capitouls began to seriously consider
recognizing Henri IV as king and submitting to his authority after more than five years in open
rebellion. While one can only surmise as to the precise reasons for this momentary disappearance,
it is possible that Maurel’s run-in with the city council in October 1593 over his declarations about
secret meetings convinced the cleric not to publicly challenge local authorities until he had a far
more compelling and well founded reason for doing so. Maurel may also have been mollified by
news of the opening of the provincial Estates General of the League in the nearby city of Albi in
late 1593 at the behest of Henri de Joyeuse duc de Joyeuse, son of the now deceased Guillaume de
Joyeuse and brother of François cardinal de Joyeuse, the newly appointed military commander of
the League in Languedoc and a former Capuchin friar.122 Delegates to the Estates reaffirmed their
devotion to the cause of the League and swore to not recognize anyone as king who was not both
Catholic and endorsed by the pope. The assembly determined as well to raise the hefty sum of
70,000 écus for military operations against the duc de Montmorency and other provincial
opponents of the League.123 When word of Paris’s submission to Henri IV after a siege in March
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1594 spread to Languedoc, the duc de Joyeuse visited Toulouse to appraise the city’s defenses and
urge its leaders to remain steadfast in their commitment to the League.124
Henri IV’s progressive subjugation of League cities in parts of northern and central France
throughout 1594 unsettled both hard-line and reluctant ligueurs in Toulouse, prompting
discussions as to the prudence of recognizing the Bourbon king that alarmed a zealous cleric like
Maurel and provided him with urgent opportunities for militant activism.125 In mid-December
1594, just days after the royal envoy Méry de Vic arrived in Toulouse for negotiations, Maurel led
an angry crowd of around twenty-five regular and secular clerics to the hôtel de ville to protest a
rumor that municipal leaders had decided to submit to Henri IV, who despite formally abjuring
Protestantism the previous year was still under a papal ban of excommunication.126 Once inside,
Maurel declared that Toulouse “had acquired in the past the reputation as one of the most Catholic
cities in Christendom, and accordingly has served as an example to this kingdom’s other cities for
persisting … in the Catholic religion.”127 Because of this, it was unthinkable “that, without waiting
for the pope’s decision as to the excommunication [of Henri IV], the councilors wished to
recognize a king,” an assumption that, if true, “the clergy neither can nor may permit,
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recognizing—with all other Catholics—the Holy Father the pope as the head of the Church.”128
Because Pope Clement VIII had not yet absolved Henri IV, Maurel suggested, Toulouse’s leaders
could not acknowledge him as sovereign without betraying the Catholic faith and subverting
ecclesiastical authority. Should they take this inconceivable step, the clergy “are resolved to close
the churches … out of fear of exposing themselves to the censures of the Church, outside of which
there is no salvation.”129

Although not carrying weapons, Maurel and his fellow clerics’

determined opposition worried the councilors, who only persuaded the clergy to disband after
assuring them that the council would discuss the matter in depth at its next meeting.
While the leaders of Toulouse did not submit to Henri IV in late 1594, their willingness to
even consider doing so may have convinced Maurel that Huguenots had infiltrated the city and
were working to seize control. At a meeting on 20 March 1595, the capitouls discussed a report
that Maurel had on the previous Sunday declared from the pulpit “that someone had introduced
ministers into the city, who have preached in some homes by night,” a startling assertion that
created something of a general panic among the city’s residents.130 Summoned to explain this
declaration, Maurel appears to have feigned contrition, assuring the councilors of his “goodwill
and good intention for the peace of the city,” even as his actions increasingly suggested
otherwise.131 Whether sensing that there was some truth to Maurel’s claim or that Maurel himself
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aimed to incite an uprising from the pulpit, the councilors asked the duc de Joyeuse to station
several companies of gendarmes much closer to the city.
Maurel’s decision to combine militant preaching with the dramatic display of arms
transpired at a particularly critical point in the city’s relations with the provincial League
commander, the duc de Joyeuse. Angered by Henri IV’s establishment at Castres in early April
1595 of a chambre mi-partie, a bi-confessional law court staffed by equal numbers of Protestant
and Catholic judges, as well as by the king’s unfavorable response to articles adopted by the
Leaguer Estates of Languedoc, the duc de Joyeuse had suspected royalists rounded up and
imprisoned in the ligueur towns of Albi, Gaillac, Lavaur, Lisle-sur-Tarn, and Rabastens while
concurrently augmenting his military garrisons there. On 11 April he entered Toulouse at the head
of 500 troops and installed himself in the archbishop’s palace, a show of force designed to
intimidate parlementaires and capitouls tempted to abandon the League. A delegation of capitouls
pressed Joyeuse to withdraw his troops, the presence of which violated municipal privileges, but
the duc rebuffed them and set about arming sympathetic Toulousains throughout the city.132 The
next day, Joyeuse and his lieutenants seized the hôtel de ville and informed the astonished capitouls
that he knew of “many persons dissatisfied with the League party, who are holding assemblies in
many of the city’s houses … [and] are determined to eject him from the city and make an attempt
on his life,” an assertion resembling Maurel’s prior declarations about clandestine gatherings and
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suggesting that the cleric had corresponded with Joyeuse in the preceding weeks.133
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When two

judges of the parlement de Toulouse arrived and entreated Joyeuse to withdraw, he ordered his
troops to set up a garrison in the hôtel de ville, seize all of the city gates, and disband the civic
militia, further consolidating his control of the city.
As the capitouls and judges tried without success to recover some measure of control,
Maurel took to the pulpit of Saint-Étienne cathedral to galvanize popular support for Joyeuse and
the provincial League, which in the cleric’s viewpoint represented a truly militant and
uncompromising Catholicism. While groups of armed citizens began erecting barricades in some
of the city’s quartiers, Maurel ascended the cathedral pulpit and began preaching to a crowd of
partisans about the virtue of the League’s cause and necessity of taking up arms in support of
Joyeuse. Maurel’s selection of the cathedral pulpit as the most appropriate site from which to
mobilize Toulousains doubtless reflects his awareness of its liturgical associations with the Word
of God and hence with sacred authority. Near the end of his sermonette, Maurel held up “a large,
naked sword in his right hand and a crucifix in the other,” a bellicose gestural action implying that
Christ himself not only sanctioned armed revolt in support of Joyeuse but required it as an act of
pious devotion.134 This martial display also exhibited Maurel’s readiness to personally engage in
religious violence against opponents of the provincial League. Then, “coming down from the
pulpit” still holding the unsheathed sword and crucifix, Maurel led his hearers into the streets as
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they shouted, “Long live the League! Long live the League!”135
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At some point Maurel was joined

by Joyeuse and his entourage, although sources are unclear as to whether Joyeuse had been in
attendance at Maurel’s preaching or arrived only as it concluded. One source indicates that Maurel
mounted a horse and rode next to Joyeuse, still carrying the sword and the crucifix, however
challenging such a feat of horsemanship would likely have been.136 Whether riding or marching,
Toulouse’s municipal deliberations make clear that Maurel was the individual responsible for
conducting the armed crowd “throughout the city,” having publicly sacralized the use of armed
force with his dramatic simultaneous display of both an unsheathed sword and a crucifix to the
gathering in the cathedral.137
The religious militancy inflamed by Maurel’s provocative action resulted not merely in an
armed display on the streets of the city but in a targeted siege of the palais de justice, a tangible
symbol of royal authority and secular jurisprudence. Maurel conducted the crowd to the palais,
where an emergency meeting of the parlement de Toulouse was in session. Warned of its
approach, the judges barred the gates of the palais, barricading themselves inside with about forty
of their own retainers and guards, “the majority armed with cuirass and halberd.”138 With the
building surrounded, Joyeuse dispatched a company of troops headed by the baron d’Ambres with
instructions to blast open the structure’s main door with a pétard, an explosive device used for
blowing up gates and walls during siege operations, if all royalist and anti-League judges refused
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to surrender the palais and leave the city.139
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Fearing the bloodshed that would ensue if Joyeuse’s

men detonated the pétard and stormed the palais, the beleaguered judges agreed to withdraw and
soon departed the city without incident for nearby Castelsarrasin.140 Joyeuse, content that anyone
able to effectively oppose his control of Toulouse had now either withdrawn or was imprisoned,
handed command of the civic militia back to the capitouls on 13 April.141
Joyeuse’s aggressive takeover of Toulouse in April 1595, in which the militant activism of
Père Maurel played a significant and indeed integral part, had serious ramifications for the
trajectory of the League in the southern province of Languedoc. The expulsion of a considerable
number of the city’s parlementaires in particular garnered the ire of Henri IV, who by the spring
of 1595 had managed to consolidate his control of most of the kingdom’s provinces, with the
exception of Languedoc and Brittany.142 Learning of the events that had transpired in Toulouse,
the king ordered Anne de Lévis duc de Ventadour and Jacques II de Goyon maréchal de Matignon
to mobilize troops for an intensified military campaign against Joyeuse’s forces and the remaining
ligueur strongholds of Haut Languedoc.143 In Toulouse itself, officials and citizens suspected of
supporting Henri IV remained in prison or under house arrest for two and a half months, and were
only released on condition that they not leave the city without permission or attempt anything
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prejudicial “to the party of the Holy Union.”144
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Toulouse’s Leaguers continued to defy Henri IV

until early 1596, when they accepted the king’s rather clement stipulations in the Edict of
Folembray.145 Thus, the actions of Maurel in mobilizing and sacralizing collective violence on
behalf of the League through preaching and the display of arms from the pulpit contributed to the
renewal of open warfare in southern France, prolonging the intense sectarian conflict that
devastated much of the kingdom in the final decade of the sixteenth century.

CONCLUSION

Catholic clergy employed preaching during the tumultuous League era to shape religious
politics and advocate sectarian violence, even as they presented such messages as a manifestation
of God’s holy will for their hearers’ earthly lives and the eternal salvation of their souls. The pulpit
became, then, not simply the site where sacred scripture and theological doctrine were expounded
and necessary moral instruction dispensed, but where clerics forcefully criticized the king, railed
against heresy and “heretics,” described politique and royalist opponents as enemies of God, and
urged violent collective activism in support of French Catholicism and its ecclesiastical and noble
defenders. To heighten the expressive power of their preaching at particular moments of acute
political crisis, as in the southern ligueur city of Toulouse in 1589 and 1595, some clergy
concluded sermons with a militant display of arms in the pulpit, actions that immediately prompted
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their audiences to collective acts of violence and aggression against regional nobles or judicial
authorities.

Clerics’ religious zeal motivated their homiletic engagement with the divisive

confessional politics of this turbulent period, and politicized preaching offered them opportunities
to publicly demonstrate their religious militancy. Catholic preachers’ sermonic activism provided
both local and national associations of the extremist Catholic League with political and spiritual
legitimacy, shaping the bitter sectarian violence that ravaged entire regions of the kingdom during
this period and reinforcing the sharp religio-political divisions within French society.

CHAPTER 2
‘A LARGE TROOP OF ARMED CANONS … DISCOVERED IN THE HOUSE’:
URBAN PLOTS AND CONSPIRACIES

On the night of 16 February 1589, a canon of Notre-Dame cathedral in Laon secretly
assembled in his house “a number of young canons, vicars, and chaplains with their arms,” in order
to set in motion a scheme for the armed takeover of the city.1 After arming his fellow clergy from
a stockpile of weapons that had been deposited clandestinely over the previous several days, Jean
Deslettres and his clerical co-conspirators set out under the cover of darkness towards a
predetermined rendezvous, where they were to link up with other plotters and occupy strategic
streets and squares within the city of Laon. While en route to the assembly point, however, the
company of armed clerics was discovered by two watchmen on patrol, both of whom quickly
notified the city’s prévôt royal, a royal official who functioned as a powerful mayor, that “this was
the night on which the Leaguers wanted to carry out their schemes.”2 In response, the prévôt
assembled six or seven of his closest aides and sent them under arms to the house of the city’s
greffier, or chief clerk, which was close to the location in which the watchmen had discovered the
group of armed clergy. When Laon’s lieutenant general was roused by an aide and informed of
the prévôt’s deployment of armed retainers to the house of the greffier, he hurriedly dressed and
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went to speak with the prévot’s men in person, in order to learn for himself what exactly was
transpiring within the city. In response to the lieutenant general’s query, the men declared that
their master had deployed them “to defend against a large troop of armed canons that had been
discovered in the house of Jean Deslettres, in case [the canons] came to attack them, as they had
previously threatened” to do.3 Dismissing the prévôt’s retainers, the lieutenant general ordered his
own men to go and “break up this assembly of canons,” not knowing that the armed clerics had
now been joined by many other militant Laonnois intent on seizing control of the city on behalf of
the Catholic League.4
The militant activism of Laon’s clergy in February 1589 illustrates the startling propensity
of Catholic clerics for bellicose collective action at the local level in support of specific religious
and political goals during the League era. In cities and towns throughout France, Catholic clergy
joined together to engage in confrontational and subversive action designed to advance various
related aims, from challenging politique local leaders and solidifying the League’s hold on urban
centers to increasing militarization of civic space and enhancing protection of their churches and
cloisters. Clerics’ defiant activism at critical moments during the turbulent 1580s and 1590s
provides compelling evidence of the choices available to clergy who initiated violence and conflict
to advance distinct confessional agendas and political objectives.
This chapter considers the energetic participation of Catholic clergy in oppositional
activities that undermined civic authorities and subverted their control of urban areas. Clerics in
cities and towns dominated by municipal leaders and royal officials loyal to the beleaguered Henri
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III took it upon themselves to bring about a seizure of power on behalf of the League. In the wake
of the December 1588 assassinations at Blois of Henri duc de Guise and Louis cardinal de Guise,
Catholic clerics in urban areas across the French kingdom played instrumental roles in the creation
and execution of endeavors to subvert royal authority and push their cities into the hands of the
League. Using the Picard city of Laon and the Burgundian city of Mâcon as particular cases, I
assess the ways in which groups of Catholic clergy took up arms in rebellion against local
authorities and either helped seize control of their towns or pressured local leaders into aligning
more closely with the radical League movement. In both of these instances, clerics’ oppositional
activism confronted municipal and regional leaders and shaped the course of local events in this
volatile period. I then turn to consider the activism of clergy in Beaune and Dijon, two ligueur
strongholds in Burgundy from early 1589 through early 1595. Rather unexpectedly, a number of
Catholic clerics in these towns acted determinedly in the mid-1590s to undermine the League
hegemony and effect their cities’ submission to Henri IV, who by that time had abjured
Protestantism and was subduing League-held municipalities one by one. While the precise
motivations of clerics who came to oppose the League’s dominance are admittedly difficult to
determine, subversive clerical activism fixed the attention of local authorities and undercut their
efforts to maintain control of their cities.

URBAN INSURRECTION AND LEAGUER POLITICS IN LAON

The centrality of Catholic clerics to insurrectionary plots intended to effect the League
takeover of an urban center in early 1589 is demonstrated most clearly in the example of the Picard
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city of Laon. A host of clergy in Laon, including the city’s bishop and members of the cathedral
chapter, went to vast lengths to propel the city into the arms of the League. While historians such
as Denis Crouzet have briefly discussed the role of some of Laon’s clerics in driving the city’s
adherence to the broader League movement, the bellicose actions of Geoffroy de Billy, abbot of
the city’s Benedictine abbey and the future bishop, and other Catholic clergy in Laon during the
critical initial months of 1589 merit closer scrutiny.5 Utilizing the account of Antoine Richart,
which remains the most thorough contemporary record of the League era in Laon, I seek to
demonstrate that militant clergy like Billy, canon Claude de Boileau, and other clerics engaged in
diverse activities that encouraged and enacted religio-political violence in the name of ligueur
extremism. Their adversarial actions in support of extremist insurrection escalated tensions and
intensified unrest in Laon, arguably bringing the city near the verge of civil collapse. Laonnois
clergy’s common action in support of urban insurrection shed light on aspects of clerical culture
and underscore the diverse possibilities for militant activism open to radical clerics during a period
of acute sectarian conflict.
Like many other towns in northern France, Laon experienced a measure of religious
conflict in the years following the outbreak of the Wars of Religion. Situated some 80 miles
northwest of Paris in the province of Picardy, this modest city of about 5,000 inhabitants was a
strategic communication and logistics crossroads overlooking the Picard plain and linking the
larger cities of Saint-Quentin and Reims along the kingdom’s northern frontier. As the seat of a
bishop, Laon contained a massive cathedral—named Notre-Dame and even predating its more
well-known Parisian counterpart—and an imposing episcopal palace, as well as abbeys, convents,
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and parish churches. The immense Benedictine abbey of Saint-Vincent stood on a raised area of
land beyond the town’s southern fortifications, the abbots of which involved themselves regularly
in the affairs of the city.6 In the mid-1560s, Laon was the site of a dramatic exorcism involving
Nicole Aubrey, a young girl from nearby Vervins who was allegedly possessed by demons.7
Although initial efforts on the part of Laon’s bishop, Jean de Bours, and his clergy to exorcise
Aubrey were ineffectual, the prelate finally succeeded in driving out the malignant spirits in
February 1566 after saying Mass and holding a sacramental wafer to the girl’s lips. For Catholics
in Laon and the wider region, the exorcism of Aubrey offered certain proof of Christ’s real
presence in the Eucharistic elements and thus invalidated Protestant attacks on the Catholic
doctrine of transubstantiation, while for Protestants the affair was nothing more than a hoax
intended to further discredit their faith.8 The Protestant leader Louis de Bourbon prince de Condé,
in whose domain Laon was situated, even had Aubrey imprisoned with a view to putting her on
trial, but was forced to free the girl after her father obtained a royal writ mandating her release.
Historian Denis Crouzet asserts that the “origins of the later ‘spirit of the Catholic League’ perhaps
can be found” in the ramifications of this impassioned event, as the evident victory of the Eucharist
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over Satan “encouraged extreme violence by urging true penitents to become sacrificial offerings
like Christ.”9 While it is difficult to discern any precise causal link between this episode and
subsequent confessional violence in Laon, the impassioned controversy that surrounded Aubrey’s
exorcism foreshadowed future conflicts over matters of religious politics and confessional
allegiance in the city.
Despite its reputation as an ardently Catholic city, the leaders and citizens of Laon
remained generally loyal to Henri III throughout the mid-1580s even as many hard-line Catholics
increasingly criticized him over his reluctance to exclude Henri de Navarre from the succession
and his inability to decisively subjugate the Huguenots. Laonnois persisted in their allegiance to
the beleaguered Valois king while a number of key towns in Picardy and the neighboring province
of Champagne rapidly yielded to League forces. Charles de Guise duc d’Aumale, the League’s
military leader in Picardy, besieged Laon for several days in early 1585 with the aim of either
taking the city by force or coercing it into voluntarily submitting to the League, yet the citizens of
Laon stubbornly resisted and Aumale was forced to withdraw in frustration.10 Over the next
several years, the cleavage between extremist Catholics and more moderate politiques hardened
considerably, owing in part to a clandestine act of iconoclasm against a popular devotional statuette
of the Virgin Mary in the cathedral in December 1586. The sacrilege prompted Laonnois
sympathetic to the League to call for the definitive expulsion all suspected Huguenots as well as a
corporate avowal of the League oath. The ligueurs failed to carry the day, however, as a majority
of Laon’s principal citizens balked at formally committing themselves to such a radical program.11
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Their reluctance was seriously challenged, of course, when word reached the city in early January
1589 of the assassination of the Guise brothers at the behest of Henri III just two weeks earlier.
Catholic clergy took the lead in actively endeavoring, both overtly and covertly, to deliver
Laon into the hands of the League, from the moment that the city’s deputies to the Estates General
returned and corroborated the shocking rumors of the Guises’ assassinations. Laon’s deputation
to the Estates General had consisted of three delegates, including Geoffroy de Billy, the future
bishop of Laon who was at that time head of the Benedictine abbey of Saint-Vincent. Before
returning from Blois, Billy and his fellow delegates, both of whom were royal officials in the
présidial of Laon, stopped over in the League-controlled capital of Paris for two weeks to confer
with its administrative council, the Seize.12 While the precise details of their meetings with Seize
officials are unclear, when Billy and the other delegates returned on 20 January 1589 they
immediately called for a general assembly of all prominent citizens. According to Richart, during
the general assembly Billy and the other deputies “related most succinctly a portion of their journey
along with the trouble that occurred at the Estates, but they kept very quiet about their stay and the
meeting they had in Paris during their return.”13 Thus concealing the extent of their dealings with
League officials in Paris at what would subsequently be viewed as a critical juncture for not only
the League but also the French monarchy itself, Billy and his fellow envoys publicly feigned
allegiance to Henri III and urged the citizens of Laon to exercise vigilance and “persist in the
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In private, however, Billy and one

of the foremost cathedral canons, Claude Boileau, whom Richart describes as “a man factious,
seditious, and suited for such a thing,” appear to have held a number of secret discussions in the
ensuing days regarding the most prudent yet forceful means of effecting a ligueur takeover of the
city.15
Billy and Boileau were emboldened in their insurrectionist designs by the seeming
ineptitude and vacillation of Laon’s military governor, the sieur de Rocourt. Richart characterizes
the sieur de Rocourt as peaceable and debonair yet unsuited for the position of governor. Rocourt
was, he rather humorously asserts, “more suited to stroke the ladies with his blond locks than to
the defense of a place of importance.”16

Yet worse than his excessive refinement and

incompetence, the governor’s deportment led those around him to believe he was fearful and timid,
and Boileau, “recognizing this timidity, informed his partisans and assured them of the governor’s
lack of boldness and determination, going so far as to tell them that he did not know if [Rocourt]
was male or female.”17 Such language obviously reflects sixteenth-century gender norms in which
women were considered indecisive and unassertive on account of their cold and moist humors, and
would thus have constituted an unforgivable impugning of the sieur de Rocourt’s honor.18
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However, it also suggests that Boileau’s energetic subversion of the governor’s—and by extension
the king’s—authority in Laon constituted an expression of masculine identity that was to some
extent at odds with his status as an ecclesiastic. Ostensibly exhibiting his own masculinity, Boileau
exploited the governor’s impotence by securing the allegiance of three out of the four civic militia
captains, two of whom were his relatives and all of whom were local elites who could command
sizeable contingents of armed men. The militia captains in turn quickly won over a majority of
the centeniers, subordinate officers of the civic guard that each directed companies of 100
militiamen.19 In procuring the support of most militia officers for the ligueurs’ conspiratorial aims,
Boileau effectively undercut royal authority by limiting the governor’s ability to deploy armed
force in response to internal and external security threats.
If Billy and Boileau were the most conspicuous clerical activists, they essentially formed
part of a much larger ecclesiastical base of militant support for the League in Laon. Nearly all of
the city’s secular and regular clergy – from the canons and habitué priests of Notre-Dame cathedral
to the Benedictine monks of Saint-Vincent and the austere Cordelier friars – appear to have rallied
to the League’s cause by February 1589, putting immense pressure on the municipal authorities
and officials in Laon that still remained loyal to the king.20 To make matters worse for the leading
politiques, clergy and ligueur townspeople clandestinely stockpiled weapons and armor at several
caches throughout the city. As Richart asserts, they endeavored “to gather arms [and] to buy
cuirasses, roundels, helmets, brassards, gauntlets, cuisses, halberds, lances, partizans, muskets,
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arquebuses, pistols, and a good number of pikes, a portion of which were sent by night and secretly
to the abbeys of Saint-Martin, Saint-John, and the Cordeliers, in order to arm these pious monks
who had already been furnished with colored surcoats.”21 Such language contains noticeable
sarcasm regarding the supposed piety of the city’s monks and friars, whose traditions emphasized
spiritual contemplation, austerity, and restraint, in accumulating weapons and outfitting
themselves with half suits or three-quarter suits of protective armor, as well as the flowing surcoats
often worn over plate armor by cuirassiers, in preparation for a violent takeover of the city.
Admittedly, these monastics were not the only militants stockpiling arms, though, as the militia
centeniers were given “some of the city’s best arquebuses à croc with powder and plenty of shot,”
likely owing to their weapons expertise and that of their subordinates.22
Several canons of Notre-Dame cathedral furthered the Leaguers’ subversive plotting by
utilizing their own homes as meeting sites and clandestine staging areas. Claude Boileau as well
as canons Denis Crespel and Jean Deslettres hosted secret planning meetings of conspirators in
early February, in conjunction with the nocturnal traffic of arms and armor. A number of
townspeople learned of these meetings and informed the sieur de Rocourt, who apparently opted
to take no action to suppress the gatherings.23 When these initial nighttime meetings concluded
without any interference from the governor or royal officers in the city, these three clerics in
21
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particular began using their houses as staging areas in which to lodge and arm ligueur partisans.
On an unspecified date near the end of February, conspirators worked to “introduce secretly into
some canons’ houses, which are large and spacious, several captains or soldiers from outside the
city … one by one, up to around twelve or fifteen without weapons, because the priests and canons
had been provided them in great quantity.”24 While Richart does not state whether these partisans
slipped into the city by day or by night, one suspects they somehow managed to do so under cover
of darkness given the likelihood of their being recognized as “foreigners” during daylight hours.
However, it is also possible that ligueur militia officers enabled their entrance by posting amenable
guards at the city gates. That these partisans may not have needed to carry concealed weapons on
their persons or with their baggage suggests the immense size of the secret arsenals Boileau,
Crespel, and Deslettres had amassed.
While their fellow ecclesiastics acted clandestinely to weaken the governor’s authority,
some clergy employed their pulpits to sway lay Catholics persisting in their allegiance to Henri
III. Without going into substantial detail, Richart refers to “the audacity of a certain Cordelier …
to openly preach sedition” from Notre-Dame’s pulpit, “in response to which the prévôt of the city
neither dared to complain to the bishop or to say anything [at all].”25 Interestingly, this is the first
explicit mention of Laon’s bishop, Valentin Douglas, in Richart’s rather painstaking account of
the League period, which indicates that the prelate was either briefly absent from the city or had
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thus far remained detached from political developments.26 While the Cordelier friar’s incendiary
preaching fixed the attention of royal officials in Laon, the distribution of pamphlets and
broadsheets “against and to the detriment of the king” simultaneously undermined the royalist
cause.27 There is no explicit evidence linking the Cordelier’s preaching campaign with the flood
of subversive popular literature that concurrently appeared on city streets, yet given the timing of
these actions there is a modest chance of a connection. In light of the actions of Catholic clergy
elsewhere in France—Paris in particular—who authored pamphlets offering biblical and
theological justification for rebellion against Henri III after the Blois assassinations, one or more
of Laon’s militant clerics almost certainly penned some of the pro-League tracts that began to
circulate throughout the city.28 Groups of militant townspeople soon gathered in the streets
claiming that the king had “a personal demon with whom he often converses for success in his
affairs, [and] that he ordinarily visits an underground oratory where, pretending to pray, he talks
very freely with the devil,” a development that confirms the combined influence of pro-League
sermons and literature on ordinary Laonnois.29
The dramatic events that transpired next reveal the controlled and calculated nature of the
ligueur clerics’ plan for seizing power in Laon. No doubt bolstered by a surge in popular support
for their cause, cathedral canons and other clerics initiated a multifaceted armed takeover of
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strategic locations within the city on the night of 16 February. Jean Deslettres assembled in his
home “a number of young canons, vicars, and chaplains with their arms,” after which they set out
“to make their way towards the rendezvous,” where they were to link up with other conspirators
and begin occupying crucial streets and squares.30 While en route to the assembly point, the armed
clerics were discovered by two guards patrolling the city on the governor’s orders, both of whom
hastily notified the prévôt “that this was the night on which the Leaguers desired to carry out their
schemes.”31 The prévôt quickly assembled a handful of his closest aides and sent them under arms
to the house of the city’s greffier, presumably situated near the location in which the guards had
discovered the clerical contingent. When the lieutenant general was awoken by an aide and told
of the prévôt’s deployment of armed retainers, he dressed and went to speak with the prévot’s men
in person, to learn what exactly had transpired. In response to the lieutenant general’s query, the
prévôt’s retainers asserted that they had been deployed “to defend against a large troop of armed
canons that had been discovered in the house of Jean Deslettres, in case [the canons] came to attack
them, as they had previously threatened.”32 Dismissing the retainers, the lieutenant general
“secretly” gave orders to his own men to go and “break up this assembly of canons,” after which
he went to the prévôt’s house and berated him for sending armed retainers about the city without
proper authorization.33 While it is unclear if the lieutenant general’s men found any of the armed
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clergy they had been sent to disperse, the ensuing commotion touched off a wider mobilization of
civic militia companies.
Since a majority of the civic militia was commanded pro-League captains and centeniers,
one suspects that the clerics’ nocturnal arming and deployment was a preparatory action aimed at
generating sufficient disorder to warrant full-scale militia mobilization. Exploiting the uproar
created by the lieutenant general’s men, several militia captains and their subordinates began to
patrol the city streets, where they soon encountered the sieur de Rocourt and his bodyguards. To
account for their mobilization, two of the militia captains explained that “several Huguenots had
assembled in a house on the rue du Blocq, where the people wanted to expel [them] with arms.”34
Taking these captains at their word, the governor and his bodyguards hurried to the rue du Blocq
but found no one in the street. After stopping by the prévôt’s residence and instructing him to
remain indoors, the perplexed governor made his way to the militia’s customary staging point,
referred to as the chambrette, where he encountered several detachments of militiamen “who
demanded his permission to go patrol the rue du Blocq, which he refused, saying it was
unnecessary because he had gone there and found no one.”35 At that instant, a citizen named Jean
Maunier fired an arquebus from his residence near the rue du Blocq, prompting the militiamen to
again press for permission to depart in that direction. Strangely, the governor convinced them—
albeit temporarily—not to depart by claiming that the shot could not have come from the rue du
Blocq. Soon after the militia captains returned to the chambrette and obtained the governor’s
permission to conduct full-scale patrol, which they performed while concurrently enabling many
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of their fellow pro-League conspirators to move about the city unhindered. Returning from their
patrol, the militia captains claimed to have seen no one as “the doors of [all] houses were shut,” to
which the sieur de Rocourt replied that they should “withdraw along with their men and each
[return] to his home to sleep.”36 The militia captains verbally assented to the governor’s request
that they retire, though they appear to have done so merely to induce him to go home as well,
thereby giving them a freer hand to advance their clandestine preparations for a seizure of power.
With the civic militia almost fully under arms, cathedral canons and ligueur militiamen
erected barricades in the streets unimpeded in the early hours of 17 February. One militia captain,
Nicolas Thuret, ordered his men to construct barricades in both the rue Châtelaine and the rue du
Blocq, streets that were situated adjacent to each other in the eastern portion of the city, close to
the cathedral. Canon Claude Boileau, “captain of the priests” in Richart’s estimation, “did not
forget to personally do his duty along with his company, among which were mingled several
soldiers that he had secretly brought into the city” during the previous week.37 Boileau also seems
to have purchased a massive quantity of wine and then placed it at the place du Petit-Marché, an
act that Richart characterizes as a “rather subtle trick in order to entice the menu peuple to him.”38
While this characterization arguably obscures the agency of ordinary Laonnois in the takeover of
the city, it also underscores the lengths to which Boileau ostensibly went in endeavoring to ensure
the success of the ligueurs’ bellicose exploits. Perhaps sensing that ordinary townspeople lacked

36

Richart, Mémoires sur la ligue dans le Laonnais, 30: “les portes des maisons fermées” … “retirer avec
leurs gens et chacun en sa maison pour y reposer.”
37

Richart, Mémoires sur la ligue dans le Laonnais, 31: “cappitaine des prebtres”; “ne s’oublia de son costé
a faire son debvoir avec sa compaignie, parmi laquelle estoit meslé quelques soldatz qu’il avoit faict entrer secretement
dans la ville.”
38

Richart, Mémoires sur la ligue dans le Laonnais, 31: “ruze assez subtille pour attirer à soi le menu peuple.”

105
the radical ideological commitment to the League that he and his fellow clerics possessed, Boileau
hoped to safeguard the vital aid of scores of Laonnois in this aggressive undertaking.
If Boileau shored up support for the ligueurs’ coup through libationary inducements,
Geoffroy de Billy engaged in armed acts and performative gestures that emboldened the
militiamen, clerics, and townspeople manning the barricades and prompted them to follow his
militant example. According to Richart, the abbé of Saint-Vincent and future bishop “donned a
cuirass” and, accompanied by several cathedral canons and a ligueur captain, “marched the length
of the city, from the canons’ cloister where he then resided to the hôtel du Petit Saint-Vincent,
where the lieutenant general lodged,” a distance of just over three-tenths of a mile.39 Billy’s
dramatic display, presented before an audience of militants guarding the barricades along rue
Châtelaine and rue Saint-Jean, demonstrated his commitment to the League while also giving civic
meaning and religious legitimacy to the militants’ bellicose actions. His wearing of armor also
signaled the martial violence inherent in their collective undertaking and constituted a visible
expression of his own martiality. Addressing the lieutenant general, Billy urged him “to go call
on the governor” and demand “in the name of the people” that he punish the prévôt for his actions
the previous night.40 When the lieutenant general returned with an unfavorable reply, Billy
dispatched militia captain Nicolas Thuret and thirty to forty arquebusiers to coerce the governor
into complying with this demand. The sieur de Rocourt soon found himself imprisoned in the
Cour du Roi, surrounded by not only militiamen but also—almost certainly on Billy’s orders—
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“many monks and Cordeliers dressed in surcoats and colored pourpoints, marching in rows with
pikes and staff-weapons,” a martial spectacle that “seemed astounding to those who had known
them [only] in monastic garb.”41 Richart’s comment stresses the ostensibly paradoxical nature of
such a warlike display by friars and monks dedicated to religious activities and unaccustomed to
soldierly affairs, not unlike Pierre de L’Estoile’s critique of the bellicose displays of arms-bearing
Parisian clerics that had helped repulse the army of Henri IV during his siege of the League-held
capital in mid-1590.42 Richart reiterates his contempt of clerical arming in Laon when he describes
Billy as, after “having given courage to all zealous bons catholiques,” withdrawing “to his
dwelling [and] taking off the cuirass, of which he found himself weary, not being accustomed to
such a burden.”43 Such politique mockery notwithstanding, Billy’s performative embodiment of
the armed monk-citizen effectively sacralized the cooperative uprising of ligueur militants in Laon
as they undertook to take control of the city.
The conclusion of Billy’s bellicose performance coincided with the evident culmination of
the ligueurs’ collective endeavor to seize power, a more widespread mobilization of the populace
that resulted in the seizure of many other officials and prominent citizens still explicitly or tacitly
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supportive of the king. Immediately after militiamen and armed clerics imprisoned the sieur de
Rocourt in the Cour du Roi and Billy returned to his residence, several other ligueur militants
sounded the tocsin in Notre-Dame cathedral, calling for all local residents to mobilize for armed
action against a shared threat. One or more of the militants who rang the tocsin may have done so
at least partly in response to a fast spreading rumor that royalists were plotting to deliver the city
into the hands of Jean de Suzanne baron de Cardaillac, whose royalist army was operating in the
field less than ten miles from Laon. Yet when the tocsin sounded, “several archers and a number
of troublemakers” instantly seized the prévôt and over twenty other officials and prominent
citizens from their homes, suggesting that this was a pre-planned action designed to produce
further commotion and sufficient cover for the hurried detention of remaining politiques.44
Perceiving themselves now firmly in control of the city, the Leaguers released the governor, from
whom they anticipated little or no further resistance. Later that day, the firing of an arquebus by
a carpenter named Jean Moyen touched off a violent crowd action, in which ligueur militants –
convinced that their prisoners had somehow gotten ahold of firearms and were initiating an attack
of their own – stormed the prison, intent on massacring all those inside. As Richart claims, the
prisoners were spared only by the last-minute intervention of “two honest men, who swore by great
oaths that they had seen the muzzle flash of the arquebus” from the window of Moyen’s house.45
Apparently, the ligueurs sensed no immediate need to kill their politique detainees, provided the
latter acceded to internment and did not interfere with the rebellion.
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While militant clerics such as Geoffroy de Billy and Claude Boileau orchestrated much of
the Leaguers’ violent takeover of Laon, the city’s bishop performed a more ceremonial and
ritualistic function during subsequent events, providing a veneer of religious and political
legitimacy to what was in many respects an illicit coup. Having remained – perhaps purposely –
at the nearby château de Presles over the previous seven or eight days, Valentin Douglas was
apprised of developments in Laon by his official and thus clearly observed the power vacuum that
had been created by the imprisonment of royal officials and politique municipal elites. To help
legitimize the ligueurs’ seizure of power, the prelate returned to the city and called a general
assembly of all citizens. He also summoned the sieur de Rocourt to the episcopal palace, where,
after a somewhat heated exchange, Douglas ordered the governor confined in the episcopal prison,
within which he would remain for the next several weeks.46 On 19 February, the prelate presided
over an assembly of the citizenry, attended as well by Billy and the lieutenant general, during
which decisions were made to appoint one of the militia captains as the city’s military commander
and give wide-ranging police powers to the quarter captains. At an identical assembly two days
later, attendees voted to moderate the governor’s imprisonment at the episcopal palace to house
arrest in the home of another cathedral canon, Maugarny. Several weeks later, at a special meeting
of all inhabitants held in the city’s cathedral, a Cordelier friar delivered a sermon denouncing Henri
III and urging “the people to adhere to the party of the League, which he called the holy union of
Catholics.”47 Following the sermon, the bishop and the abbots of Saint-Vincent and Saint-Jean,
as well as other prominent clerics, joined the lieutenant general, militia captains, and other civic
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elites in formally swearing allegiance to the League. The oath sworn, all those in attendance sang
the Te Deum and then gathered outside to watch an artillery salvo. A celebratory feux de joye was
prepared near the cathedral cloister, at the commencement of which “the bishop, wearing [his]
mitre, lit the fire with great solemnity.”48 Douglas’s formal igniting of the bonfire while wearing
the ceremonial headdress that symbolized his episcopal office provided yet further sanction of the
ligueurs’ militant actions, representing their successful insurrection as an occasion for corporate
rejoicing and pious thanksgiving.49
The example of Laon in the early months of 1589, therefore, underscores the central role
that militant Catholic clergy could assume in the planning and execution of insurrectionary actions
that usurped royal authority and captured control of urban areas in the name of the Catholic
League. Clerics in Laon worked tirelessly in the wake of the royally-orchestrated killings of the
duc and cardinal de Guise at the Estates-General, securing the allegiance of militia captains and
lower-ranking officers, stockpiling of weapons and armor in their own homes, and enabling ligueur
partisans to covertly enter the city. These preparatory activities helped ensure the success of their
collective seizure of power, which commenced on the night of 16 February and continued over the
next several days. Armed cathedral canons as well as other regular and secular clergy occupied
civic spaces, manned barricades, and arrested royal officials and municipal elites, presenting
themselves as warrior churchmen with body armor worn over their clerical attire. Leading clergy
like Geoffroy de Billy, abbot of the city’s Benedictine abbey and the future bishop, as well as
Loan’s present bishop, Valentin Douglas, sacralized the ligueurs’ uprising and offered political
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legitimacy to their actions, representing the revolt as an event superintended by divine providence
for which the Laonnois faithful must joyfully praise God. The bellicose activism of Laon’s clergy
brought intensity and force to the insurrection and shaped the dynamics of sectarian conflict.

MÂCON’S CLERGY AND COLLECTIVE ARMED MOBILIZATION

The case of Catholic clergy in Mâcon reveals the ways in which militant clerics collectively
took up arms to protest their civic leaders’ hesitation to fully join the Catholic League and pressure
them into formalizing their city’s adherence to this radical movement. An overwhelmingly
Catholic city situated near the Burgundy-Lyonnais provincial border, Mâcon had strong and active
ties to the Burgundian capital of Dijon as well as to Lyon, France’s second largest municipality
and a hub of international finance and trade since the late fifteenth century.50 Also like nearby
Lyon, Mâcon had experienced a Protestant takeover near the onset of the Wars of Religion in the
early 1560s, the social and political effects of which lingered into the mid- to late 1580s.51 The
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Catholic clerics of Mâcon, concentrated mainly on the cathedral of Saint-Vincent but also in the
Capuchin and Jacobin friaries, played an active role in civil and political affairs in the town,
attending city council meetings, providing funds for municipal projects, and – as will be addressed
in subsequent chapters – participated in civic militia duty and related military activities. As
numerous Catholic cities throughout France rallied to the League in response to the Blois
assassinations of December 1588, the leaders of Mâcon took cautious and measured steps toward
uniting with the wider League rebellion. The canons of Saint-Vincent cathedral, however, judged
their allegiance to the League insufficient, and collectively took up arms to pressure municipal
authorities into aligning more closely with the extremist movement and intensifying the city’s
militarization in preparation for anticipated clashes with royalist and Huguenot troops operating
in the Mâconnais region. The extant deliberations of Mâcon’s city council during March 1589
provide an intruiging glimpse into the cathedral canons’ armed mobilization.
The assassinations of the duc and cardinal de Guise escalated tensions and unrest in Mâcon,
as in many other Catholic cities, at the end of December 1588, though royalists appear to have
dominated most of the political discussion.52 The only detailed record of developments in Mâcon
during the early months of 1589 are the city council registers, the deliberations of which indicate
that multiple royalist officials exhorted Mâcon’s citizens to obedience. Though the échevins
redoubled the civic guard, there was initially no overt discussion of outright rebellion. In early
February, Philibert Barjot, the lieutenant-général du bailliage, reported to the council that he had
written to the king, informing him that the inhabitants of Mâcon “will conserve themselves well
in his obedience without [a] garrison” of troops, offering rather flippantly to augment the city’s
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If there were

individuals on the city council who preferred solidarity with the radical actions taken in the capital
city of Paris, they seem to have done so only outside of the city council’s formal meetings.
In response to mounting uncertainties and ambiguities among municipal leaders and royal
officials, the canons of Saint-Vincent cathedral collectively took up arms and mobilized in support
of the League. On the morning of 20 March, the city council received word that the Saint-Vincent
cathedral canons had “taken up arms and barricaded themselves within the city, having closed their
cloister.”54 This admittedly imprecise statement conveys the impression that the cathedral canons
either barricaded themselves within their cloister, situated adjacent to Saint-Vincent cathedral’s
southern façade, or closed off access to the cloister and set up defensive barricades in the narrow
streets around the structure. The latter seems much more plausible, as this action would have
permitted the clerics to monitor avenues of approach to the cloister and, if necessary, repel any
unwanted intruders with force of arms. Upon hearing of the clerics’ actions, which threatened not
only the safety of Mâcon’s residents but also the authority of its civic leaders, the échevins hastily
dispatched one of the city’s military commanders, the sieur de Marbé, to “find the clergy … and
ask them to disarm themselves and dismantle their barricade.”55 Authorities in Mâcon could not
simply disregard the fact that the cathedral clerics had taken up arms, closed off access to their
cloister, and erected defensive barricades in the adjacent streets.
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The sieur de Marbé’s encounter with the armed canons provides the first indication of their
rather complex motives for taking up arms. When the sieur de Marbré inquired as to the
motivations for which they had armed themselves and fortified their cloister, the clergy claimed
that Mâcon’s citizens “had armed and erected barricades, especially those of the quartier SaintAntoine,” the northernmost quarter of the city containing the cathedral, cloister, and episcopal
palace as well as thirty to forty dwellings of varying proportions. They went on to assert “that
“when the people have laid down the weapons and barricades, they would put theirs down and not
otherwise.”56 To corroborate the clerics’ claims, several échevins as well as the sieur de Marbé
searched the immediate vicinity but found no other barricades or townspeople under arms except
for the militiamen guarding the city gates, a situation that they swiftly reported back to the clergy
in the hope of convincing them to disarm. Despite assurances from Marbé and the échevins that
no other citizens had mobilized under arms, the cathedral canons refused to disarm or to dismantle
the barricades they had erected near their cloister. The canons’ refusal to do so suggests that either
they did not believe Marbé and the échevins or their stated reason for having taken up arms was
purposely misleading, perhaps in an effort to obtain additional time in which to formulate their
grievances, rally others to their cause, or shore up their improvised fortifications.
The cathedral clerics’ initial refusal to disarm appears to have rapidly escalated the
situation, a development that signals the destabilizing and threatening nature of their
confrontational action. Not long after remaining échevins learned of the clergy’s rebuttal, they
sent an urgent dispatch to Charles de Savoie duc de Nemours, military governor of the Lyonnais
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and partisan of the League, apprising him of the occurrence. City leaders also consulted with a
royal official and privy councilor, Jean sieur de Chandon, then present in the city, on what other
measures should be taken to pressure the clergy into disarming. Later that afternoon, councilors
debated the utility of presenting the clergy with a recent letter from Henri III, in which the
embattled monarch urged Mâcon’s citizens to obey the sieur de Chandon and to oppose anyone
who would impede faithful service to their rightful sovereign.57 According to municipal records,
city leaders resolved “to go show it to the troop of ecclesiastics and read it in their presence, and
get them to listen to the credible word of the sieur Chandon,” a decision that reflected minimal
understanding of the Catholic clerics’ religious politics as well as the broader political currents
rapidly engulfing the kingdom.58
As subsequent events suggest, the presence of a royal official like Chandon within Mâcon
was almost certainly a precipitating cause of the cathedral clerics’ armed mobilization. When
delegates from the city council returned to the cloister and exhibited the king’s letter, the canons
asserted that they would not trust the sieur de Chandon’s word, “because his intention is wholly
other, having spent four nights at the château de Berzé in order to confer with the sieur de
Rochebaron, who endeavors nothing for any reason other than to enter this city as governor.”59 If
accurate, their response indicates a surprising awareness of Chandon’s recent activities as well as
of local political dynamics. The nearby château de Berzé was controlled by René de Rochebaron,
comte de Berzé and baron de Joncy, a loyal servant of Henri III and one of the most active
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defenders of the royalist cause in Burgundy during the late 1580s and early 1590s. Charles de
Lorraine duc de Mayenne, the ligueur governor of Burgundy and – after the assassinations of his
older brothers – titular head of the Catholic League, had besieged the well-fortified château on
several occasions, but was repulsed each time Rochebaron’s defenses.60 Due to the proximity of
his château to the city as well as its burgeoning ties with League-affiliated nobles, Rochebaron
likely wished to secure Mâcon for the royalist cause and widen his effective control of the
surrounding region. Chandon’s multi-day visit to the château signaled to the cathedral canons his
evident intent to deliver Mâcon into the hands of odious royalist troops.
In addition to their concerns about politique nobles and royal officials, the cathedral canons
also demanded that city leaders strengthen Mâcon’s formal affiliation with the Catholic League,
which by March 1589 had solidified its control of dozens of key urban centers across the kingdom.
While the bishop of Mâcon, city officials, and leading citizens had on 15 February sworn a diluted
version of the League oath, which pledged obedience to Henri III, the clerics now asserted that
Mâcon must swear “the Union of those of Lyon” or “the Union of Catholic princes,” which they
clearly perceived as being far more strident in its criticism of Henri III and its opposition to his
Protestant heir, Henri de Navarre.61 When the échevins and sieur de Marbré replied that Mâcon’s
inhabitants had already sworn an oath of Union, the clerics insisted that civic leaders must “once
again convene a general assembly to renew the oath, and that this being done and seeing the
citizens in agreement and the mutinous punished, they will lay down their arms and not
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Such determined insistence on following the example of nearby Lyon, whose leaders

had on 2 March sworn a nearly identical Oath of Union to that drawn up by League leaders in
Paris, reflects both the clerics’ identification with the broader League movement and the strategic
necessity of aligning Mâcon as closely as possible with its much larger and more influential
southerly neighbor.63
Hatred and suspicion of politiques was again the critical issue for the cathedral canons
when questioned by the duc de Nemours, who entered the city sometime the next morning.
Prompted by the échevins’ urgent dispatch relating the clerics’ armed mobilization, the duc arrived
in the city with an entourage of noble retainers and immediately ordered the city gates shut and all
principal streets barricaded. Nemours also deployed his men, as he reported in a subsequent letter
to Lyon’s city council, “throughout the entire city … in order to keep the insufficiently zealous
from taking up arms.” Perceiving himself firmly in control of Mâcon, Nemours sent two nobles,
the comte de Tremont and the comte de Morlans, to question the cathedral canons “as to what
occasion they had armed and barricaded themselves” around their cloister. The canons, apparently
somewhat unnerved by the ducal emissaries, offered “a thousand apologies” before asserting that
“they had done so only to secure themselves against the insufficiently zealous, their enemies, …
entreating [Nemours] to do the same.”64 Mention of the “insufficiently zealous” clearly denotes
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politiques and other Catholic moderates opposed to the extremism of the League, many of whom
referred derisively to Leaguers as les zélés, the zealous.65 Mâcon’s clerics may have been
convinced that a royalist takeover of the city would soon commence, during which anyone inclined
to the League would be imprisoned, expelled, or even killed. In urging Nemours’s emissaries to
mobilize with force of arms as they had done, the clergy envisioned either a city-wide clash with
politiques for urban control or a more aggressive armed campaign against the Leaguers’ sectarian
opponents in the immediate region.
The clerics’ urgent appeal to the duc de Nemours and their steadfast refusal to disarm
directly contributed to the subsequent arrest of leading politiques within the city, a development
that finally induced Mâcon’s leaders to align the city more closely with the League rebellion. As
Nemours related in his letter to Lyon’s city council, upon hearing the cathedral canons’ plausible
justification for their bellicose actions, he had his men immediately seize a number of prominent
royalists, including “the lieutenant, the prévot, two échevins, and a person named Le Rat,” all of
whom were then doubtless confined in the prison of the episcopal palace, at that time the largest
detention facility within Mâcon.66 It is unclear from extant documents whether any of the cathedral
canons singled out these specific individuals by name, or whether Nemours was already aware of
their political leanings. At some point during these arrests, the remaining échevins and sieur de
Marbé urged the sieur de Chandon to depart the city, which he apparently did without delay.
Perhaps under pressure from Nemours, the échevins also acquiesced to the clerics’ demand for a
general assembly of Mâcon’s citizens, which was apparently set for the following day.
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While municipal registers contain no clear indication of the precise moment at which
Mâcon’s cathedral canons finally agreed to disarm, the outcome of the general assembly convened
on 22 March almost certainly persuaded them to lay down their arms and disassemble their
barricades. The stated purpose of the assembly, which convened at city hall and was attended by
civic leaders as well as all prominent residents, was to “swear with the inhabitants of this city a
firm Union … for the conservation of the Catholic religion, extirpation of heresies, obedience to
the duc de Mayenne for the service of the king.”67 Although the latter portion of this phrase might
appear at first glance out of place in an oath affirmed by League sympathizers against their reigning
monarch, the wording signals a long-standing French tradition of loyalty to a Catholic king while
simultaneously affirming the citizens’ allegiance to the duc de Mayenne, the ligueur governor of
Burgundy and titular head of the collective League rebellion. During the assembly, the sieur de
Marbé also contended that all those assembled “promise fidelity to the ecclesiastics by oath,” a
striking assertion that doubtless reflects his recognition of the far-reaching consequences of the
cathedral canons’ confrontational activism.68 Marbé’s contention appears to have persuaded the
échevins presiding at the assembly, in view of the fact that the third paragraph of the oath sworn
on 22 March reads as follows:
We swear and promise in the same way to confirm and defend one and all, and likewise
the ecclesiastics, from all the oppression and violence of the heretics and those who disrupt
the public peace, and offer all aid and favor to the aforesaid ecclesiastics for the
69
conservation of their persons, goods, honors and immunities.
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While one could question the seriousness of this formal expression of consideration, its inclusion
in the formal oath sworn by all those in attendance at the assembly reflects the centrality of
Mâcon’s clerics to the civic body. It also acknowledges, however implicitly, the cathedral canons’
spiritual role as those responsible for combating heresy and protecting the Catholic faithful of
Mâcon from its devastating effects.
Though they had effectively pressured the leaders of Mâcon into more closely aligning the
city with the League, the cathedral canons may have used the threat of armed revolt to keep the
city council mindful of its sworn commitment. At subsequent meetings of the council, key
members of the cathedral chapter raised questions about the implications of the wording of the
oath sworn on 22 March as well as the precise state of the city’s military defenses.70 Perhaps
owing to the intensification of military hostilities throughout southern Burgundy and the northern
Lyonnais, representatives of the clergy demanded several weeks later that the city raise a garrison
of 300 troops “for its security,” sparking a prolonged deliberation that ultimately persuaded the
échevins of the need to mobilize at least 200 men and appoint a special military governor to oversee
its defense.71 The heightened militarization of Mâcon was an implicit goal of the clerics’ armed
mobilization during the month before, though perhaps for political reasons they waited to more
forcefully agitate for it.
The bellicose activism of cathedral canons in Mâcon played an instrumental role in
solidifying the city’s rebellion against Henri III and formalizing its association with the radical
Catholic League.

Over a period of several days, clerics’ dramatic confrontational actions
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galvanized municipal leaders and regional nobles, prompting extended negotiations, the
imprisonment of leading politiques, and the withdrawal of one of the king’s privy councilors.
While perhaps a comprehensible reaction to the escalating instability and ambiguities of the late
1580s, clerics’ armed activism posed severe challenges not only to the safety of their fellow
townspeople but also to the intents of civil officials charged with maintaining civic order in Mâcon.
By collectively arming and fortifying their cloister, the canons of Saint-Vincent cathedral escalated
tensions within the city and intensified awareness of religio-political differences among the town’s
inhabitants. The prospect of their city’s entire cathedral chapter remaining under arms and
barricaded around their cloister compelled civic leaders to yield to the canons’ demands and take
more concrete steps to strengthen Mâcon’s adherence to League. The cathedral canons’ armed
activism contested urban control and shaped the development of local sectarian conflict.

CLERICAL ACTIVISM AND ANTI-LEAGUE INTRIGUES IN BURGUNDY

Although the vast majority of Catholic clergy in cities and towns under the influence of the
League appear to have instinctively supported its militant political and religious agenda, clerics
both regular and secular not only were suspected of harboring anti-League opinions but also took
an active part in plots to oppose the League in a number of its local configurations. While the
motivations for anti-League activism on the part of middling and low-ranking Catholic clerics are
admittedly difficult to uncover, their reasons probably involved far more complex impulses than

the irreligious pragmatism often ascribed to so-called politique opponents of the League.72

121
As a

number of historians have recently begun to point out, many individuals in late sixteenth-century
France found or attempted to locate a kind of middle ground between ultra-Catholic ligueurs on
the one hand and so-called politiques on the other.73 Whatever their precise motives, archival
evidence suggests that some Catholic clergy in key League-held cities within the province of
Burgundy took or were presumed by authorities to have taken concrete steps to thwart local League
power and expedite the association’s downfall. What makes such activism on the part of Catholic
clerics even more astonishing is the actuality that it occurred not in royalist or Huguenot-controlled
towns but within the context of municipalities ostensibly devoted to what historians Robert
Descimon and José Javier Ruiz Ibanez have described as “an absolute Catholicism” that would
neither cohabitate with another religion nor submit to the authority of a monarch—in this case,
Henri IV—suspected of feigning his new-found attachment to the Catholic faith.74 Thus, while
their fellow ecclesiastics were endeavoring both physically and spiritually towards the ultimate
success of the League, a number of clerics not only prayed for the League’s downfall in their
region but actively endeavored to achieve such an end. Their activism fixed the attention of local
authorities committed to the cause of the League, resulting in numerous efforts to crack down on
such errant and seemingly dangerous clerics.
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In examining the actions of Catholic clergy embracing anti-League sentiments, I focus
exclusively on the key Burgundian cities of Dijon and Beaune. Municipal leaders in both of these
towns, which are separated by just under twenty-five miles, decisively rallied to the League in the
early months of 1589, though the citizens of either town did not formally swear the League’s oath
until March of that year. Of the two towns, Dijon was of course the most populous and more
prominent in the sixteenth century, hosting one of only eight royal appellate courts, or parlements.
Dijon also had the fortune of being the historic seat of the powerful dukes of Burgundy, though
the ducal court had briefly installed itself at Beaune during a stint in the thirteenth century.75
Despite such prestige, neither city was the seat of a bishop in this period, although both towns
contained a number of collegiate churches, abbeys, and convents. Within both towns as well,
Catholic clergy played a prominent role in civic life, evidenced for example by the election of
clerical delegates to échevinages, or city councils. Furthermore, and as I consider at length
elsewhere in this study, clergy in both Dijon and Beaune were called upon by local leaders to play
critical roles throughout the League period in civic defense initiatives, personally standing watch
on the ramparts alongside their fellow townsmen, conducting armed patrols of city streets and open
spaces, and guarding the city gates. With respect to documentary sources, both municipal council
deliberations and ecclesiastical records from the League period are relatively complete for Dijon
and Beaune, thus facilitating a rather thorough assessment of anti-League activities on the part of
several clerics in both cities.76
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The cities of Dijon and Beaune contained profound religious and political divisions at this
time. Despite the fact that these were heavily Catholic cities with numerous Catholic churches,
monasteries, and abbeys, the citizenry of neither municipality was religiously homogenous.
Notwithstanding the best efforts of local authorities to enforce the 1585 Treaty of Nemours, which
had decreed—among other things—that all Protestants must either abjure their faith within six
months or leave the French kingdom for good, a number of suspected Huguenots appear to have
continued residing in Beaune and Dijon, as they did in nearby Chalon-sur-Saône, another
Burgundian city eighteen miles south of Beaune that would also rally to the League in early 1589.77
This circumstance is confirmed by numerous references on the part of municipal authorities to
“heretics,” “those of the new opinion,” and “those of the pretended reformed religion” still living
within these cities well beyond the summer of 1585.78 Of course, royalist Catholics continued to
reside in these towns as well, either feigning loyalty to the League on a persistent basis or at times
voicing what could be construed as royalist sentiments. The ongoing presence of both suspected
Huguenots and so-called politiques in Dijon and Beaune thus made dissident actions of the part of
Catholic clerics in these cities even more problematic for authorities, given the number of
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prospective collaborators that could potentially join them in formulating or executing a subversive
plot.
Some Catholic clergy appear to have come to the attention of local authorities in the early
months of 1589 both for verbally opposing the formalization of their city’s adherence to the League
as well as by maintaining contact with suspect persons. When instructed by Charles Emmanuel
de Savoie duc de Nemours and Guillaume de Hautemer sieur de Fervaques, foremost Leaguer
nobles operating in Burgundy and the neighboring province of Lyonnais, to draw up a list of
beneficed local clergy “who are notoriously in opposition to the party of the Holy Catholic Union,”
the civic leaders of Beaune could think of only one cleric, namely Jean Catherine, who was
archdeacon of the collegiate church of Notre-Dame, the city’s primary church.79 According to city
council deliberations, the mayor and échevins determined to inform Nemours and Fervaques that
“they know no ecclesiastics of Beaune to be contrary to this Union except Jean Catherine,
archdeacon … who is commonly reputed to be hostile to the [League] party.”80 The councilors
went on to assert that Catherine “ordinarily frequents the city’s heretics, and … for this reason the
sieur de Montmoyen, this city’s governor, has forbidden him to leave the city and has prohibited
the regular gatekeepers from letting him leave.”81 While municipal records do not indicate the
particular sentiments that Catherine might have articulated in the initial months of 1589, the
archdeacon’s apparent contact with known or suspected Huguenots in Beaune was construed by
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authorities as highly problematic, to such an extent that the town’s military governor opted to
restrict Catherine’s freedom of movement to within the city walls.
Beaunois authorities’ initial attempts to curb the archdeacon’s ostensibly subversive
activism by confining him to the city limits appear to have proven ineffective. At a council meeting
held in late October 1589, the échevins decided to place Catherine under house arrest, ordering
that he “confine himself to his house, with interdiction to exit it.”82 In an effort to prevent the
archdeacon from then making use of this confinement as an opportunity to conduct meetings with
potential conspirators, Beaune’s leaders also forbade “any politiques or other suspicious persons
attached to the party of the king of Navarre to enter the aforesaid house.”83 While such a
prohibition might seem at first glance somewhat difficult to enforce, since individuals’ genuine
religio-political attitudes were not always immediately perceptible, the échevins almost certainly
had in mind citizens known for one reason or another to either have opposed the normalization of
the city’s adherence to the League or to possess some evident connection to the Huguenot party.
Three days prior, councilors had discussed an alarming report that Huguenots within the city were
coming and going at will “in violation of the injunctions made against them,” to which councilors
responded by again ordering known Huguenots to “remain inside their homes on pain of death”
and doubling the number of sentries guarding the city’s gates.84 Two weeks after placing Catherine
under house arrest, agents of one councilman intercepted some letters detailing the involvement of
several Beaunois in military preparations in the nearby royalist stronghold of Saint-Jean-de-
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In December 1589, authorities in Beaune arrested another person in possession of two

letters and a passport from Saint-Jean-de-Losne.86 Although there is no evidence linking Catherine
with either of these events, the Leaguer authorities of Beaune clearly hoped to curtail his capacity
for participation in such plots by confining him to his residence and blocking all contact with
potential conspirators. The extreme measures taken by Beaune’s leaders to limit Catherine’s
sphere of movement indicate that they indeed viewed him as a serious threat to both their and the
city’s security.
Pulpits provided clergy with ideal venues in which to publicly express anti-League
sentiments, though certainly not without some risk to themselves. In Dijon, one of the Cordelier
preachers based in the church attached to the order’s monastery came to the attention of the city
council for anti-League preaching some eight months after the town had formally joined the Holy
Union. Councilors discussed in mid-December 1589 a report that an unnamed Cordelier had “in
his preaching pronounced very scandalous words, and, to excite emotions in this city therewith,
said that the crown belongs to the king of Navarre and not to a cardinal who cannot wear it,” an
unmistakable reference to Charles cardinal de Bourbon, the League’s would-be heir to the French
throne.87 In light of this rather troubling report, the city council designated some of its members
to advise the Cordeliers’ superior to command the preacher “to contain himself in his preaching to
the limit of his duty, so that he does not bring about renewed tumult in this city,” reflecting not
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only the councilors’ fear of sedition but also their conception of what constituted the appropriate
subject matter of sermons in general.88 Several days later, councilors were informed that the
Cordelier in question had, when reprimanded for preaching in this manner, made no apology but
retorted that he “had preached and proclaimed nothing that was not true.”89 When reminded “that
the king of Navarre [and] all those who follow him and adhere to his party are excommunicated,”
the Cordelier remained unapologetic.90 The multiple warnings that the cleric received from
Dijon’s leaders regarding his royalist preaching appear to have had minimal effect, because less
than two weeks later councilors formally outlawed the Cordelier from preaching his “scandalous
words” any longer in the city.91 Evidently, from the viewpoint of this friar the city council’s
warnings to refrain from espousing anti-League opinions from the pulpit could be easily
disregarded.
Despite the readiness of municipal authorities in Dijon to crack down on anti-League
preaching in the city, sermons continued to be a preferred medium for the dissemination of some
clerics’ dissenting views. In July 1593, just one day after Henri IV formally abjured the Protestant
faith at Saint-Denis, a Cordelier preacher reportedly shouted “Long live the king!” from the pulpit
of the conventual church.92 Sources give no firm indication whether this Cordelier was the same
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individual who had gotten into trouble with Dijon’s échevins in late 1589 or not, although in light
of the preaching injunction formerly implemented it is possible that they were not one and the
same. According to Gabriel Breunot, a contemporary chronicler who was also a judge in Dijon’s
parlement, this Cordelier again preached in support of Henri IV two days later “without touching
word of his gospel text, with great scandal for his hearers.”93 That the Cordelier’s royalist
preaching appears to have scandalized so many Dijonnais indicates the degree of popular support
for the League in Dijon even after Henri IV’s much-anticipated and much-publicized conversion
to Catholicism.
Clerics who did not normally undertake preaching duties or who were not qualified to
occupy pulpits often chose to articulate their anti-League sentiments in a more informal manner.
This appears to have been the case for a Benedictine monk of Saint-Bénigne abbey in Dijon,
concerning whom a troubling report reached the city council in September 1590. The city’s
échevins quickly expelled this unnamed cleric, who also held an appointment as the abbey’s maître
des enfants, a musician responsible for educating certain children as well as overseeing their
limited participation in religious services, for having spoken words “tending to conspiracy and
sedition.”94 This charge suggests that the monk’s utterance not only expressed royalist or politique
opinions but also incited some of his fellow citizens to subversive action or outright rebellion
against local League authorities. On account of the ostensible risk that the cleric posed to the
security of Dijon, as well as to the minds of numerous Catholic children in the city, he was banished
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by the council “with sanctions against returning here upon pain of exemplary punishment.”95
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a punishment also suggests that Dijon’s councilors viewed the monk as an untrustworthy person
with a proclivity for involvement in seditious plots to undermine League dominance of the city.
Clergy’s use of preaching and other subversive forms of speech to oppose the League was
closely associated with more concrete forms of activism such as clandestine participation in
organized plots to destabilize League control of Dijon and Beaune. In mid-August 1594, the
gardien of the Cordelier monastery, the sacristan of Sainte-Chapelle, and two other canons took
part in a daring plot to open one of Dijon’s city gates to royalist troops close at hand and thereby
effect the city’s submission to the forces of Henri IV. According to Gabriel Breunot, the plotters
had planned to seize control of either the Saint-Pierre or Nicholas gate, allow several hundred
soldiers to enter the city and seize control of the city’s château, and then capture prominent Leaguer
nobles such as Charles duc de Mayenne, Gaspard de Saulx vicomte de Tavannes, and Jean de
Boyault seigneur de Franchesse.96 The plot was discovered at the last minute, however, and a
considerable number of Leaguers armed themselves and rushed to the city’s gates and ramparts,
effectively forestalling the more daring aspects of the conspirators’ scheme.
When the plot to introduce royalist forces into Dijon unraveled, some clerical plotters
played a key role in helping a leading conspirator to elude arrest. The Cordeliers’ gardien sheltered
a royalist captain named Lévisey for a number of days, despite demands from Dijon’s authorities
that Lévisey be handed over.97 There was widespread confusion within the city for many days as
magistrates attempted in vain to ascertain Lévisey’s whereabouts. Some residents of the faubourgs
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claimed to have seen Lévisey descend the city walls by means of a rope, while other reports
indicated that his valet had been spotted carrying a corselet into the Cordeliers’ monastery. When
interrogated as to Lévisey’s whereabouts, the gardien initially feigned ignorance and brusquely
informed the authorities “that they are not his judges.”98 Threatened with judicial torture, the cleric
still refused to expose Lévisey, although he did ask for permission to personally conduct another
search of the monastery and query his confrères whether they had seen the captain. Shortly
afterward, League authorities somehow apprehended Lévisey, who had most likely attempted to
slip out of the monastery by night, and imprisoned him in the château. As for the gardien, Dijon’s
city council wrote to the Cordelier provincial—then in the nearby town of Dole—requesting that
he immediately remove the gardien as punishment for having “sheltered at the convent one of the
chief persons who conspired … to betray this city and thus place it into the hands of the enemy.”99
Seemingly without waiting for the provincial’s reply, Dijon’s leaders ejected the gardien from the
city in the early hours of 2 September 1594 “without desiring to give him time to return home to
put things in order and take [some] shirts.”100 Clearly, the cleric’s continued presence in Dijon
was a situation that League authorities would no longer accept, which prompted their decision to
immediately expel him from the city.
Clerics in Dijon not only took part in large-scale plots to facilitate the demise of the League
but also helped individual accomplices at times slip in and out of the city. A Benedictine monk of
Saint-Bénigne abbey named Guy de la Baulme was accused in March 1594 of having illicitly
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gotten a soldier out of the city along with a small quantity of body armor. La Baulme had obtained
a passport from the president of Dijon’s parlement, Pierre Jeannin, in order to allow a soldier of
suspect provenance to exit the city without hindrance. The échevins later discovered not only that
the soldier was affiliated with royalist troops holding nearby Crécey but also that La Baulme had
altered the passport to enable the soldier to leave Dijon with “a cuirass and the [accompanying]
brassards,” in direct contravention of previous municipal injunctions that no arms or armor were
to be taken out of the city.101 La Baulme appears to have been aided in this endeavor by a priest
of Saint-Philibert parish church named Virot, who carried the soldier’s rerebraces and somehow
managed to slip out of the city without a passport. The échevins were further troubled by a report
that La Baulme “had substantial contact with the enemies and was regularly at Saulx-le-Duc and
Grancey,” both of which were then under the control of forces loyal to Henri IV.102 Intriguingly,
the échevins seem to have made more of an effort to recover the cuirass unlawfully taken out of
the city than to apprehend La Baulme, perhaps because the monk had a friend or relative on the
council. The priest Virot was subsequently arrested, on the other hand, and admitted his complicity
in the affair without divulging his precise motives for participation.
Because they had vocalized clear hostility to the League, clergy who were not
conspicuously undertaking subversive actions were at all times strongly suspected by civic
authorities of doing so. In February 1594 the city council of Dijon instructed the Cordeliers not to
close off access to the open square at the entrance of their monastery, most likely out of suspicion
that the space would be used to store illicit munitions, hide suspect persons, or as a staging area
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for some kind of royalist coup. Having received word that the Cordeliers planned to soon begin
this construction project, councilors forbade the friars “to effect the enclosure and walling off of
the inner courtyard at the entry of their convent.”103 To underscore their determination that the
Cordeliers not enclose the courtyard, councilors likewise prohibited all of the city’s masons from
working at the monastery for an unspecified period of time.104 The concern of Dijon’s authorities
over what might transpire within the walls of the Cordeliers’ convent appears not to have been
unfounded, in view of the many subversive exploits on the part of several of the convent’s
inhabitants.
Clerics’ hostility to League authorities in Beaune and Dijon was not limited to verbal
opposition or clandestine plots, but sometimes took the form of minor noncompliance with official
directives or similar acts of obstructionism. This appears to have been the case especially when
more overt acts of opposition to League predominance had consistently elicited punitive
crackdowns. In January 1595, as the forces of Henri IV under the command of Charles de Gontaut
duc de Biron were progressively threatening the League strongholds of Burgundy, councilors took
great pains to ensure that the garrison of troops that the duc de Mayenne had stationed in the
château of Beaune for the city’s defense were well provisioned. At a meeting of the city council
attended by three delegates of the chapter of Notre-Dame de Beaune, councilors ordered the
chapter to arrange for the delivery of a substantial quantity of grain and wine—the fruits of the
chapter’s many domains, no doubt—to Mayenne’s troops. Jean Catherine, still the chapter’s
archdeacon and one of the clerical delegates at the meeting, flatly refused to arrange for the
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delivery, asserting that “the sieur de Mayenne did not understand that the ecclesiastics were …
constrained, and that the chapter had neither wheat nor grain for their nourishment.”105 Catherine
even went on to declare that the council’s request “was altogether outrageous,” a claim that seems
only to have incensed the councilors, who then ordered a search of the chapter’s storehouse.106
While it may certainly have been the case that the chapter’s own supply of wheat and wine had
seriously deteriorated due to the persistent ravages of passing armies on campaign, in light of
Catherine’s previous activities there is strong reason to presume that his actions constituted a
deliberate attempt to obstruct the provisioning of Mayenne’s troops in the château de Beaune.
Indeed, the League’s hold on key Burgundian cities such as Beaune and Dijon was at a critical
juncture in January 1595, and it was only a matter of months before both of these towns ultimately
fell to the forces of Henri IV. Catherine could not have failed to appreciate the city’s predicament
at this time, and attempted once more to undermine the League’s command of Beaune.
Catholic clergy in both Dijon and Beaune who opposed the League, therefore, confronted
many options as they sought to undermine its ascendancy. Clerics’ success or failure in opposing
the League ultimately depended on their ability to gain accomplices and effectively exploit
weaknesses in the power and influence of League-affiliated authorities at the local level. The
handful of clergy in both of these important Burgundian cities that felt antipathy either to aspects
of the League’s overall program or merely to League hegemony in their respective cities articulated
their opposition while also engaging in clandestine activism in an effort to undermine League
dominance of their towns. While distinctive and perhaps even exceptional in the degree of their

105

Chapter deliberations, 9 January 1595, AD Côte-d’Or, G 2509, fº 264: “ledit sieur de Mayenne n’entendoit
que les ecclésiastiques y fussent … contrainct et qu’il n’y avoit bley ny grains au chapitre pour leurs nourritures.”
106

Chapter deliberations, 9 January 1595, AD Côte-d’Or, G 2509, fº 264: “estoit tout notoire.”

134
involvement in anti-League activities, Catholic clerics in Dijon and Beaune could not have been
alone in their disapproval of the extremist tendencies of this revolutionary and mystical association
of hard-line Catholics, despite the fact that the overwhelming preponderance of Catholic clerics in
France instinctively supported the program of the League.107 Although their motivations for
opposing the League are somewhat difficult to pinpoint, the actions of Catholic clergy who found
or attempted to locate a middle way between ultra-Catholic ligueurs on one hand and so-called
politiques on the other hand are crucial to understanding the larger dynamics of religion, politics,
and sectarian conflict at the height of the Wars of Religion.

CONCLUSION

Catholic clergy in cities and towns throughout France were central actors in plots and
conspiracies that undermined civic authorities’ control of urban areas in the late 1580s and early
1590s. Content neither to hope and pray for change nor to quietly advocate for their aims through
non-confrontational activism, Catholic clerics embraced aggressive actions of defiance and
disorder, instigating violence and insurrection to attain their political and religious aims. Clerics’
immersion in adversarial and activist strategies of challenge and protest made them central
participants in the oppositional political culture of this climactic period. As the cases of Laon and
Mâcon amply demonstrate, the common action of ligueur clergy in support of religio-political
causes appealing to the ideals of militant Catholicism subverted royal control of urban areas in the
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wake of the Guise assassinations, effecting a temporary breakdown of civic order and changes in
urban authority. For the small number of Catholic clerics in Dijon and Beaune who opposed the
League, clandestine activism undercut the power of local League authorities and may have helped
hasten their cities’ eventual submission to the forces of Henri IV by the mid-1590s. Despite their
varied motivations for engagement in subversive activism, urban clerics were critical producers of
militant activism and sectarian conflict. Consideration of urban clerics’ militant activism is
therefore crucial to comprehending the broader dynamics of religion, politics, and sectarian
conflict throughout the tumultuous League period.

CHAPTER 3
“THE ERADICATION OF HERESIES FROM THIS KINGDOM”:
RELIGIOUS COERCION AND SPIRITUAL OPPOSITION

Catholic

clergy

energetically

immersed

themselves

in

confessional

activism,

demonstrating their opposition to Protestant heresy in their communities and regions. In January
1590, as the Protestant claimant to the French throne, Henri de Navarre, battled ligueur armies
throughout France in an effort to consolidate power, the clergy of Saint-Jean cathedral in Lyon
commissioned a procession, which they were to lead the following Sunday. According to the
chapter’s deliberations, the aim of the procession was to appeal to God for the “holy Union of the
Catholic princes and for the eradication of heresies from this kingdom.”1 This procession was one
of many regular processions that the canons of Saint-Jean cathedral chapter conducted throughout
the late 1580s and early 1590s, collectively exhibiting their support for the Catholic League and
their fervent opposition to Huguenot heresy.
This chapter considers the ways in which Catholic clergy championed religious coercion
and spiritual opposition to Protestant heresy and heretics. League-affiliated clerics throughout
France engaged in an array of confrontational and coercive practices that encouraged confessional
antagonism as well as the social and cultural exclusion of the Huguenots. Viewing heresy and
heretics as grave threats to the physical and spiritual well-being of Catholic communities, clergy
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zealously confronted Protestants and suspected Protestants through coerced conversions, CounterReformation devotional activism, and related forms of spiritual opposition. Active opposition to
heresy had immense significance for Catholic clergy, who exhibited a sense of duty to purify their
cities and towns of Huguenots. Clerics’ antipathy toward heresy underscores the profound
significance of personal religious belief and practice in late sixteenth-century France. Their
militant religious activism in opposition to heresy and heretics encouraged confessional animosity,
fueling religious confrontations and intensifying sectarian conflict.

CLERICAL CONCEPTIONS OF HERESIES AND HERETICS

Concerns about the proliferation of heresies and heretics pervaded clerical thinking about
the conflict and upheaval of the Wars of Religion. Many Catholic clerics considered proliferating
heresies and belligerent heretics as directly responsible for the political instability and societal
turmoil of the later sixteenth century. Protestantism was for Catholic clergy a false and heretical
religion, which polluted Catholic communities, corrupted the bodies and souls of its adherents,
and led them ultimately to eternal damnation. Guillaume le Blanc, bishop of the Provençal sees
of Grasse and Vence, condemned forcefully in print the residents of his diocese who had
recognized the newly-converted Henri IV as king, declaring that “in recognizing a heretic, you
have recognized the Devil.”2 The diabolical and poisonous effects of Protestant heresy constituted
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an ever-present threat to zealous Catholics, prompting Catholic clergy to take increasingly
emphatic stances against heresy in their local communities and regions. Powerful conceptions of
heresy shaped clerics’ understanding of the League’s armed rebellion against Henri III and Henri
IV, causing them to view the sectarian warfare of this period as intimately connected with spiritual
matters.
Catholic clergy articulated serious concerns to each other about the spread of heretical
beliefs throughout France, identifying Huguenots as the followers of Genevan reformer Jean
Calvin. These anxieties were often expressed within the context of clerical meetings, such as the
regular gatherings of cathedral and collegiate chapters. At one such meeting in July 1590, the
clerics of Notre-Dame and Saint-Thomas-de-Fourvière in Lyon lamented the extent of “heresy in
this kingdom” and blamed its production directly on “this villain and apostate, Calvin, who with
his hangers-on was provoked by the cunning of Satan” to attack the Catholic faith. Because of
Calvin, France was now filled with “an infinite number of heresies,” which corrupted “the
Calvinists” and fueled their impiety.3 The views of Lyon’s clerics were no doubt shaped by their
relative proximity to Geneva, from which Calvin and his successors sent Protestant missionaries
into central and southern France from the mid-1550s onward.4 Yet their characterization of French
Protestants as the devotees of Calvin reflected common clerical assumptions about the nature of
Protestant religious convictions and their sharp divergence from Catholic faith and practice.5
The views of many late sixteenth-century Catholic clerics concerning the dangerous and
disruptive character of Protestantism can be partly traced to the lasting effects of Huguenot
3
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takeovers of many French cities during the outbreak of the Wars of Religion, the acute
consequences of which lingered well into the 1580s and 1590s. The Cordeliers of Mâcon
petitioned the city council in 1585 for the return of their large clock, a prized item that had been
confiscated and disassembled by Protestant magistrates in the mid-1560s, the heyday of Protestant
ascendancy in the city, and was apparently still being stored somewhere in the hôtel de ville.6 In
Lyon, the parishioners of Saint-Sorlin church succeeded in late 1586 in reopening their parish
cemetery, which in 1562 “had been converted into a public place by the sectarians of the new
opinion,” a stunning act of desecration that seemingly deprived the dead of proximity to the
sacred.7 Similarly, in 1588 Lyon’s municipal authorities finally reimbursed their Cordelier friary
for confiscated dimension stone, which “had been taken from their church by those of the
pretended reformed religion in 1562 and used for the boulevard nearest the drawbridge of the Vaise
gate.”8 The experiences of Catholic clergy in Mâcon and Lyon were comparable to those of clerics
throughout France, who had come to associate Huguenots not only with monstrous heresy but with
appalling irreverence and sacrilege.
Many Catholic pamphlets decried the violence and aggression of Protestant militants and
referred to them collectively as “the heretics” or “the Huguenots.” An anonymous pamphlet,
written by a Catholic cleric in light of the theologically- and biblically-themed language of its
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preface, detailed the attempted takeover of the city of Troyes in Champagne by troops under the
command of Jean Desprès sieur de Torteron in September 1589. According to the pamphlet’s
author, among those “massacred” by Torteron’s soldiers was the doyen of the cathedral, a cleric
named Tartier who was known for “his virtue and prodigious knowledge,” and “two venerable
canons.”9 Another pamphlet related how the “rebel heretics” in Burgundy tried to capture the
ligueur town of Chalon-sur-Saône, which had declared for the League in early 1589 along with
the other principal cities of this frontier province.10 Thus, a common discourse of Huguenot
aggression and subversion both fashioned and reinforced Catholic anxieties about the grave threat
posed by militant Huguenots to Catholic communities everywhere.
Potent conceptions of heresy encouraged Catholic clergy to view the League rebellion as
well as the warfare of the 1580s and 1590s in explicitly religious terms. In a formal remonstrance
composed at an assembly of French clergy in late 1585, the bishop of the Breton diocese of SaintBrieuc, Nicolas Langelier, commended Henri III for undertaking “a holy war for the extermination
of heresy.”11 An anonymous Catholic prelate similarly represented the military conflicts in print
as connected to spiritual matters such as “the safeguarding of God’s honor, the preservation of the
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Other

contemporary observers comprehended ligueur armies as actually combatting “the Calvinist
heresies,” suggesting that they were fighting to eradicate the pernicious effects of heretical beliefs
and practices from France as much as to purge the heretics themselves.13 Viewing the Leaguers’
uprising as a violent attempt at religious reformation and renewal shaped clerics’ recognition of
confessional opponents as, in the language of a canon of Saint-Paul collegiate chapter in Lyon,
those “who hate the cause of God.”14 Thus, by opposing heresy and heretics in battle, the
Leaguers’ struggled in the name of a just and holy cause.
Convictions regarding the seriousness of heretical opposition to the cause of God
profoundly influenced clerics’ understanding of the ecclesiastical vocation. When prospective
members of Saint-Jean cathedral chapter were called before capitular officers for examination to
determine their fitness for the clerical calling, they were asked specific questions regarding their
past. A young nobleman named Claude de Salornay was accepted as a canon in the cathedral in
early 1584 after chapter leaders judged that he “has not borne arms against the church.”15 Officers
came to a similar conclusion later that year about a young man named Louis de la Barge, as “neither
he nor his parents have borne arms against the church.”16 The implication of such inquiries is that
only a heretic would take up arms and participate in military campaigns against God and his
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church, a sin so abhorrent that it would permanently disqualify one from the clerical vocation.
Similarly, clergy viewed confronting heresy and heretics as one of their main spiritual duties.
Assuming the office of archdeacon of Saint-Vincent cathedral in Mâcon in August 1588, canon
Jean Ligeret pledged to defend and preserve the Catholic religion “against the heretics with all of
his power,” and to help eradicate “from this realm … all schisms [and] heresies condemned by the
holy councils and principally that of Trent.”17 These solemn assertions openly mandated clerical
opposition to heterodox beliefs as well as to the individuals in which such beliefs resided.
Persistent widespread concern about the presence of Huguenots within Catholic
communities informed clerics’ personal and collective attempts to oppose heresy, especially in
cities and towns with overwhelming Catholic majorities. In March 1585, authorities in Toulouse
were disturbed by a report that several Huguenot students were lodged within the city, in response
to which they dispatched search parties to all inns and boarding houses.18 The failure of their
initial attempts to identify suspected Huguenots studying in the city did not deter Toulouse’s
leaders, who continued these efforts in subsequent days. A handful of armed “suspect students”
clashed with civic guards some weeks later, presumably unsettled by word that the city council
had initiated measures to locate, banish, or otherwise harm them.19 Representatives of the SaintÉtienne cathedral chapter, including the cathedral’s provost and vicar-general, Jean Daffis,
attended the council meetings in which concerns about the Huguenot students were expressed, and
presumably kept their fellow clergy abreast of these developments. In a context such as that of
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Dijon, situated in a less religiously mixed region than Toulouse, local leaders exhibited an almost
identical amount of alarm at the presence of Protestants. When a Huguenot from nearby Chalonsur-Soâne tried to enter Dijon in December 1586, he was immediately seized and imprisoned.20 In
many other instances Dijon’s leaders denied entry to known Huguenots and imprisoned or expelled
suspected Huguenots from the city, sometimes asking Catholic clergy for assistance in identifying
these individuals.21
Protestant ministers appear to have particularly worried Catholic religious and civic elites,
due to their status as the foremost propagators of the Calvinist faith. Such concerns intensified
whenever a Protestant national or provincial synod convened to discuss general matters of concern
for the Huguenot churches as well as specific issues of ecclesiastical governance.22 When the
capitouls of Toulouse learned in 1597 of “an assembly of sixty to eighty ministers” in the town of
Castres, forty-five miles to the east, they assumed that the synod “had no other goal but to
undertake something against the Catholic cities” of Haut Languedoc. Aside from taking customary
steps to shore up the civic militia, the capitouls launched house-to-house searches with orders to
ascertain the origin and religion of all “outsiders.”23 Judgments of the specially monstrous
character of Huguenot pastors may also explain why authorities in Aix-en-Provence had by 1590
imprisoned or placed under house arrest several suspected Huguenots, but had expelled a
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As heretical clergy, Huguenot ministers constituted an

especially offensive embodiment of willful religious deviance.
Proliferating heresies and belligerent heretics, then, were viewed by many Catholic clergy
as directly responsible for the political instability and societal turmoil of the later sixteenth century.
Clerics articulated a patently religious understanding of the sectarian warfare that devastated
France in the 1580s and 1590s, leading them to take increasingly emphatic stances against heresy
in their cities and regions. Considering their religious opponents as “heretics,” Catholic clergy felt
a religious obligation to prevent and suppress Protestant heresy within their parishes and
communities. Huguenots represented an ever-present threat to militant Catholics, making clerics
willing and able to mobilize in defense of both their churches and the Catholic faithful.

CONVERSION, EXCLUSION, AND THE DEMARCATION OF HERETICS

Catholic clergy worked to subdue rival religious beliefs and practices through coercive
processes of conversion and exclusion. Capitalizing on the provisions of the Treaty of Nemours
of 1585, which rescinded former edicts of pacification and mandated that all Huguenots must either
abjure the Protestant faith or flee the kingdom, Catholic clerics waged an open struggle against
religious heresy. Although high-ranking prelates helped pressure Henri III into signing the treaty,
middling clerics such as cathedral canons, diocesan officials, and local curés assertively sought
converts in an effort to rid their communities of heresy and heretics. The extensive abjurations of
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Huguenots seemed to confirm for clerics the falsehood of the Protestant faith, reinforcing the
black-and-white contrasts they repeatedly drew between the two confessions.

While most

Protestant conversions to Catholicism after 1585 were in all likelihood opportunistic, clergy
constructed a model of conversion that balanced matters of exteriority and interiority.
Ecclesiastical efforts to force abjurations also created new opportunities to scrutinize religious
beliefs and practices in local communities, where manifestations of religious difference seemed to
signal the continuing instability of French Catholicism.
By mandating the coerced conversion of the Huguenots, the architects of the 1585 Treaty
of Nemours attempted to effect the formal return of religious heretics to the unique practice of the
Catholic faith. High-ranking Catholic clergy such as Charles de Bourbon cardinal de Bourbon and
Louis de Lorraine cardinal de Guise collaborated with powerful ligueur nobles like Henri de
Lorraine duc de Guise to pressure Henri III into revoking all former edicts of pacification and
outlawing Protestantism everywhere in the kingdom.

The treaty, signed on 7 July 1585,

constituted a major capitulation on the part of the king, who had previously tried to coopt
leadership of the nascent League movement.25 Under the terms of this exceptionally brutal
settlement, the practice of Protestantism was proscribed and liberty of conscience abolished.
Protestants were given six months – a period that was reduced to fifteen days in early October of
that year – to choose between abjuration or exile. Protestant pastors were given one month to
leave the kingdom. The treaty also explicitly revoked all prior edicts of pacification, and deprived
the Huguenot prince Henri de Navarre of his rights of succession. All fortified towns previously
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coincidentally, Pope Sixtus V followed up the Treaty in September 1585 by formally
excommunicating Navarre and his first cousin, Huguenot military leader Henri I de Bourbon
prince de Condé.27
The clerical architects of the Treaty of Nemours may not have anticipated the complex
ways in which its confessional demands would be enacted in cities and towns across the kingdom.
As implied by other concessions they requested during the negotiations preceding the treaty, the
cardinal de Bourbon and cardinal de Guise seemed more concerned with securing control of certain
cities and receiving detachments of personal bodyguards at the crown’s expense than with
formulating precise requirements for the local clergy who would ultimately be responsible for
accomplishing Huguenot abjurations.28 Consequently, responsibility for creating regulations and
procedures governing coerced conversions to Catholicism devolved to middle-ranking clergy such
as diocesan officials, cathedral canons, and the holders of urban and rural parishes.
As they prepared to manage and effect Huguenot conversions, clerical leaders formulated
methods intended to dramatize renunciations of Protestantism and underscore its heretical
characteristics. An undated ecclesiastical regulation, drafted almost certainly after the publication
of the Edict of Nemours, stipulated that a prospective Huguenot convert must come to a Catholic
church “on a feast day during High Mass,” when a maximum number of both clerics and
parishioners would be in attendance, and then make “the profession of faith and abjuration of all
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heresy according to the form” in which the presiding cleric directs. He or she was to do this “very
loudly, word for word,” a requirement that signaled the public nature of their abjuration as well as
the clergy’s critical role in defining orthodoxy. After this, the presiding cleric was to record the
date and “how many times they had returned to heresy,” in an effort to determine the frequency
with which a prospective convert had crossed the confessional boundary. Finally, the convert “will
order them [to perform] for penance … prayers and certain alms.”29
An extant abjuration record from late 1585 suggests that local clergy adhered to the
majority of these regulations when effecting abjurations. On All Saints Day, 1 November, a
sergent royal named Étienne Vinet, then residing in the small town of Montaigu, southeast of
Nantes, abjured the Protestant faith in the parish church of Saint-Jean after “the High Mass.” Vinet
pledged “to live from now on in accordance with the Catholic, apostolic, and Roman church, and
to observe its ordinances.” 30 The abjuration was accomplished in the presence of René Gignet,
the curé and rector of Saint-Jean, as well as four priests from the neighboring parish of SaintMartin, a detail that underscores the role of Catholic clergy in pressuring those individuals making
a religious change. This brief but fascinating document, composed on very same day, contains the
signatures of Vinet, Gignet, and the other four clerics.
While the record confirming Étienne Vinet’s abjuration does not specify the precise
language with which he renounced Protestantism, the aforementioned regulation reveals that
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converts were made to affirm the depravity of the Protestant faith as well as the grave sin they had
committed in forsaking the Catholic church. A convert first had to state that she or he abhorred
“everything” contrary to the canons and councils of the Catholic church, “especially all Lutheran
and Calvinist opinions, heretofore known as the new, pretended reformed religion … and generally
all heresies that the church condemns, disapproves of, and anathematizes.” Having renounced all
contrary beliefs, the convert had to request “with all my heart and in all humility and affection,
pardon from God and his church, from which I miserably departed … and embraced the heresy
and faction of the heretics and Calvinists, to the great scandal of the church, and [to] the prejudice
of God’s honor and of my salvation,” phrasing that places blame for their heresy solely on
themselves.

After this confession of wrongdoing, the convert begged for “absolution and

remission,” and promised “to live until my final breath, by the grace of God, in this true faith,
which I now voluntarily profess.”31 Interestingly, this prescribed form of abjuration differs
noticeably from a version published in 1572, which required that a convert affirm specific points
of Catholic doctrine such as transubstantiation, purgatory, and the intercession of the saints.32
The differences between the 1572 and 1585 forms of abjuration might be accounted for by
the latter’s additional requirement of further observation, instruction, and abstention from the Mass
for some time. Clerical officials may have sensed that some local clergy would rush to admit
Huguenot converts to Catholic rites without first achieving a formal abjuration. Doubtless troubled
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by the haste which some parish clergy were admitting Huguenots to the Eucharist, the officers of
Notre-Dame collegiate church in Beaune forbid all of its vicars and local curés from allowing “the
heretics” to partake of the sacraments “without having made their abjurations.”33

Close

observation was necessary to guard against insincere or merely opportunistic converts, who would
threaten the unity of the faithful and possibly incur divine wrath. During the probationary period
following a Protestant’s conversion, he or she was prohibited from even attending all celebrations
of the Mass, “whether parochial or other, whether low or high.” Interestingly, they could attend
the service during which Mass was to take place, but “would be ordered to exit the church and
retire outside … from the commencement of the Mass,” as their membership in the community of
Catholic faithful was as yet incomplete. In addition to temporary exclusion from the Mass, the
convert had to “confess every other week to [a cleric] whom the archbishop or bishop will deputize
for this purpose.” At the confessor’s discretion, however, the convert could be required to confess
“once a week” as well as perform ongoing penance. During the probationary period, the convert
was also to be “catechized and instructed in the principles and elements of the Catholic faith by
the curés, their vicars, or others” appointed to teach them.34 While it is unclear what criteria clergy
employed before finally admitting a convert to the Eucharist, they evidently sought evidence of
authentic contrition and a nominal understanding of basic Catholic doctrine.
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Clerical emphasis on observation and instruction indicates a clear desire to imbue
Huguenot converts with the understanding of and respect for Catholic ecclesiology and teachings.
Such instruction was necessary if converts were to resolve their remaining misgivings about the
Catholic faith and fully recognize the fallacies of their former beliefs. Yet these stipulations also
underscore the role of the clergy in guiding those individuals making a confessional change. Only
through attentive tutoring and surveillance could Huguenots rediscover the “true” faith and accept
the authority of the Catholic church, thus completing their conversion to Catholicism.
Although evidence regarding the regularity of coerced conversions is dispersed and
uneven, it is certain that local clergy were instrumental in effecting hundreds if not thousands of
abjurations following the Edict of Nemours. Analysis of lists of abjurations in the southeastern
city of Aix-en-Provence sheds some light on the quantitative impact of the 1585 Edict on
Protestants in a predominantly Catholic city of some 10,000-12,000 residents.35 According to
extant records of the Saint-Sauveur cathedral chapter, Aix’s clergy presided over 138 abjurations
between July and December 1585, 24 abjurations in 1586, 6 abjurations in 1587, 12 in 1588, and
roughly 1 to 2 each year for the following ten years.36 These figures appear to reflect abjurations
accomplished in the cathedral as well as in Aix’s handful of smaller parish churches. Although an
aggregate of 195 abjurations for the years 1585 to 1598 might not seem consequential for a
provincial city such as Aix, if one assumes that comparable numbers of abjurations occurred in
most of the major provincial towns just in central and southern France the total figure of Huguenots
that converted under pressure during this period could easily reach over 2,000. At the same time,
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it should also be remembered that the Edict of Nemours presented Huguenots with only two
options: convert or emigrate. Many Protestants chose the latter option, departing the kingdom for
the safe havens of Geneva, England, or Zeeland.37
Catholic clergy also utilized the Edict to intensify surveillance of the men and women
residing in their communities. Such heightened observation was at least partly due to the efforts
of local authorities to enforce the Edict’s provisions, as suggested in an attestation from 1590. In
this document, sworn in May 1590 before the greffier civil of Saint-Saulge, a small town in the
province of Nivernais, the curate of the local church, Guillaume Berry, and his assisting vicar,
Silvain Desprez, affirmed “that there are no, nor do they know of having in this city and parish,
any heretics or anyone suspected of heresy.” Berry went on to affirm that he knew of only one
parishioner, now deceased, who “had been a heretic for some time,” but had abjured the Protestant
faith and was received “into the Catholic, apostolic, and Roman church” prior to his death.38 That
Berry and Desprez swore this in the presence of the town’s chief clerk implies that the town council
or provincial leadership had mandated the document’s creation in an attempt to ensure uniformity
of religious belief in Saint-Saulge. Evidence of similar local initiatives elsewhere comes from
Beaune, where municipal leaders in April 1586 asked the sacristan of Notre-Dame and the vicars
of all parish churches to hand over the names of Huguenots whose confessions they had heard in
the weeks and months following the Edict.39
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As part of their multifaceted efforts to eradicate the Protestant faith, clerics in some regions
appear to have enacted inquisitional practices aimed at suppressing heresy. Admittedly, the term
“inquisition” conjures up a host of images involving tribunals, torture, and capital punishment,
though recent scholarship on the Spanish and Italian Inquisitions has attempted to dispel a variety
of myths and exaggerations that have distorted understandings of this controversial historical
phenomenon.40 While ecclesiastical leaders never developed inquisitorial initiatives within France
to the extent that they did in sixteenth-century Spain and Italy, efforts to establish something like
an Inquisition appear to have made some progress during the 1580s and 1590s.41 In June 1591,
Charles de Lorraine duc de Mayenne approved the appointment of a Jacobin friar and doctor of
theology, Arnaud de Saint-Fort, to the position of “inquisitor of the faith” in Toulouse, where
Saint-Fort had apparently labored for some time.

The document confirming Saint-Fort’s

appointment as the inquisitor of Toulouse, with responsibility for the wider province of
Languedoc, indicates that he was charged with “the maintenance of the Catholic Church and
religion” and “the extirpation of heresies,” though without specifying exactly how the cleric was
to implement such pursuits. Interestingly, the impetus for Saint-Fort’s selection for this position
appears to have come from the Jacobin provincial of Languedoc, Jacques de la Pave, who
submitted “letters of commission” to the duc de Mayenne, then encamped in the ligueur city of
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The absence of similar documents could suggest that formal endeavors to

establish an Inquisition were limited to Languedoc, a province with one of the highest
concentrations of Huguenots as well as a long history of indigenous heretical movements.43
Because they interrogated Huguenot converts and observed their subsequent conduct,
clerics wielded the power to effectively demarcate heretics and expose them to severe religious
penalties. Ensuing behavior that did not accord with Catholic belief and practice signaled an
insincere or unfinished conversion, and thus an incomplete renunciation of one’s former faith.
Accordingly, the clergy of Notre-Dame church in Beaune refused in late 1596 to bury or even
sound the church bells for a local doctor of some renown named Claude Dariot, despite pressure
from city councilors to do so.44 Dariot had abjured Protestantism at some point during the
preceding years, but had not “done his Catholic duty” by subsequently attending Mass and taking
communion. Hearing testimony from its sacristan of Dariot’s persistent failure to participate in
the Eucharistic rite, the chapter resolved not to have the bells rung for Dariot or to permit him “to
be buried in any of our churches or cemeteries,” which they considered sacred space and sanctified
ground.45 Had he made good on his abjuration by later attending Mass and receiving the Eucharist,
as had the widow of Antoine Virot sieur de Tailly in 1586, who though having been “of the new
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opinion” professed the Catholic faith and later received the sacraments, Dariot would almost
certainly have been afforded a Catholic burial in one of Beaune’s several churches and
cemeteries.46 His failure to do so suggested to the clerics of Notre-Dame that he had relapsed,
leaving the new religion to return to his old faith.
The exclusion of Dariot’s remains from churches and cemeteries in Beaune constituted a
potent act of symbolic exclusion. As the rectors of the Confraternity of the Holy Cross reminded
the city council of Lyon, which in 1586 was considering allowing Protestants to be buried in the
cemetery of the Hôtel-Dieu, “a heretic must not be interred in holy and consecrated ground, nor in
a cemetery of Catholic Christians.”47 Penny Roberts has contended in her work on ProtestantCatholic burial disputes during the religious wars that, by excluding Protestant burial, “the
previously communal churchyard, the repository of a collective ancestry, became symbolic of the
confessional rift in society.”48 While Roberts’s insights are more applicable to communities
containing both Protestant and Catholic cemeteries, her assertions about the emblematic nature of
conflict over such sites are helpful in assessing the actions of Beaune’s clerics regarding the burial
of Dariot. In one sense, their denial of burial to Dariot can be understood as an act to ensure that
a heretical body did not profane the chapels, graveyards, and tombs in which their ancestors were
buried. Yet their action also signified Dariot’s confessional difference and his perpetual ostracism
from the spiritual union of the Christian church, living and dead.
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In addition to serious religious penalties, clergy’s capacity to demarcate heretics meant that
they could alternately shield individuals from or expose them to severe civil and judicial
punishment. In Dijon, for example, scores of Huguenots abjured Protestantism after 1585, and
municipal authorities constantly sought opportunities to expel anyone surreptitiously practicing
the Protestant faith.

In 1595 they began investigating Denis de la Bretèche, a teacher of

penmanship they suspected of converting to Protestantism.49 Three days later, the échevins
charged with scrutinizing Bretèche reported back to the council that he was not Protestant, but
“lives in accordance with the apostolic and Roman religion.” As proof of Bretèche’s religion, they
provided a document signed by Jean Debens, a priest in the Saint-Michel parish church, stating
that Bretèche was his parishioner, attended religious services, received the sacraments, and
presented his children for baptism. In addition, Bretèche had never given Debens any reason to
suspect that he or the members of his family had done “anything contrary to the [Catholic]
religion.”50 Debens’s attestation ultimately prevented the expulsion of Bretèche and his family
from Dijon, along with the consequent hardships such an outcome would have encompassed.
Debens’s emphasis on the external evidence of religion highlights another important aspect
of clerical attempts to police confessional adherence and religious identity. To a clerical observer
such as Debens, Bretèche’s performance of customary Catholic rites and rituals indicated that his
attachment to Catholicism remained firm. While extant records do not indicate why the échevins
of Dijon initially suspected Bretèche of having converted to Protestantism, his faithful involvement
in the signs and symbols of Catholicism signaled to Debens that he was a good Catholic. Had
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Bretèche failed to present one of his children for baptism or only infrequently attended Mass,
Debens would have had reason to suspect that he had fallen into religious error. If Bretèche had
previously been an adherent of Protestantism but had abjured the faith and was now a practicing
Catholic, Debens may have carried out a more intrusive examination of Bretèche’s religious
beliefs, as well as his understanding of and respect for correct doctrine.
In pressuring Huguenots to abjure the Protestant faith and submit to the authority of the
Catholic church, Catholic clergy engaged in persistent spiritual combat against religious heresy.
By differentiating Protestants from Catholics, clerics erected a firm confessional boundary
between the adherents of the two religions, a boundary that possessed distinct social and cultural
implications. Clerics actively sought converts in an effort to rid their communities of the contagion
of heresy, though the conversion model they attempted to fashion contained fissures and
contradictions. Huguenot abjurations seemed to confirm the falseness of the Protestant faith, while
simultaneously providing Catholic clergy with new opportunities to police religious practice and
belief. Although clerics across France moved assertively to effect abjurations in the wake of the
Edict of Nemours, they struggled to balance ongoing concerns over matters of sincerity, freedom
of conscience, and doctrinal assent.

DEVOTIONAL ACTIVISM

Catholic clerics’ personal and collective attempts to oppose heresy within their own
communities encompassed forms of devotional activism associated with Counter-Reformation
religious piety. The persistence of Protestant belief and determination of Huguenot military forces

157
motivated clergy to organize displays of militant religiosity that expressed their devotion to the
Catholic faith and opposition to Calvinist heresy. Clerics attached to cathedrals and collegiate
churches in Catholic-dominated towns actively orchestrated devotional processions, civic rituals
that emphasized penitential devotion and pious zeal for an ultimate victory over heresy. These
dramatic, collective actions were frequently timed to coincide with critical military operations,
expressing a notion of a universal or militant Church engaged in a multi-layered struggle against
the heretics. In addition, members of Counter-Reformation religious orders like the Capuchins
and the Jesuits encouraged the establishment of confraternities in many cities and towns, which
provided further sites for lay Catholics to participate in devotional activism.51

Clerics’

implementation of collective devotional activism continually distinguished Catholics from
Protestants, thus contributing to the reinforcement of confessional identities.
Proponents of Catholic renewal in the later sixteenth century placed considerable emphasis
on exteriorized, penitential piety. Many of the new Counter-Reformation orders, favored by the
papacy to oppose Protestant heresy and advance Catholic confessionalization, emphasized prayer,
fasting, penance, and charity as hallmarks of authentic spiritual devotion.52 Henri III himself
engaged in highly publicized devotional activities in the 1580s, processing through the streets of
Paris dressed as a penitent and spending extended periods of time at the Hieronymite monastery
in the Bois de Vincennes.53 Apocalyptic fervor and Catholic zeal spurred an immense wave of
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penitential processions, known as the processions blanches, throughout much of France in 1583
and 1584, as Denis Crouzet has helpfully shown.54
Many clergy considered processions as an effective way to model devotional piety for lay
Catholics in a solemn yet impassioned context. Archdeacon Jean Ligeret of Mâcon’s SaintVincent cathedral chapter, for example, urged the bishop of Mâcon in September 1587 to
commission its canons to conduct a general procession on the next Sunday. According to the
chapter register, the bishop agreed and instructed the clerics to ask the city council for permission
to announce the procession throughout the city, “so that the people dress as penitents and attend
it.”55 In a similar way, the canons of Saint-Jean cathedral chapter in Lyon resolved to conduct
regular processions during May 1589 “to incite the people to pray to God for the pacifying of the
troubles and the suppression of heresies.”56 Conceptualized in this manner, processions served as
a mechanism for confessional bonding through popular devotion during a period of severe political
upheaval.
While they drew on older medieval traditions of Eucharistic processional piety, Catholic
clergy elaborated and expanded upon this form of devotional activism during the Wars of Religion
by introducing distinct anti-Huguenot characteristics. The vicars-general of Saint-Lazare cathedral
at Autun, in western Burgundy, commissioned public prayers and processions on the occasion of
the jubilee proclaimed by Pope Sixtus V in the spring of 1588. The stated purpose of these
collective performances of devotion was “to appease [God’s] wrath against us,” but also to appeal
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for “the conversion of the unrepentant [and] extirpation of the rebels.57
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Explicitly connecting the

subjugation of Protestants to the welfare of both French Catholicism and the French state, Autun’s
clerical officials presented Huguenots as outsiders posing acute threats within Catholic
communities. The rituals and processions they planned were to serve as a collective demonstration
of penitential piety and a call for divine action to eradicate heresy.
If processions constituted a public representation of the church’s triumph over heresy, they
also emphasized zeal for an ultimate victory over the heretics plaguing the French kingdom. In
Beaune, the Notre-Dame collegiate chapter organized processions on three successive Rogation
Days in May 1590 to “beg God to quench his wrath towards us and give the Catholics victory over
the heretics.”58 Beaune’s chapter clergy led similar processions in early 1592, as Henri IV’s army
was engaged in a brutal, protracted siege of the League-controlled city of Rouen.59 The stated
purpose of a procession held on 6 January of that year was to implore God “to give us a good
Catholic king,” while the intent of several processions conducted in mid-February was to “entreat
God on behalf of the Catholic princes and to obtain victory against the heretics.”60 Such assertions
convey the notion of militant church united in a multidimensional struggle against the Huguenots.
Catholic processions celebrating specific military battles and momentous episodes of
religious violence not only animated partisan feelings but disturbed and even intimidated the
Huguenot residents of Catholic-dominated towns and regions. Leaders of the Protestant churches
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in France petitioned the crown during the League period to suppress Catholic processions and
related forms of militant activism that commemorated Catholic violence or Protestant misfortune.
In late 1593, Huguenot ecclesiastical leaders gathered in Mantes, halfway between Rouen and
Paris, and compiled a list of urgent demands concerning the treatment of Protestants to be sent to
Henri IV, whose momentous abjuration of the Huguenot faith had occurred just five months
earlier. One of the representatives’ key requests was that the king forbid all French Catholics “to
celebrate any festivals or conduct processions on account of the death of the prince de Condé, Saint
Bartholomew’s Day, the taking of cities, battles and [other] engagements” in which the Huguenots
suffered defeat.

From the viewpoint of Protestant religious leaders, such processions and

collective actions “renew the memory of these events,” venerating religious conflict and
contestation and buttressing confessional divisions within French society.61
In addition to collective processions, Catholic clergy aggressively endeavored to organize
new confraternities, which provided further sites for lay Catholics to participate in devotional
activities. Ann W. Ramsey and Andrew Barnes have demonstrated the connections between
confraternities and militant devotional activism in the later sixteeenth century, especially with
respect to anti-Huguenot initiatives.62 The members of Counter-Reformation religious orders were
instrumental in introducing confraternities into cities and towns in contested regions, pressuring
municipal leaders to permit the establishment of new confraternal organizations. A Capuchin
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preacher urged the city council of Carcassonne in 1594 to allow him to introduce a penitential
confraternity into the town, which had declared for the League in 1590.63 In pressing councilors
to allow this, the Capuchin asserted that he knew of “a great number of people who wished to
introduce a confraternity of penitents in this city,” suggesting widespread popular support for
increased confessional activism in Carcassonne.64 Because they were founded and sponsored by
clergy, new confraternities operated out of Catholic churches in the parishes and districts from
which their membership was drawn.
Confraternal associations strove to reinforce the practices and rituals of the post-Tridentine
Catholic faith by molding expressions of religious enthusiasm and devotion. A confraternity
founded in 1587 at the Mathurin convent in Toulouse required its members to participate in a
number of annual processions and religious observances, particularly on feast days. Members
were also to attend each high Mass and requiem Mass performed in the convent’s church, as well
as participating in regular meetings.65 Likewise, each adherent of the Confraternity of SaintMichel, established in Orléans in 1590, was obligated to confess their sins and receive the
Eucharist “once per month in his [own] parish and elsewhere,” characteristic innovations of the
Counter-Reformation, which promoted more frequent reception of the sacraments and attempted
to focus religious life on the parish.66 Masses for confraternity members and requiems for the
confraternal dead further intensified Catholic religious solidarity. Devotional requirements such
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as these underscore the ways in which confraternities could reinforce Catholic religious reform
and clerical authority in the context of collective rites and activities.
Confraternities founded in the 1580s and 1590s attempted to position themselves at the
forefront of militant Catholic opposition to the Huguenots. The articles of the Confraternity of
Saint-Michel required all members to swear “to live and die in the Catholic, apostolic, and Roman
faith and religion, which is the only, the true, and singular religion, outside of which no one may
be saved.” Members also pledged “to never recognize Henri de Bourbon as king,” indicating how
Catholic clerics used confraternal involvement to foster ligueur militancy. Furthermore, the
adherents of the confraternity explicitly swore “to promptly arm and equip themselves … in order
to go out against the heretics in battle” at the command of Orléans’s ligueur governor, Charles II
de la Chastre baron de Maisonfort, esteeming it favorable “to be killed defending the cause of God
and of his church.”67 Confraternities founded exclusively for women similarly appear to have been
centers of anti-Protestant activism. After arriving in Toulouse to negotiate with Languedoc’s
leading Leaguers on behalf of Henri IV, Méry de Vic wrote to the king of intense opposition in
the city from within the confraternities. Particularly hostile were the women of the Confraternity
of the White Cross, who apparently “would strangle their children … if they ever recognized Your
Majesty.”68

The Counter-Reformation church thus afforded lay women and men new

opportunities for militant religious piety.
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The active implementation of new and revived devotional practices by Catholic clergy,
therefore, promoted interrelated processes of Counter-Reformation and confessionalization in late
sixteenth-century France. Clerics’ promotion of post-Tridentine devotional activism for lay
Catholics in cities and towns across France helped construct distinct confessional boundaries by
differentiating Catholics from Protestants. Militant devotional activism also helped perpetuate and
reinforce the local character of resurgent French Catholicism. Clearer confessional definition
through devotional activism heightened anxieties about heretical contamination, further depriving
Huguenots of membership in Catholic communities. Exciting popular emotions and emphasizing
zealous and dramatic activities, clergy encouraged lay Catholics to embrace confessional activism
and militancy.

THE CAPUCHINS OF BÉZIERS AND SPIRITUAL OPPOSITION TO HENRI IV

The intriguing case of the Capuchins of Béziers illustrates how Catholic clergy took
emphatic and consequential stances against Protestant heresy as embodied in the figure of Henri
IV. As historians such as Michael Wolfe and others have informed, Henri IV’s formal abjuration
of Protestantism in the abbey church of Saint-Denis on 25 July 1593 touched off intense debate
among Leaguers and royalist Catholics over the sincerity of the monarch’s conversion.69
According to contemporary diarist Pierre de l’Estoile, League preachers in Paris like Jean Boucher
declared from their pulpits “that the king had gone to Mass by day and to the prêche by night,”
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underlining their profound suspicion of the authenticity of Henri IV’s renunciation of the
Protestant faith.70 In royalist-controlled cities throughout the French kingdom, crown officials,
municipal authorities, and even some anti-League prelates organized public ceremonies and
religious services of thanksgiving for the king’s conversion. Although the Pope had not yet
absolved Henri IV by negating his excommunication, Catholics across France were enjoined to
trust the sincerity of the newly Catholic monarch and acknowledge divine providence in bringing
about his momentous conversion. Such was the case in the royalist stronghold of Béziers in Bas
Languedoc, which had been firmly under the control of Henri I de Montmorency duc de
Montmorency since the mid-1580s and to which the duc had transferred the province’s royalist
parlement in December 1591.71 However, the Capuchin friars of Béziers steadfastly refused to
participate in religious services celebrating Henri IV’s conversion to Catholicism, openly
demonstrating their spiritual opposition to the newly converted monarch in a fascinating episode
of confrontation that garnered the attention not only of local leaders and judicial authorities but
also of the French king himself.
Determined opposition on the part of the Capuchin friars of Béziers to participation in
religious services celebrating Henri IV’s conversion became a major concern for local authorities
in August 1593, not long after the royalist parlement at Béziers instructed the city’s bishop,
Thomas I de Bonsi, to organize public services invoking divine protection for the king. In the first
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of several letters to Henri IV, the parlement’s premier président, Pierre d’Ausserre, claimed that
after the royal court had heard on 14 August “the news of Your Majesty’s pleasing reconciliation
to the Catholic Church,” its members ordered the bishop to commission public prayers and a
procession for the following Sunday, and then “went as a group to the [cathedral] church of SaintNazaire in order to sing the Te Deum,” a traditional hymn of praise associated with royal
ceremonial.72 According to d’Ausserre, the procession took place on the appointed day along with
a sermon and celebratory bonfires, all of which were executed “most honorably and without any
dispute, except for the Capuchins who had no intention of being found there.”73 Incensed, the
bishop of Béziers dispatched an emissary to threaten the Capuchins and present them with the
court’s formal order to participate in the ceremonies. In the face of such pressure, the monks
appear to have placated the bishop.
Despite yielding to episcopal pressure to participate in the general procession and related
ceremonies on 22 August, the Capuchins continued to defy official directives to collectively pray
for Henri IV. Perceiving the importance of “the continuance of public prayers for the health and
prosperity of Your Majesty and the peace of his state,” the parlement next sent two of its members
to the bishop in order to reiterate the need for such prayers, to which the bishop responded by
producing a notarized order to all of the city’s ecclesiastical establishments to that effect.74
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Seemingly unconvinced that the bishop’s order would be obeyed without delay, the deputies
queried “several monks of each monastery in order to know how they had proceeded.”75 Much to
their consternation, the deputies discovered “exactly the opposite, because the Capuchins
absolutely refuse to conduct these prayers, as do the Carmelites.”76 Evidently, the Capuchins’
audacity in contravening the parlement and the bishop had emboldened the friars of the city’s
mendicant Carmelite order, one of the three principal occupations of which was contemplative
prayer, to similarly flaunt both judicial and episcopal authority with respect to collective prayers
for the French king.77
Refusal to publicly pray for religious opponents appears to have been a preferred tactic of
ligueur clergy in their efforts to oppose heresy. For example, the clergy of Saint-Jean-Baptiste
church in Dijon refused to conduct prayers for Germain Piot, who in March 1591 died
“excommunicate” while “bearing arms for the king of Navarre against the Holy Union.” To make
matters worse, prior to his death Piot had apparently participated in the burning of barns owned by
the Cistercian monks of nearby Cîteaux. Saint-Jean-Baptiste’s clerics persisted in their refusal to
pray for Piot, despite the fact that his mother and father were “respectable people and good
Catholics.”78 Because he had fought against the military forces of the Catholic League and enacted
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violence against the Cistercians at Cîteaux, it was unthinkable for the clergy of Saint-Jean-Baptiste
to pray for the soul of Piot, despite his family’s long connection with the church. Their refusal to
collectively entreat God on Piot’s behalf thus signaled his continued exclusion from the
communion of the Catholic faithful.
The Capuchins’ obstinate refusal to publicly pray for Henri IV predictably resulted in a
summons to appear before the parlement and account for their willful noncompliance. Appearing
in court on the morning of 7 September, a delegation of friars from the Capuchin monastery
appears to have somewhat meekly yet firmly maintained their order’s resistance to obligatory
prayers on the king’s behalf. As Pierre d’Ausserre explained in his initial letter, the judges “made
remonstrances to them as gently and decently as possible,” an assertion that probably exaggerates
the parlement’s benignity towards the recalcitrant clerics, since “we were not able to make them
accede thereto.”79 While there is limited documentary evidence of what the Capuchin friars
actually said in their defense before the parlement, we can glean some sense of what they most
likely said in an instructional memorandum provided by the duc de Montmorency to Jacques
Vallier seigneur de Saint-Aubin in late 1593.80 In this document, Saint-Aubin is instructed to
apprise the king of the Capuchins’ contention
that they do not have cure of souls, that they do not say high Masses, neither do they
perform other public acts proper for divine service, [rather] that their function consists
solely in mental prayers and low Masses, according to the established rule [of what] is
proscribed for them word-for-word by the general of their order, and to which they cannot
add or take away from, without contravening their constitutions and meriting the
81
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Clearly, the Capuchin delegation hoped to obtain exemption from the official directive for public
prayers by convincing the judges that its monastic regulations expressly prohibited the monks of
this austere order from leading public religious services. This sweeping assertion seems rather
strange in light of what historians such as Bernard Dompnier have identified as significant
preaching and missionizing activities on the part of Capuchins throughout France at this time.82
The Capuchins of Paris would also conduct large-scale public exorcisms in late 1598 and early
1599 that were attended by hundreds of people, an activity also in apparent conflict with their
purported declaration to the parlement in Béziers.83

By way of concession, the Capuchin

delegation is reported to have stated that it would “nevertheless in their mental orations perform
the aforesaid prayers for the king,” a compromise that at first glance might appear to show the
monks in a rather more conciliatory light.84 Yet given the profoundly public nature of religious
devotion in the sixteenth century, the Capuchins’ offer to mentally pray for Henri IV—however
much religious interiority was touted within contemplative mysticism—was unlikely to have
satisfied either the court’s directive or the bishop’s call for an oral, audible, and public expression
of devotion on the king’s behalf.85
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Aside from offering to conduct mental prayers for the king, the Capuchins also sought
permission to solicit additional advice from the minister general of their order in Rome. As the
instructional memorandum indicates, the friars advocated a “delay of two months, [during which]
they will apprise their general of the situation” and solicit his advice.86 Such an offer almost
certainly constituted a clever tactic designed to prolong the situation, though it may also have been
an attempt to obtain some sort of ecclesiastical cover should the Capuchins be forcefully compelled
by judicial authorities to obey the court’s arrêt concerning public prayers for Henri IV. Regardless
of the Capuchins’ intentions in asking for additional time to consult with their order’s minister
general, Montmorency and other leaders in Béziers seriously doubted whether any positive
outcome would ensue, particularly because the order’s leadership was based in Rome, “where the
enemies of France loudly clamor.”87 Yet the parlementaires also resolved to discover “if another
of their order with monasteries at Chartres, Blois, Mantes, Gaillon and other places loyal to the
king are performing these prayers on the king’s behalf,” which suggests that at least some of the
judges gave moderate credence to the Capuchins’ claims that the performance of public prayer
services was contrary to their organization’s statutes.88
The Capuchins’ refusal to publicly pray for Henri IV encouraged other religious orders in
Béziers to join them in this momentous confrontation against the embattled king. Their obstinacy
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before the parlement began to generate “a great scandal, upon which the other monks and
monasteries [of the city] wished to make common cause with them.”89 With the situation clearly
escalating beyond an allowable level of dissent, the court’s procureur général commanded the
friars “to obey or to leave the city,” and then sent them back to their monastery “to come to a
decision as to the means to satisfy this essential and necessary duty.”90 It is unclear whether the
court genuinely thought that the Capuchins would seriously reconsider their position, or if the
judges merely wanted time to consider the situation more fully now that the friars had formally
given voice to their insubordination. However, the court concluded that it would be advisable to
confer with the duc de Montmorency, who was at that time in the neighboring town of Pézenas.
As far as the Capuchins were concerned, there was no need to discuss among themselves
any possible means to appease either parlement or bishop, since the friars had definitively resolved
not to do so and were prepared to face whatever consequences ensued, including leaving the city.
“Around noon on the same day,” d’Ausserre informed the king, “they departed the city and went
to rebel-held Narbonne,” some sixteen miles to the southwest, which had been allied to the League
since the early months of 1589.91 While we have no way of confirming the precise number of
Capuchin friars that left Béziers for Narbonne, d’Ausserre seems to imply that the Capuchins
shuttered their monastery and departed the city en masse. Municipal records from Narbonne
indicate that the Capuchin convent there could temporarily accommodate an influx of residents, as
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In a second letter to Henri IV bearing the same date

as his initial letter, d’Ausserre asserted that “the Capuchin monks residing in this city wished to
leave it and abandon their monastery rather than conduct public prayers to God for Your Majesty’s
health and prosperity.”93 This second report of d’Ausserre’s certainly gives the impression that
virtually all of Béziers’s Capuchins vacated the city and joined their ligueur partisans in
neighboring Narbonne. Yet d’Ausserre was also at pains to assure the king that the Capuchins
departed the city “voluntarily,” implying that a forceful expulsion of the rebellious friars may not
have been in keeping with Henri IV’s emergent politics of douceur, or gentleness.94
In making the decision to vacate their city of residence, the Capuchins of Béziers received
support from members of their order in the nearby town of Agde, some of whom even joined the
friars in their threatened relocation to the League stronghold of Narbonne. Situated just over
twelve miles east of Béziers on the Mediterranean coast, the small city of Agde remained firmly
under the duc de Montmorency’s control throughout the 1580s and 1590s. Its bishop, Bernard du
Puy, who had begun his ecclesiastical career as a lowly Franciscan monk, held the diocese en
confidence and was thus altogether financially dependent upon Montmorency.95 The prelate was
also a regular participant in the royalist Estates held at Béziers until 1589 and at Pézenas from
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1591, during which he demanded the inclusion of language in the assembly’s cahier insisting that
Henri IV abjure the Reformed faith.96 The Capuchins were established in the outskirts of Agde in
1583 by none other than Montmorency, who financed the construction of a large church and
adjacent monastery on the site of an ancient chapel dedicated to the Virgin Mary.97 According to
the memorandum provided to the sieur de Saint-Aubin, the king was to be informed that “those
[Capuchins] of the convent of Agde are also resolved to depart, and all to withdraw together to
Narbonne and other enemy towns, for whom they will make a trophy.”98 While it is unclear how
exactly the Capuchins of Agde may have coordinated their resistance together with their fellow
friars in Béziers, it seems likely that there was a cooperative decision taken to abandon their
convents in protest and retire jointly to Narbonne, the League city closest to both of these locales.
The political significance of the Capuchins’ threat to depart Béziers and relocate to an
openly rebellious bastion of the League such as Narbonne is underscored by the somewhat
conciliatory measures eventually taken by local authorities to temporarily pacify the city’s
recalcitrant friars. Rather than opting to formally expel the Capuchins from Béziers as its
procureur général had initially threatened, after conferring with Montmorency the parlementaires
decided to grant the friars’ request for a two-month delay while simultaneously imposing
provisional restrictions upon them.

As the memorandum indicates, the parlement and

Montmorency jointly determined “that the Capuchins shall continue residing within their convent
… without conducting any divine service in public, [and] that they will keep their doors closed,
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that they will not sound any bells nor receive the people into their church, except to continue their
prayers in private and their masses amongst themselves alone.”99 However, the judges permitted
the friars “to go about the city to make provision for their nourishment.”100 Many of these
restrictions on the Capuchins’ activity were doubtless viewed by the monks as rather benign,
particularly the directive to continue contemplative prayers and low Masses privately or
intramurally as usual. Yet the liturgical confinement of the Capuchins to the inside of their
monastery, together with the ban on receiving visitors and ringing the bells of their belfry,
occasioned the friars’ exclusion—both symbolic and literal—from the town’s corporate religious
life. The court’s proscription of bell-ringing in particular restricted the friars’ ability to aurally
demarcate sacred time and space within a region teeming with Huguenots and so-called politiques,
which must have been especially frustrating for the members of a militant Catholic reform order
dedicated to spiritual renewal and penitential devotion.
While it is unclear whether the Capuchins of Béziers actually wrote to the general of their
order at Rome to solicit guidance, the prior of the Capuchin monastery, Frère Simon, penned a
long letter to Henri IV in early 1594 in which he assured the king of the monks’ allegiance but
gave no indication that they were prepared to conduct public prayer services as ordered by the
parlement. At the outset of his missive, the prior complains to the king that d’Ausserre “has had
our church closed and has deprived us of all spiritual exercises and the public [divine] office, which
all true and good Catholics must do, even more so the regular clergy and consummate monks,
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namely those of our order,” a somewhat puzzling assertion in light of the friars’ previous claim
that public religious services were at variance with the order’s regulations.101 Yet the prior also
affirmed that d’Ausserre “has made you to understand … that we do not wish to pray for your
fortunate estate and venerable majesty, something that would be more than barbarous and cruel.”102
In contrast to d’Ausserre’s accusation, Simon asserted that the Capuchins were greatly concerned
for the king’s health and prosperity, and went on to delineate an extensive number of prayers that
the friars regularly performed both vocally and silently for the monarch. Aside from the priestly
clerics who say “vocally once per day the psalm Exaudiat te dominus … together [with] the oration
Quaesumus omnipotens deus,” lay brothers “without the ability to read say fifteen Paters and as
many Aves per day.”103 In addition, all priests of the order are enjoined “to remember to petition
God for your state, advancement, and prosperity during their offerings and Masses and in their
commemorations, and to all those assisting them [during these activities] to offer with immense
devotion the same sacrifice to God for your needs.”104 Furthermore, in the “two hours of mental
prayer that one performs in our religious order … each day morning and evening, together having
determined (and observed by God’s grace) that all of the brothers [shall] lift up their spirit to God,
… representing your necessities to God, praying for your estate and improvement, for the
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extirpation of heresies and the augmentation of the [Catholic] faith in your kingdom.”105
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The litany

of prayers that Simon has outlined here is admittedly impressive, and may have even been useful
in convincing some individuals of the Capuchin leader’s allegiance to Henri IV. Yet it is difficult
to evaluate the sincerity of the prior’s assertions, and at no point in his letter does he give any
indication that the monks under his charge are prepared to conduct the public prayer services
previously commanded of all other ecclesiastical organizations in Béziers subsequent to the king’s
momentous abjuration the preceding summer. Frère Simon’s assurances regarding the particular
content of private and ceremonial prayers that Béziers’s Capuchins apparently conducted on a
regular basis would have provided little satisfaction to the monarch and key royal officials seeking
widespread ecclesiastical endorsement of Henri IV’s controversial conversion.
There is some evidence to suggest that Henri IV was somewhat displeased at the way in
which the duc de Montmorency and Pierre d’Ausserre punished the Capuchins for their refusal to
conduct public prayer services, which prompted the premier président to defend his actions in
writing. In a brief letter to Henri IV composed just nine days after Frère Simon’s letter to the
monarch, d’Ausserre affirms his desire to “enlighten Your Majesty of that which has occurred here
concerning his justice,” indicating the premier président’s belief that the king had been
misinformed of the events in Béziers and his intent to justify the measures taken by himself and
other officials in the region.106 D’Ausserre insists that he has provided the king with “the true
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report of everything that has transpired, which I promise is genuine at the risk of my life and my
honor … because I would never offend him deliberately or maliciously.”107 With regard to “the
obstacles that the Capuchins carry out against me here,” d’Ausserre contends that he “cannot
tolerate them, Sire,” and goes on to make the fairly audacious claim that “at Rome and at the ends
of the earth, my intention will be found just and reasonable.”108 D’Ausserre is particularly adamant
that a firm response was required in answer to the Capuchins’ refusal to pray for the king, as the
matter “touches your person, which—after God—is straightaway the primary thing honored,
adored, and loved [by me] in all humility.”109 Yet d’Ausserre also attempts to rationalize the hard
line taken against the Capuchins by pointing out the fact that the duc de Montmorency and his
brother, Charles de Montmorency-Damville, a royalist military commander, “have recognized at
last their evil nature, and … the connétable wanted to chase them away and will do it. He knows
that you have not abandoned me in this matter, or your court, which has proceeded herein most
sincerely.”110 Evidently, d’Ausserre felt compelled to offer the king as robust of a defense as
possible of his court’s chastisement of the Capuchin friars, suggesting that the premier président
had come under considerable royal scrutiny for his handling of the affair.
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Although the precise details are somewhat difficult to glean from existing documents, the
Capuchins persisted in their refusal to publicly pray for Henri IV for the better part of a year,
yielding only momentarily after intervention by both the papal vice-legate of Avignon and the
prior of Avignon’s Capuchin monastery. As d’Ausserre rather cheerfully notified the king in
December 1594, royal officials in Béziers “had at long last brought the Capuchins of this city back
to their duty” with the support of both of these clerics, though he fails to elaborate on the exact
role these prominent individuals played in persuading the friars to yield to the parlement’s will.111
D’Ausserre again emphasizes his exceedingly charitable treatment of the Capuchins, proclaiming
quite dramatically that “I have cherished, caressed and assisted them in every possible way,” in
particular by arranging “in your name … a payment of 50 écus in order to clothe them this winter
and provide for their incidental needs.”112 The parlement’s generosity towards the Capuchins
appears to have been in vain, however, as the friars seem to have taken no firm decision to remain
within the hostile environment of Béziers. “The other Capuchins who reside in ligueur cities and
among those that … obey Your Majesty only by force,” d’Ausserre informed the king, “have
suborned them in such a manner that they quietly left on the twentieth of this month, … two for
Toulouse, two for Carcassonne, and two for Provence, because they would not suffer anyone to
conduct the [aforesaid] prayers in their monastery for Your Majesty’s health and prosperity.”113
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In explaining the Capuchins’ latest departure to the king, d’Ausserre clearly hoped to avoid giving
the impression that the local friars themselves were to ultimately to blame, but rather stressed the
role of Capuchins from nearly League cities in surreptitiously inducing the monks of Béziers to
abandon their monastery. There may have been some internal disagreement among Béziers’s
Capuchins, in light of d’Ausserre’s claim that the friars “left two [monks] to guard their monastery,
stating that they had their superiors’ permission [to do so].”114
The Capuchins’ renewed defiance of the parlement de Béziers in December 1594 could
have formed part of a wider strategy on the part of regular Catholic clergy throughout the province
of Languedoc to challenge royal authority as well as conciliatory impulses on the part of formerly
steadfast Leaguers. D’Ausserre certainly seems to have considered this the case, as he connected
the departure of Béziers’s Capuchins to news that “two Jesuits, as well as Capuchins and other
mendicants, wanted to publicly stir up a new sedition at Toulouse.”115 This reference to a dramatic
episode of civil unrest in Toulouse, orchestrated by the Franciscan preacher Maurel, suggests that
d’Ausserre judged the subversive actions of Béziers’s friars as part of a broader undertaking by
the members of Catholic religious orders such as the Jesuits and Capuchins to renew enthusiasm
for the embattled League throughout southern France.116
The intriguing case of the Capuchins of Béziers underscores the willingness of regular
clerics to defy magisterial and episcopal directives at a critical moment when such dictates
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provided essential religious support for the newly converted monarch still battling to consolidate
his control of the vast French kingdom. Far from remaining a minor issue easily managed by local
authorities, the Capuchins’ persistent refusal to publicly pray for Henri IV became a significant
political problem not only for the judges of the region’s parlement but especially for its premier
président, Pierre d’Ausserre. The Capuchins’ determination to defy official instructions to pray
for the king put the entire civil and judicial leadership of Béziers in disarray from July 1593 to
January 1595, capturing the attention of Henri IV himself and involving Pierre d’Ausserre in
extensive correspondence with the king, as well as lengthy negotiations with the duc de
Montmorency and the papal vice-legate of Avignon. For their part, the Capuchins obtained
repeated concessions from the parlement, frustrating the court’s desire for widespread clerical
legitimization of the king’s momentous conversion at Saint-Denis. Even after the intervention of
the papal vice-legate, Béziers’s Capuchins renewed their defiance of the court’s directives,
departing the city in December 1594 for an unspecified period of time and dispersing in small
groups to various League strongholds throughout Languedoc and neighboring Provence. The
Capuchins’ persistent subversion of the authority of the parlement de Béziers thus constituted an
important challenge to royal authority in Bas Languedoc, even within key towns that were firmly
in royalist hands throughout this fraught period.

CONCLUSION

Clerics’ personal and collective actions in opposition to Protestant heresy and heretics
helped entrench confessional identities in the late sixteenth century. As they enacted religious
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coercion, Catholic clergy positioned themselves as zealous proponents of a militant Catholicism
unwilling to contemplate coexisting with Protestants. Pressuring Huguenots to convert to the
Catholic faith immersed Catholic clerics in a seemingly cosmic struggle against Protestant heresy,
which had afflicted the kingdom of France for several decades. Organizing militant devotional
activism enabled clergy to mobilize lay Catholics in displays of penitential devotion and pious zeal
for a decisive victory over the heretics. Demonstrations of resolute spiritual opposition to Henri
IV, whose abjuration of the Protestant faith in 1593 was regarded by many ligueurs as an execrable
deception, asserted clerics’ active hostility to a heretic’s pretensions to the French throne. Clerical
activism in opposition to Protestantism represented the Huguenots’ spiritual exclusion from the
true community of Catholic faithful, reinforcing the sense of Protestant separateness in late
sixteenth-century French society.

PART II. SECTARIAN VIOLENCE AND RELIGIOUS WARFARE

CHAPTER 4
‘ALMOST TWICE AS MANY CAVALRY AS ME’:
WARFARE AND MILITARY OPERATIONS

In a letter written to a family member in late 1590, François cardinal de Joyeuse discussed
the recent troop movements of politique nobleman Henri I de Montmorency duc de Montmorency
in the region around the fortified city of Carcassonne in Haut Languedoc, which at that time was
allied to the Catholic League. Joyeuse claims to have attempted to engage Montmorency a number
of times on the battlefield, only to see the powerful duc withdraw inexplicably at the last moment.
Montmorency’s avoidance of battle was especially puzzling for Joyeuse, since the duc was
reported to have “almost twice as many cavalry as me.” Undoubtedly owing to the numerical
disparity between their two armies, Joyeuse’s own troops were similarly reluctant to commit
themselves to battle. “As I planned to go engage him in battle,” Joyeuse explains, “[my] Spanish
cavalry abandoned me out of fear.” Despite his Spanish auxiliaries’ reticence to follow him into
battle against the numerically superior force of Montmorency, Joyeuse indicated his resolve to
keep the duc from taking Carcassonne, which “is near its last legs, being squeezed by plague and
by famine.”1 Clearly, the cardinal aimed to make effective use of the Spanish forces that had lately
arrived in the southern province of Languedoc at the behest of King Philip II of Spain, who had
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formally thrown his support behind the League some six years prior with the Treaty of Joinville.2
As archbishop of nearby Toulouse, a native of Carcassonne, and a member of a powerful regional
family, the twenty-eight-year-old cleric was resolved not to permit Montmorency to gain a
foothold in Haut Languedoc, the principal cities of which were then in League hands.3 Joyeuse’s
operational command of a League army reveals the important secular roles that high-ranking
Catholic clergy could play in military action against Huguenot and royalist forces throughout the
intense armed conflict of the 1580s and 1590s in France.
This chapter investigates clerical participation in sectarian warfare and military operations
during the tumultuous League era of the Wars of Religion. Scholarly treatment of clerics’
involvement in military processes and war-making during the wars has tended to focus largely on
the initial decades of these conflicts, when France was first convulsed by the intense sectarian
antagonism engendered in the spread of the Protestant Reformation. Recent work by Philip
Benedict on Huguenot pastors during the first few religious wars contends that a number of local
clergy involved themselves in both military mobilization and political decision-making, despite
the reservations held by leading Protestant thinkers like Théodore de Bèze regarding ministerial
participation in such activities. Benedict shows that many Reformed pastors not only bore arms
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in these wars and performed defense-related tasks in besieged Protestant-controlled cities, but also
played a role in mobilizing troops and relaying political instructions among Huguenot churches.
Yet he also argues that “no single line of conduct or mode of thinking about politics governed their
actions or arguments,” though Reformed ministers as a group seem to have recognized that the
wars “were nothing short of struggles to defend the true faith and its adherents against
extermination.”4 Regarding Catholic clergy, Frederic Baumgartner’s study of bishops during the
Wars of Religion shows that some prelates actively participated in war during the 1560s and 1570s,
especially in southern France. Baumgartner argues, however, that episcopal involvement in
warfare markedly declined after the carnage of the Saint Bartholomew’s Day Massacre of 1572
and the brief round of civil war this awful violence precipitated. As Baumgartner focuses primarily
on bishops, his study fails to examine the martial activism of other high-ranking Catholic clerics
such as abbots as well as lesser clergy like cathedral canons and parish priests.5
Recent scholarship on clergy in other regions of early modern Europe has begun to more
seriously investigate the active participation of clerics in armed conflict during the European Wars
of Religion as well as the attitudes toward clerical arms-bearing on the part of clergy and
laypersons alike. Focusing on late fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century Italy, D. S. Chambers’
study of the Renaissance papacy’s involvement in warfare argues that, “however monstrous, it was
not new fashion at all in the early sixteenth century for popes, let alone cardinals, to participate
actively in war.”6 Chambers attributes high clerical participation in war chiefly to the defense of
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jurisdictional and territorial rights believed to have been the papacy’s by an amalgam of divine
sanction, legal prescription, and established custom. Taking a somewhat different approach, Denis
De Lucca contends that the newly founded Society of Jesus played a key role in disseminating
technical knowledge about the architecture of military fortifications through its teaching and
learning institutions, which were founded to educate young Catholic nobles. Portraying all Jesuits
as militantly opposed to “heretical and infidel ideological infiltrations,” De Lucca finds that Jesuit
expertise in fortification mathematics was not limited to classrooms but extended to design
consultancy and even active service in war theatres throughout sixteenth- and seventeenth-century
continental Europe.7 Most recently, Fiona McCall’s work on loyalist clergy during the English
Civil Wars finds some indication of clerical participation in military activity, though she admits
that evidence of loyalist clerics’ bellicosity “was often somewhat circumstantial” and rooted
largely in Puritan parliamentary propaganda.8 While such studies often neglect the complex social
and cultural meanings associated with clerics’ bellicose activities, they demonstrate international
academic interest in this subject and lay the foundation for further work on clerical participation
in armed conflict of a confessional or sectarian nature during the Reformation and CounterReformation eras.
This chapter considers the complex and multifaceted ways in which French Catholic clergy
involved themselves both directly and indirectly in warfare and military operations at the height
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of the French Wars of Religion. Drawing on archival sources such as manuscript correspondence,
municipal deliberations, and cathedral chapter registers, in addition to published documents and
memoirs, I argue that Catholic clergy at virtually all levels of the ecclesiastical hierarchy became
important military actors during the intense sectarian warfare of the 1580s and 1590s. Some
clergy—lower-ranking clerics especially—performed battlefield roles as military chaplains,
endeavoring to publicly sacralize particular military operations and entreat divine intervention on
behalf of ligueur forces ostensibly engaged in “holy war” against the enemies of God. Clerics at
both the local and provincial level also worked to help fund troop mobilization costs as well as the
wages and rations necessary to keep ligueur armies in the field. Many clergy participated more
directly in sectarian warfare by fortifying defensible structures, providing weapons and logistics
services, and personally commanding troops and managing military operations. Clerics’ wideranging involvement in the organization and prosecution of sectarian warfare in this period
demonstrates that Catholic clergy had rather unexpected relationships to organized violence during
the League, thereby altering our understanding of the military dynamics of the French Wars of
Religion.

IDEAS OF CLERGY AND WAR-MAKING

The personal participation of French clergy in war-making and military activities during
the League period almost certainly complicated long-standing debates about the appropriateness
of clerical involvement in warfare and arms-bearing. The legitimacy of clerics’ involvement in
warfare had been a subject of heated debate among theologians and canon lawyers since at least
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the mid-twelfth century, when the canonist Gratian formulated the core of the Latin Christian
Church’s theory of just war. While excusing participation in warfare by laypersons, the twelfthcentury Church formally opposed clerical involvement in violence and prohibited clerics to bear
arms and fight in wars. The Church did, however, authorize clergy to accompany armies for the
provision of spiritual support through battlefield prayers and the hearing of soldiers’ confessions.9
Despite official prohibitions on their direct involvement in warfare, members of the upper clergy
such as bishops and archbishops repeatedly violated such restrictions in the latter half of the
medieval era. Prelates, many of whom typically came from the military aristocracy, occasionally
raised troops from their lands and led armed retinues into battle. German bishops were especially
noted for their bellicosity by the twelfth century, at times mobilizing larger military contingents
than those of lay magnates.10 The archbishop Christian of Mainz even had something akin to a
military career, commanding imperial troops in Italy for nearly twenty years.11 Nonetheless, these
warlike prelates regularly incurred the criticism of colleagues for setting a bad example to other
clergy.
By the late twelfth century, some canonists began to excuse clerical participation in warfare
in defensive circumstances of extreme exigency.12 The canonist Rufinus argued that clergy might
use arms in dire necessity defensively or against “infidels” on a superior’s order, while Huguccio
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agreed but specified that clerics might in these instances only utilize defensive arms such as armor,
not offensive weapons. Thirteenth-century canonists largely accepted this moderated position,
restricting clergy to their conventional role of encouraging those individuals fighting “just” and
“holy” wars, except that they might use offensive weapons in unavoidable personal self-defense.
Pope Clement V confirmed this exception in canon law during the early fourteenth century,
declaring that clergy perpetrating defensive bloodshed no longer incurred “irregularity,” a
canonical barrier to receiving and exercising holy orders.13
While some popes and Italian cardinals of the later fifteenth century engaged in military
operations, the papacy of Julius II from 1503 to 1513 was arguably the apex of papal participation
in warfare. As a cardinal, the future Julius II—born Giuliano della Rovere—served his Franciscan
uncle, Pope Sixtus IV, as military envoy in Umbria, constructed the fortress of Ostia, and later
guided Pope Innocent VIII’s policy during the Neapolitan Barons’ War of 1485-1486.14 Upon his
election as pope, Julius II militarized the papacy to an extent previously unseen, launching several
campaigns of territorial reconquest in the papal state and, on one occasion, personally directing
the siege of Mirandola during the War of the League of Cambrai.15 Julius II’s bellicose activism
elicited substantial criticism, particularly from the Dutch humanist and reformer Desiderius
Erasmus, thought to have authored the anonymous 1518 publication Julius Exclusis, a satirical
dialogue that depicts the pope being denied entry to heaven by Saint Peter for wearing “the dress
of a priest on top, while underneath it you are all bristling and clanking with blood-stained
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Thus, the papacy’s conspicuous enthusiasm for war-making during the first decade of

the sixteenth-century blatantly contradicted traditional norms of clerical behavior.
For a number of religious reformers in the early decades of what would come to be known
as the Protestant Reformation, the morality of war itself was exceedingly questionable, even in
cases of so-called “just” war. While he remained firmly within the Latin Christian Church,
Erasmus strongly advocated pacifism, rejecting all discussion of the legitimacy of war that
Augustine had pioneered and Thomas Aquinas had developed into a theory of just war.17 Radical
sacramentarian and Anabaptist preachers such as Michael Sattler, Felix Manz, Conrad Grebel, and
Jörg Blaurock—many of whom had formerly been monks—argued that Christians could not take
part in war or military activities because the biblical Ten Commandments explicitly prohibited
people to kill.18 The sixth article of the 1527 Schleitheim Confession, authored by Sattler,
explicitly defined Anabaptism as pacifist, outlawing Christian involvement not only in war but
also in the judiciary, which might require punishing criminals by the sword.19 Saxon reformer
Martin Luther—a former priest and Augustinian monk—arrived at a different conclusion on the
question of war, however, contending in a 1526 tract entitled “Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be
Saved” that the Christian faith is indeed “compatible with being a soldier, going to war, stabbing
and killing, robbing and burning, as military law requires us to do to our enemies in wartime.”
Because of its apparent connection to the divinely ordained office of the sword elaborated in the
New Testament book of Romans, Luther viewed the military profession as a “legitimate and godly
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calling and occupation” in which Christians may justly partake as obedient servants of their
temporal rulers.20 Similarly, Jean Calvin accepted that “kings and people must sometimes take up
arms to execute … public vengeance,” though he maintained that war—whether against foreign
invaders or rebellious subjects—must be conducted with restraint and waged only as a last resort.21
Leading Protestant reformers that insisted on the compatibility of war and the Christian
faith had rather different views on clerical arms-bearing and participation in warfare. Even as
reformers like Luther criticized the extreme clericalism of the Latin Christian Church and argued
for the “priesthood of all believers,” they nevertheless considered ministers and pastors—as
Protestant clergy were known—to possess distinctive offices setting them apart from laypersons
and requiring stricter standards of comportment.22

Luther in particular railed against the

involvement of clergy in war on the grounds that it violated the spiritual and pastoral character of
the clerical vocation, thereby inviting divine punishment. “If I were emperor, king, or prince and
were in a campaign against the Turk,” Luther declared in a 1529 tract on the Ottoman threat, “I
would exhort my bishops and priests to stay at home and attend to the duties of their office, praying,
fasting, saying mass, preaching, and caring for the poor, as not only Holy Scripture, but their own
canon law teaches and requires.”23 The only warfare in which clergy should engage, in other
words, is spiritual in nature. Luther underscored this claim with characteristic overstatement,
arguing that “it would be less harmful to have three devils in the army than one disobedient,
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apostate bishop who had given up his office and assumed the office of another.”24
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In his view,

when a bishop or priest took up arms and participated in warfare, they had effectively abandoned
their vocation as Christian ministers. Zürich reformer and pastor Ulrich Zwingli shared little of
Luther’s opposition to clerical involvement in military affairs, and helped create a political and
military alliance among Switzerland’s Protestant cantons in the late 1520s.25 Zwingli’s death
beside other armed Protestant clerics during the Battle of Kappel in October 1531 “confirmed
Luther’s negative attitude toward the Zürich reformer,” according to Heiko Oberman, and
reinforced his conviction that it was against God’s will for clergy “to draw the sword with the
knights of the empire, to hurl a firebrand with the peasants, [or] to call to arms.”26 Yet Zwingli’s
successor in Zürich, Heinrich Bullinger, rather predictably hailed the fallen reformer as a “good
shepherd” who had died for and among his flock.27
Zwingli’s participation in confessional warfare in the Battle of Kappel echoed the militancy
of radical reformers who utilized armed force to spread a particular view of the Christian faith in
the early decades of the Reformation. Thomas Müntzer, a fiery priest and one-time follower of
Luther, eagerly joined German peasants in their uprising against the “godless” aristocratic
landlords in 1524-1525, leading an army of several thousand peasants to utter defeat at the Battle
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of Frankenhausen in mid-May 1525, after which he was tortured and beheaded.28
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The millenarian

fervor that prompted Müntzer to shoulder arms in the Peasants’ War similarly inspired pastor
Bernard Rothmann, prophet Jan Matthijs, and self-proclaimed messiah Jan Beukels—also known
as Jan van Leiden—to orchestrate the Anabaptist seizure in early 1534 of the Westphalian town of
Münster, which they identified as the New Jerusalem. The forces of Franz von Waldeck,
Münster’s expelled prince-bishop, immediately besieged the city, in an operation that dragged on
for seventeen months and only ended when turncoats from inside Münster led some of Waldeck’s
troops through the defenses.29 As with Zwingli, the battlefield deaths of Protestant radicals such
as Thomas Müntzer and Jan Matthijs inspired their subsequent celebration as martyrs who actively
lived out and died for their faith.30 Luther, of course, described Müntzer as satanically-inspired to
“take the sword and murder and rob, as the spirit of murder drove him,” again reflecting the Saxon
reformer’s revulsion toward clerical arms-bearing.31
The sweeping reform of nearly all aspects of ecclesiastical life enacted at the mid-sixteenthcentury Council of Trent appears to have made remarkably little effort to address the participation
of Catholic clergy in war, though some reform-minded bishops attempted to confront the issue at
the local level.32 The subject of clerical use of arms only seems to have been raised tangentially
at Trent during the fourteenth session in 1551, one of the decrees of which permanently excluded

28

Tom Scott, “The ‘Volksreformation’ of Thomas Müntzer in Allstedt and Mühlhausen,” Journal of
Ecclesiastical History 34 (April 1983): 194-213.
29

James M. Stayer, The German Peasants’ War and Anabaptist Community of Goods (Montreal: McGillQueen’s University Press, 1994), 123-138.
30

Brad S. Gregory, “Anabaptist Martyrdom: Imperatives, Experience, and Memorialization,” in John D. Roth
and James M. Stayer, eds., A Companion to Anabaptism and Spiritualism, 1521-1700 (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 467-506.
31
32

Luther, “On War Against the Turk,” in Luther’s Works, 46: 180.

Much of this paragraph is drawn from Duggan, Armsbearing and the Clergy in the History and Canon Law
and Western Christianity, 161-162.

from ordination anyone who had committed voluntary homicide.33
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While Trent did nothing to

change canon law on clerical arms-bearing, reformist prelates such as Stanislaus Hosius and Carlo
Borromeo presided over regional synods shortly after Trent’s conclusion that explicitly addressed
this issue. Cardinal Hosius’s diocesan synod at Warmia in 1565 decreed that clergy were forbidden
to bear arms except when traveling.34 Carlo Borromeo, archbishop of Milan from 1560 to 1584,
chaired his first provincial council in late 1565, the delegates of which decreed that “clerics are
not to bear weapons of any sort for offence or defense, excepting little knives designed for
domestic use, unless by chance they must undertake a journey outside a city in suspect places.”35
To further delimit the kinds of arms clergy might legitimately bear when traveling in dangerous
regions, the council “forbid entirely crossbows, spears, arquebuses, daggers, and other weapons of
this sort,” many of which were seen as offensive, military-grade weapons.36 Despite the limited
scope of such regional synods, their efforts to crack down on clerical involvement in military
activities underscore the increasingly problematic nature of clerical arms-bearing in the postTridentine context.
With little active discussion occurring among high-ranking French clergy as to the
appropriateness of clerical engagement in warfare and military activities, most clerics may have
looked to the Papacy for guidance on this matter. What they heard from Rome, particularly during
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the League period, could not have been clearer. A brief issued by Gregory XIV, who held the
papal throne from December 1590 to November 1591, explicitly permitted all clerics, regardless
of status or rank, “to take up arms and fight against the heretics and adversaries of the Catholic
religion.”37 Perhaps more importantly, this brief released all clergy from the customary censures
and restrictions they typically incurred when personally involved in the shedding of blood,
including restrictions on the celebration of Mass and other divine offices. Thus, for a very short
window of time, French clergy seem to have been given free reign to participate in warfare against
anyone perceived as an enemy of the Catholic faith.

SPIRITUAL AND TACTICAL SUPPORT ROLES

Catholic clerics’ shared perception of themselves as mediators between God and
humankind shaped the varied ways in which they attempted to provide direct spiritual support for
the military activities of Catholic armed forces. As zealous Catholics engaged in a momentous
struggle against both Protestant heresy and politique equivocation, League-affiliated clergy
displayed an energetic impulse to sanctify the cause of their co-religionists on the battlefield. Both
regular and secular clergy appear to have served as military chaplains, regulating the morality and
religious devotion of lay combatants and providing spiritual counsel to noble commanders.
Clerics’ physical presence within armies and their administration of sacramental rites—
communion, confession, and penance especially—seem to have been considered by military
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leaders as something akin to tactical support, which helped to curry divine favor and thereby ensure
an army’s success in battle. Catholic clergy who could not be physically present on the battlefield,
such as cathedral canons, endeavored to publicly sacralize particular military operations and
entreat divine intervention on behalf of ligueur forces ostensibly engaged in “holy war” against
the enemies of God and his true followers.38
The practice of intentionally including priests in Catholic armies appears to have become
standard procedure during the initial decades of the Wars of Religion, when armed forces of
opposing confessions first clashed in battles and sieges throughout the French kingdom. As James
B. Wood shows, it seems to have been official military policy in the early religious wars for a
priest to accompany the main body of an army. In his discussion of the massive field army that
Henri duc d’Anjou, the future king Henri III, led into the field against an Huguenot army in
December 1567, Wood indicates that a priest with a portable altar for the celebration of Mass
accompanied the leading contingent of the royal army’s main body. This advance contingent—
not to be confused with the army’s advance guard, a sizeable unit that preceded the main body
altogether—comprised an artillery train of “ornate guns of various calibers,” 200-300 munitions
wagons, pioneers, and several hundred specialists of the grand master of artillery.39 The advance
contingent was followed immediately by an enormous block of Swiss infantry, “the hard core of
all royal armies … some 6,000 strong and almost entirely pikemen.”40 While Wood does not
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speculate as to the precise reasons the army’s Catholic priest accompanied the artillery train that
preceded the greater part of the royal army’s main body, the military leaders who chose to position
the cleric at that particular point most likely had specific aims in doing so. The priest’s situation
with the artillery train clearly implied a supportive and less overtly combative function. At the
same time, his positioning among “ornate” field artillery and the cannoneers that fired and
maintained these heavy weapons suggests that military commanders also comprehended the
priest’s spiritual and liturgical function as something of a tactical consideration that helped secure
divine aid.
Clerics’ service as military chaplains arguably assumed new significance during the crisis
years of the League period, as Catholic forces battled to subjugate the Huguenot party once and
for all. In a rather conspicuous increase in the number of clerics within military ranks, some
ordinances from the late 1580s even stipulated that each regiment and each company was to have
its own priest in order that soldiers and officers could regularly hear Mass. A royal army regulation
issued in early October 1587, just before the army was severely routed near the southwestern town
of Coutras by Huguenot forces under Henri de Navarre, directed commanders of both infantry and
cavalry units “to have in each company or regiment a priest for the saying of Mass, at which the
captains, maîtres de camp, officers, and soldiers shall be obliged to attend on feast days and
Sundays at the minimum.”41 In addition to requiring a priest in each regiment and company for
the celebration of Mass, the regulation further stipulated “so that the soldiers will be all the more
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instructed and conserved in their duty by God’s word itself, there shall be in both the main body
[of the army] and the advance guard a preacher who will proclaim the word of God to them.”42
Proscriptions against blaspheming “the name of God” and lodging troops within churches “and
places dedicated to the service of God” underscore Catholic officials’ evident concern with piety
and morality in this particular ordinance, the first portion of which is overwhelmingly concerned
with such matters.43 While it is entirely possible that Henri III had such rules formulated—as the
preamble of the ordinance indicates—simply so that all royal soldiers would conduct themselves
“with the order, duty, and discipline that should be observed in the army of a most Christian
prince,” other portions of this document explicitly state that the army’s purpose is “to defend the
honor of God and the authority of the Catholic church.”44 Royal officials clearly considered the
active ministration of clergy essential to this end. The frequent celebration of Mass in the field, in
particular, during which the elements of bread and wine were seemingly transformed into the body
and blood of Christ before the assembled troops, was to be a powerful symbol of divine favor and
spiritual protection that could simultaneously reinforce soldiers’ identity as dutiful Catholic
warriors.
Catholic officials’ desire for clergy to serve as military chaplains offered CounterReformation religious orders new opportunities for preaching and evangelization within Catholic
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armies in France.45
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Dedicated to the renewal of Catholicism in response to the forceful strictures

of Protestant reformers, religious orders such as the Society of Jesus displayed considerable
enthusiasm for the military chaplaincy in war theatres throughout later sixteenth-century Europe.
Military leaders in many regions sought to capitalize on Jesuit enthusiasm for the chaplaincy. For
instance, the military governor of the Spanish Netherlands, Alessandro Farnese, duke of Parma,
assented in 1587 to the request of Jesuit Thomas Sailly to formally establish a Missio Castrensis
of twelve Jesuits to preach and minister to the Catholic soldiers at that time fighting a protracted
war against Protestant rebels in the Low Countries.46 Members of the Jesuit order in France
received special dispensation from Rome to celebrate Mass on portable altars “when they are on
mission or in armies,” as an official exemption from 1584 indicates.47 In this capacity, Jesuit
military chaplains counseled soldiers, distributed the sacraments, heard confessions, and
administered last rites to the critically wounded.48 Jesuits’ use of portable altars in the field
sacralized the space of an army encampment and underscored the sanctity of the soldiers’ cause.49
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In addition to administering sacraments to Catholic troops and providing spiritual counsel
to military leaders, Catholic chaplains sometimes performed dramatic acts of spiritual devotion in
an effort to ensure their army’s success in battle. Before setting out from the village of Dourdan
on a campaign in November 1587 to retake the château d’Auneau from a large force of German
mercenary pistol cavalry, or reiters, that had recently occupied it, Henri de Lorraine duc de Guise
both engaged in religious observance himself and directed his chaplain to perform a substantial
feat of devotional piety. According to the chronicler Sébastien Le Pelletier, the duc de Guise heard
vespers, took Mass, and “called on God his Creator and Savior, God of battles and Lord of armies,
who gives victories to whom he pleases.”50 However, to ensure that he obtained divinely-ordained
success in battle, Guise “[left] his chaplain there [at Dourdan], commanding him to pray to God
all night long, and to say three Masses.”51 Guise evidently supposed that ordering his chaplain to
spend the entire night praying and celebrating Mass would have a decisive and favorable impact
on the outcome of his planned military operation to retake the château d’Auneau. In this particular
instance Guise’s troops succeeded in capturing the château, managing to kill around twenty-six of
the reiters’ officers in the process. To stress the significance of this conquest, Le Pelletier asserts
that the beaten reiters,
seeing themselves thus stripped of their officers and defeated right in the middle of France,
without safe conduct or a place of surety … buried two of their cannon together with their
cannonballs, and mounted their horses … leaving behind their sick, wounded, and all of
52
their weapons and supplies to the satisfaction of the surrounding troops, ran away.
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Guise’s stunning defeat of the reiters at Auneau can be seen in the haste with which they apparently
abandoned both their munitions and their wounded comrades in a desperate attempt to flee. The
supplication of Guise’s chaplain on the noble commander’s behalf the night before this seemingly
small battle thus had wider ramifications for French Catholics eager to rid the kingdom of the
loathsome German mercenaries.53
While individual chaplains held nighttime vigils to procure divine assistance for ligueur
forces in battle, the clergy of cathedral and collegiate chapters often organized public religious
processions and devotional prayers on the eve of critical engagements. A common ritual practice
in the Catholic regions of late medieval and early modern Europe, religious processions were
typically either commemorative in nature or linked explicitly to the Church’s liturgical calendar.54
Yet the dynamic and pervasive warfare of the League period—characterized by innumerable
sieges, battles, and raids—provided new opportunities to Catholic clergy wanting to publicly
sacralize the martial activities of ligueur armies and collectively entreat divine intervention on the
League’s behalf. The clerics of Notre-Dame collegiate church in Beaune, for example, organized
processions and public prayers on the eve of Jean de Saulx vicomte de Tavannes’s siege of the
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nearby royalist town of Verdun-sur-le-Doubs in early September 1592. Chapter leaders resolved
to conduct an elaborate procession, complete with numerous stations for prayers, on each day
during the siege “at seven in the evening, since more people will be there than at other hours of
the day.”55 Clerics’ impulse to maximize lay participation reflects these processions’ collective
nature, joining at one moment the individual prayers and devotions of vast numbers of Catholic
faithful to communally implore God’s help on the battlefield. On this particular occasion,
however, the vicomte de Tavannes was forced to lift his siege of Verdun after several days, an
outcome that must have sorely disappointed Beaune’s clergy and laity alike.56
If local clergy often organized processions and public prayers just before or during specific
battles, they likewise did so immediately after specific military operations to solemnize the
occasion or offer collective thanks to God for a battle’s outcome. In late May 1592, Leaguer forces
under Philippe Emmanuel de Lorraine duc de Mercoeur, military governor of the province of
Brittany, won a decisive victory at Craon over a massive royal army—including some 1,200
English troops and 800 German mercenaries—commanded by Henri de Bourbon duc de
Montpensier and François de Bourbon prince de Conti. Mercoeur’s triumph at Craon dealt a
crushing blow to Henri IV’s effort to subjugate Leaguer control of Brittany, and the king would
not force the duc’s submission for another six years.57 Upon learning of Mercoeur’s stunning
victory over royalist forces in Brittany, clergy in League-affiliated cities throughout France
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organized special religious services and devotional acts to solemnize the occasion and publicly
thank God for the outcome of this engagement. The clerics of Notre-Dame collegiate church in
Beaune, for instance, organized a general procession involving themselves, the city’s Cordeliers
and Jacobins, and all prominent citizens on the feast day of Saint John the Baptist on 24 June 1592.
While such a procession might seem at first glance rather commonplace, chapter leaders decided
that “upon the procession’s return we will sing the Te Deum laudamus in this church, to thank God
for the victory that the duc de Mercoeur has obtained against the enemy in Brittany.”58 The
impulse to visibly celebrate the triumph of Leaguer forces under Mercoeur at Craon, which took
place several weeks prior in the distant province of Brittany, suggests that Beaune’s clergy
perceived God’s hand at work in this battlefield engagement and wished their fellow Beaunois to
interpret the battle’s outcome accordingly. Their decision to collectively sing Te Deum laudamus,
an early Christian hymn that Henri III had brazenly coopted in the late 1580s for use in royal
ceremonial, constituted a dramatic reclamation of a praise song that both emphasized the
eucharistic presence of Christ and described God as the “God of armies (Deus Sabaoth).”59
Unsurprisingly, the clergy of Beaune were not alone in publicly praising God for Mercoeur’s
momentous victory over the royal army in Brittany, as the Te Deum was also sung at Notre-Dame
cathedral in the League-held capital of Paris.60
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While Catholic clerics’ provision of spiritual and tactical support for military activities did
not involve them directly in the enactment of armed violence, contemporaries viewed clergy’s
varied supportive functions as having a direct correlation to an army’s success or failure on the
battlefield. Whether sharpening the moral consciences of individual soldiers or sanctifying the
larger designs of the architects of battle, Catholic clergy exercised crucial supporting roles in the
conduct of warfare during the League period. Even when they were away from the battlefield,
clerics both justified and glorified organized killing on God’s behalf.

FINANCING MILITARY OPERATIONS

If Catholic clergy concerned themselves with supporting military operations through
ministering to troops and sacralizing the conduct of war against religio-political opponents, they
also actively financed sectarian warfare throughout France.

Money, of course, was an

indispensable element for conducting war. Owing to the substantial revenues associated with most
episcopal sees, French bishops and archbishops had been required to annually provide funds—
known as the décime—to the king from the reign of François I onward, a portion of which helped
finance military operations.61 Aside from these fixed payments to the crown, high-ranking clergy
often had to raise money for combat operations on an ad hoc basis, as in 1552 when Henri II
obliged an assembly of cardinals and bishops to furnish the vast sum of 1,400,000 livres for his
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war against Charles V.62 Clerics were hardly the sole financiers of mobilization and campaigning
costs in the mid-sixteenth century, and the crown seems to have gradually attempted to shift the
cost burden of field operations to noble commanders.63 At the outbreak of religious war in the
1560s, many bishops were forced to sell church property to meet the crown’s demand for further
revenues to pay for combat operations against the Huguenots.64 Yet if Catholic clerics were
somewhat reluctant to fund the crown’s military expenditures during the initial decades of the
Wars of Religion, the intense political strife and sectarian hostility of the League era presented
Catholic clergy of all ranks with fresh possibilities for financing a range of combat operations
against their Huguenot and politique opponents. Despite the ravages of war, which severely
reduced the incomes of not only bishops but also cathedral chapters and abbeys, clergy at both the
local and provincial level worked to help fund the initial costs of troop mobilization as well as the
wages and rations necessary to keep ligueur armies in the field.
Catholic prelates affiliated with the League regularly took charge of formal negotiations at
the provincial level to finance warfare against Huguenot or royalist armies. As provincial elites
fractured along political lines in the 1580s, ligueur and royalist officeholders formed separate
provincial estates to adjudicate political, religious, and military matters in their respective regions.
For the members of regional Leaguer estates, raising the funds necessary to effectively combat the
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king’s armies as well as formidable Huguenot forces was of critical importance. Bishops in the
southern province of Languedoc in particular played an active role in securing war finance during
meetings of the province’s Leaguer estates. Christophe de Lestang, the twenty-six-year-old bishop
of Lodève, presided over the Leaguer estates of Languedoc in March 1586 at Carcassonne, a
meeting called by Guillaume maréchal de Joyeuse and attended largely by the vicars-general of
most of the province’s archbishoprics and bishoprics. Joyeuse had called the estates precisely to
obtain funds necessary to raise additional forces for his ongoing campaign against Henri I duc de
Montmorency, who had recently allied himself with the Huguenot party and seized many towns in
the region around Béziers and Narbonne. Having considered his request for 6,000 infantry, twelve
cavalry companies, and eight field cannons to combat Montmorency’s forces and secure the main
routes between Toulouse and Narbonne, the estates’ delegates appear to have readily agreed to
furnish Joyeuse with sufficient cash for both vital munitions and equipment.65

Upon the

conclusion of the estates, Joyeuse immediately commenced logistical preparations for a new
campaign against Montmorency.66

The delegates’ collective decision to finance combat

operations against Montmorency must have immensely pleased Lestang, who had been expelled
from his diocese by the duc one year prior, most likely in retaliation for his adherence to the
League.67 In light of this circumstance, one could perceive the prelate’s involvement in the
provision of funds for war against Montmorency simply as an act of personal revenge. Yet
considering Lestang’s subsequent activism on behalf of the League in Languedoc, including a
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diplomatic mission in 1591 to thank the Spanish king Philip II for vital military support, the young
bishop’s direction of war finance talks at the provincial estates in 1586 may be viewed as his first
deliberate engagement with military preparations against opponents of the League in southern
France.68
While a number of Catholic prelates worked to finance warfare against Huguenot and
royalist forces at the provincial level, the clerics of numerous cathedral chapters similarly
endeavored to provide capital needed for military operations against religio-political opponents at
the local level. The chapter officials of Saint-Vincent cathedral in Mâcon, for example, readily
assented to furnish several hundred écus in late July 1589 to help pay for the mobilization costs of
a combined undertaking against the city’s former governor, Georges de Bauffremont comte de
Cruzille, an ardent royalist determined to bring about the League’s downfall in the Mâconnais. At
meetings held on 24 July and 27 July 1589, chapter leaders discussed plans by Mâcon’s current
governor, Jean de Nagu seigneur de Varennes, to besiege the château de Cruzille—situated fifteen
miles north of Mâcon—with several companies of troops from the city as well as from Lyon and
Chalon-sur-Saône, “especially as this château is the scourge of the region and the hideout of
brigands and robbers.”69 Varennes and the échevins of Mâcon asked the cathedral clergy for funds
to help munition these troops as well as considerable quantities of grain and wine for rations, for
which the chapter would not be subsequently reimbursed. Although the chapter could not satisfy
the request for grain and wine, “seeing that there is none in our granaries and wine cellars,” after
careful deliberation its leaders agreed to provide a sum of 300 écus to subsidize the attack on “the
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This latter

statement is particularly striking, as it seems to conflate both the royalist Catholic and Protestant
opponents of the League into a single category irrespective of their confessional differences. Yet
the assertion may also merely reflect chapter leaders’ acceptance of pervasive League rhetoric,
which denounced all royalist Catholics as the fauteurs, or supporters, of heretics.71
The Saint-Vincent cathedral chapter’s provision of several hundred écus for a planned
siege of the château de Cruzille may have encouraged Mâcon’s civil and military leaders to quickly
devise additional operations against the comte, who appears to have been actively carrying out
raiding warfare against League-affiliated towns and châteaux in the Mâconnais. At a subsequent
meeting on 7 August 1589, the cathedral’s doyen, Philippes Bernard, informed other chapter
officials that the seigneur de Varennes now desired to raise “a cavalry company of fifty or sixty
horse … in order to put a stop to the ravages and theft of crops by the companies of the comte de
Cruzille in this region,” the costs of which Varennes evidently wished “messieurs of the church”
to pay. After an in-depth discussion, chapter leaders concluded that satisfying Varennes’ request
for more funds was impossible, “seeing that we advanced the city 300 écus only ten or twelve days
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While chapter leaders clearly wished to facilitate the demise of the comte de Cruzille, their

financial resources were by no means limitless.
Although the intended siege of the château de Cruzille took several months to plan and
execute, the clerics of Mâcon took advantage of other opportunities in the intervening weeks to
provide financial support for additional operations against the comte de Cruzille and his
lieutenants. Cathedral clergy were doubtless motivated to fund small-scale actions in late August
and early September 1589 by Cruzille’s persistent attacks and raids, many of which targeted the
small châteaux on the chapter’s numerous landholdings in the surrounding area. During the first
week of September 1589 the comte captured several of these châteaux and took a number of
prisoners, one of which was a cleric named Noël de Namps, who held the position of prêtre habitué
in the cathedral.73 Two weeks later, the seigneur de Varennes asked the chapter for an unspecificed
sum to help munition the troops of Philippe d’Anglure seigneur de Guyonvelle, a ligueur noble
from northern Burgundy with connections to the duc de Nemours, who had offered “to bring his
forces into this region to rescue it from the theft and pillage of the comte de Cruzille and his
accomplices, and to deliver the [fortified] places and châteaux of the church held and occupied by
the comte.”74 Presumably owing to their recent experience of violence at the hands of Cruzille
and his clients, chapter officials were more willing to commit the necessary funds to equip ligueur
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troops already on the march than to provide the initial capital for another mobilization effort that
might take weeks or even months to accomplish.
The financial contributions of Mâcon’s clergy to the mobilizational and operational costs
of war-making efforts against the comte de Cruzille arguably helped to ensure the success of these
actions, represented by the ligueur forces’ effectual investiture of the comte’s château. The
regiments of the seigneurs de Varennes and de Guyonvelle invested the château de Cruzille on 24
September 1589 and after two days of bombardment succeeding in creating two breaches in the
structure’s walls, through which the attacking soldiers entered and killed most of the forty-five to
fifty defenders. The comte himself was not within the château at the time of its capture, having
apparently slipped out under cover of darkness. The officer commanding the château in Cruzille’s
stead, a captain Prin, nearly escaped “through the latrines” but was caught, taken to Guyonvelle,
and “after some questions and reproaches was executed with an arquebus,” a common punishment
for defending commanders who failed to surrender honorably.75 While Cruzille’s whereabouts in
the immediate aftermath of the attack on his château were uncertain, this action deprived the comte
of his main base of operation, hampering his ability to effectively orchestrate warfare against the
ligueurs of the Mâconnais for the next ten to twelve months.
In addition to offsetting the financial costs of specific military operations, local Catholic
clergy routinely met the subsistence needs of League forces operating nearby. Armies of all sizes
required food and drink for their soldiers on the march, which necessitated significant advanced
planning. The provision of bread, meat, and wine in particular were constant concerns for late
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sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century military commanders, who were obliged to obtain the
bulk of such rations from local communities or pay for them out of their own pockets.76 As the
owners of extensive tracts of arable land in the regions around their cities, clerics of cathedrals and
collegiate churches typically stored quantities of agricultural produce in church-owned
warehouses, although looting and plundering of property in war zones frequently reduced clergy’s
on-hand supplies of foodstuffs.77 Excepting seasons of scarcity or famine, ligueur armies could
normally count on the clergy of League-affiliated towns to help feed their troops when camped in
their vicinity. In early May 1591, for example, the army of Claude de Bauffremont baron de
Sennecey, the duc de Mayenne’s lieutenant general in Burgundy, set up camp on the outskirts of
Beaune, in preparation for combat against the forces of Jean VI maréchal d’Aumont, one of Henri
IV’s trusted noble commanders in that region. At a meeting on 4 May, the clergy of Beaune’s
Notre-Dame collegiate church resolved to furnish an enormous quantity of wine and grain “to help
nourish the company of troops under messieurs de Sennecey and [François de Damas baron de]
Thianges encamped in the faubourgs of this city.”78 This provision of critical rations was
particularly well timed, as Sennecey’s troops were forced to fend off an attack by a combined force
led by the maréchal d’Aumont and the sieur de Cypierre just three days later.79
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Catholic clergy, therefore, played key roles in the financing of warfare and military
operations in this period. While prelates and other high-ranking clergy actively financed the largescale costs of military mobilization at the provincial level, local clerics in Leaguer towns readily
funded particular military operations and provided for the needs of ligueur troops on the march.
As money and provisions were critical elements for the waging of war against their politique and
Huguenot adversaries, clerics throughout France worked to ensure the continuity of combat
operations.

FORTIFYING DEFENSIBLE STRUCTURES

Like many of the participants in the dynamic warfare of the League period, Catholic clergy
grasped the strategic importance of defensible structures such as châteaux and other places
fortes—literally “strong places”—for controlling space and stockpiling weapons and munitions.
While the advent of gunpowder artillery during the Hundred Years’ War had forced architectural
changes to defensible structures, it by no means rendered them obsolete.80 As historians like
Pierre-Jean Souriac have noted, places fortes constituted the central technical element of territorial
organization during the Wars of Religion and, when equipped with soldiers, could assure effective
control of the surrounding area.81 In addition to châteaux, many ecclesiastical structures such as
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abbeys and monasteries were situated on hilltops or near towns, and possessed thick walls,
reinforced gates, high bell towers, and large courtyards that made them natural improvised bases
and magazines. Recognizing the tactical significance of defensible structures, Catholic clergy
often played key roles in securing and fortifying these sites. In doing so, clerics aimed to help
ligueur forces retain the strategic advantage in the countless skirmishes, sieges, raids, and
ambushes that typified sectarian warfare during the turbulent League era.
The clergy of cathedral chapters in particular were intimately involved in both fortifying
and defending châteaux on ecclesiastical landholdings, many of which had significant defensive
elements such as towers and moats. While only some church-owned temporalities contained
châteaux, those that did required constant protection and improvement.82 The chapter of SaintVincent cathedral in Mâcon, for example, owned châteaux on several temporalities in the
immediate area, and defending these structures was a continual preoccupation for its clergy during
the relentless warfare of the League. Although chapter officials often paid to have soldiers defend
their châteaux, individual clerics at times personally managed the protection of these structures
and participated in defense activities. At a meeting in July 1589, chapter officials advised canon
Jean de l’Aubespin, to augment the guard at the château de Saint-Albain “at the expense of
messieurs [of the chapter], which instruction Aubespin refuses and will himself perform guet et
garde,” a decision chapter leaders appear to have accepted.83 In Lyon, the clergy of Saint-Jean
cathedral agreed in late June 1589 to double the guard and speed repairs to the walls at the château
de Châteauneuf, some nineteen miles to the southwest, after hearing that “the Huguenots of
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Dauphiné, Vivarais, and Velay have seized many châteaux in Forez and other places near the
borders of this region.”84 Similarly, the canons of Saint-Étienne cathedral in Toulouse maintained
a garrison at the château de Braqueville, three miles south of the city, throughout most of the early
1590s and at times directly partook in defense duties there.85 When problems of funding and
manpower restricted the number of armed guards that cathedral chapters could station at
ecclesiastical châteaux, clergy considered whether to demolish a château or permit it to fall into
enemy hands. Fearing in May 1594 that the château de Saint-Clément would be overrun by troops
loyal to the comte de Cruzille, “just as they have already done to [the château] de Verzé,” SaintVincent chapter officials opted against demolishing the structure, instead ordering an archdeacon
to “have all of the doors of the château removed, together with the drawbridge, and have them
transported to this city, and to wall up the aforesaid portals as diligently as possible.”86 Retaining
ownership and control over their châteaux was far preferable to demolition, even if the latter was
the most convenient or sensible tactical decision at that time.
Catholic clergy attached to churches or chapels situated inside châteaux also involved
themselves directly in their fortification and defense. The eight clerics inhabiting the château de
Beaujeu, situated in the Rhône valley between Mâcon and Villefranche-sur-Saône, appear to have
been solely responsible for defending the castle complex housing the collegiate church of NotreDame de Beaujeu, in which they conducted religious services and ministered to the inhabitants of
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the adjacent town. Interestingly, the château seems to have been void of other residents, aside
from two soldiers that Jean de Nagu sieur de Varennes, Mâcon’s military governor, stationed there
in the summer of 1593.87 Throughout this period, the canons of Notre-Dame took on active roles
in the château’s defense, standing watch on a round-the-clock basis, upgrading their weapons when
funds permitted, and making tactical decisions regarding the structure’s security. By 1586,
practically all of Notre-Dame’s canons were guarding the château’s gate and ramparts day and
night.88 Chapter leaders decided in September 1588 that “the trees which are around the château,
that shall pose an impediment to its defense, are to be cut down,” an operation that would enhance
the clerics’ ability to fire upon would-be besiegers.89 In July 1592, the chapter’s secretary
informed his superiors that he had—after two years—finally succeeded in purchasing at Lyon the
weapons that they “had commissioned him to purchase … for the conservation of our [fortified]
house … namely ten muskets, twelve arquebuses, and eight halberds.”90 The clerics’ acquisition
of firearms and polearms undoubtedly enabled them to repel a surprise attack in April 1594 by
royalist forces under Philibert des Serpens sieur de Gondras, who failed to take the château despite
detonating at least two pétards against its front and rear gates.91
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Clerics in charge of rural monasteries and abbeys worked to ensure that nearby châteaux
remained in the hands of Leaguer forces, sometimes even purchasing firearms for a particular
château’s defense out of their own pockets. In early March 1589, for instance, a theologian and
regent of the University of Toulouse, Pierre de Lanes, informed the members of Toulouse’s city
council that an armed contingent of “the politiques” had attacked the château de Coubirac and
driven out the Leaguer garrison recently installed there. Lanes, who simultaneously held the office
of prior at the Cistercian abbey of Notre-Dame de Grandselve in nearby Bouillac, which was
located near the château de Coubirac, was determined that the château not become a base for
royalist forces in the Haute Garonne valley between Agen and Toulouse. He therefore purchased
twelve arquebuses and four heavy muskets from Toulouse’s municipal arsenal, and requested the
immediate issue of “these weapons for the defense of this place and to maintain the premises in
obedience to the Catholic faith and religion.” According to municipal deliberations, Toulouse’s
councilors signed off on Lanes’s request for the urgent delivery of these firearms, enjoining him
“to keep the said place [forte] de Coubirac under obedience to the Catholic religion,” by which
they meant under the League’s control.92 Interestingly, there is no indication in extant sources that
Lanes requested soldiers or townsmen to wield these weapons. In light of his position as prior and
the monastery’s proximity to the château, however, Lanes most likely arranged for a handful of
Cistercian monks from Notre-Dame de Grandselve to defend the structure with the arquebuses and
muskets, at least until a more permanent garrison could be reestablished. The Toulousain
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councilors’ directive to Lanes to preserve the château for the League suggests that he himself
planned to command the structure’s defense in the immediate future.
Some Catholic clergy took part in the fortification of their own monasteries and abbeys,
especially when these structures were situated near League-held cities and could be used
defensively. Nicolas Brûlart, the Leaguer abbé commendataire of the Benedictine abbey of SaintMartin, which was situated close to the contested city of Autun in southwestern Burgundy, worked
to fortify his abbey and install a garrison of troops there in October 1589.93 Brûlart, whose brother
was then premier président of the parlement of Burgundy, seems to have been concerned to
robustly defend the abbey against incursions by the royalist commander Guillaume de Saulx
vicomte de Tavannes, whose forces—from their bases in Semur-en-Auxois, Charolles, and
Montcenis—were at that time attempting to capture many of the fortified structures in the region
around Autun.94

Brûlart even petitioned the deputies of the ligueur Estates of Burgundy,

convening in Dijon, to help offset the costs of fortification work at the abbey and the expenses of
keeping troops there. Regrettably for Brûlart, the deputies invoked a previous resolution regarding
châteaux and other places fortes held by adherents of the League:
… as to the request of the abbot of Saint-Martin d’Autun, it has been resolved, in
consequence of the resolution formerly taken, concerning the defense of places fortes …
that he will maintain the garrison in the aforesaid abbey at his expense, so that the enemy
may not take possession of it, unless he prefers to have it dismantled and demolished.95
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While the Estates’ deputies obviously did not consider themselves bound to pay for the abbey’s
defense, they deemed the continued presence of soldiers at the abbey vital to keeping the fortified
structure in League hands. Although they expected Brûlart to defray the cost of defending SaintMartin, the abbey’s proximity to the League-held city of Autun—a mere quarter mile to the
northeast—rendered it a strategic objective for royalist troops hoping to besiege the town. The
concerns of Brûlart and the Estates’ deputies for Saint-Martin’s security were warranted, as huge
swaths of its arable land were continually ravaged in late October 1589 by troops loyal to royalist
captains Guy de Rabutin baron de Chantal and his son Christophe de Rabutin, as well as the
commander of Montcenis’s château, the sieur de Saint-Mathieu, and the military governor of
Verdun-sur-le-Doubs, Julien de Bissy. In early November, the younger Rabutin captured the
abbey itself, inducing Henri IV to award him its revenue as a means of punishing Brûlart.96 Yet
royalist control of the abbey was short-lived, and by the spring of 1590 it was back under the
control of Claude de Bauffremont baron de Sennecey, the duc de Mayenne’s lieutenant general in
Burgundy, who entrusted its defense once again to Brûlart. While it is unclear whether Brûlart
subsequently played an active role in the abbey’s defense or simply entrusted this charge to
another, the abbot was clearly instrumental in initiating its militarization in the fall of 1589.
Clerical leaders of rural abbeys and monasteries often solicited military assistance from
municipal authorities in neighboring League towns when threatened by royalist or Huguenot
armies. Dom Anglade, the prior of the Cistercian abbey of Fontfroide in Bas Languedoc, requested
aid in the form of munitions and personnel from the leaders of Narbonne in early August 1589,
after a brush with the troops of politique nobleman Henri I duc de Montmorency. Throughout late
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July and early August, the duc’s forces blockaded the League stronghold of Narbonne, eight miles
northeast of Fontfroide, as well as several smaller towns in the surrounding area from their bases
in Bizanet, Moussan, and Béziers.97 When two monks of Fontfroide traveling near Bizanet were
seized by the duc’s troops during the first week of August, Dom Anglade made the short journey
to Bizanet in order to negotiate their release. Granted an audience with Montmorency’s maréchal
de camp, the sieur de Pujol, Anglade was then taken prisoner, perhaps on the duc’s orders.98 He
managed to escape, however, and quickly made his way back to Fontfroide, from which he
dispatched a letter to authorities in Narbonne requesting military aid. After recounting his ordeal,
Anglade urged Narbonne’s leaders “to munition us with gunpowder, rope-matches, and fuses as
well as men, if you wish to conserve this place.”99 Anglade’s request for only munitions and
personnel suggests that the abbey already possessed a number of arquebuses or heavier muskets,
both of which utilized a slow-burning match cord saturated with saltpeter.100 Anglade also
requested aid from the nearby château de Saint-Martin-de-Toques, the Franco-Italian seigneur of
which sent him six arquebusiers but informed authorities in Narbonne that “I cannot keep them
there for long, as I have need of them for the preservation of my own house.”101 That the prior
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requested vital munitions and manpower from both Narbonne and Saint-Martin-de-Toques
underscores the urgency of Fontfroide’s predicament as well as Anglade’s resolve to repulse any
raids or plots launched by Montmorency against the hilltop abbey.
The fortification and protection of defensible structures such as châteaux, abbeys, and
monasteries, then, formed a significant component of Catholic clerics’ participation in warfare and
military preparations.

While clergy worked to secure and fortify châteaux, they similarly

endeavored to keep their abbeys and monasteries out of the hands of their religio-political
opponents. Clerics’ involvement in the fortification and defense of châteaux and monasteries
exposed them to the dangers of enemy forces intent on disrupting such activities and capturing
these defensible structures for themselves.

SUPPLYING WEAPONS AND COORDINATING MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Catholic clergy fulfilled equally crucial roles as providers of military hardware and
logistical support for army commanders and municipal authorities. Clerics endeavored to deliver
weapons or munitions directly to combatants engaged in siege operations and independent
campaigns. Clergy also participated in a range of activities aimed at providing logistical services
to fellow ligueurs engaged in armed conflict with enemy forces, both on the battlefield and in
urban areas. Clerics’ involvement in the provision of weapons, munitions, and logistics services
to ligueur forces facilitated the enactment of martial violence against the royalist and Huguenot
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opponents of the League, even as their participation in such projects sometimes prompted internal
debate about the legitimacy of clerical engagement in activities of this nature.
High-ranking clergy such as abbots and bishops often participated in the planning of local
military operations, offering specific advice on the weapons and ammunition requirements of
military commanders at critical stages of their planning processes. Claude de Guise, abbot of the
Benedictine monastery of Cluny in southern Burgundy, involved himself in discussions conducted
in the nearby League city of Mâcon during July 1591 concerning a planned siege of the château
de Berzé, one of the most well fortified châteaux of the Mâconnais region. This imposing château,
which stood just over four miles south of Cluny and not quite equidistant between Cluny and
Mâcon, was at that time held by René de Rochebaron comte de Berzé and baron de Joncy, a loyal
servant of the crown and one of the most energetic defenders of the royalist cause in Burgundy.
Rochebaron was frequently away from the château during this period, and in these absences his
wife, Françoise d’Aumont, appears to have personally commanded the château garrison.102 Both
the duc de Mayenne and Jean de Nagu seigneur de Varennes, Mâcon’s military governor, had
attacked the château on a number of recent occasions, but were unable to gain control of the
structure.103 In late July 1591, a combined force under the command of Charles de Savoie duc de
Nemours, a League partisan and military leader in Lyonnais, again besieged the château and
succeeded in effecting Rochebaron’s surrender by the end of the first week of August. According
to the formal terms of the capitulation, Rochebaron was permitted to safely vacate the château
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along with his “gentlemen, captains, soldiers, and domestic servants, with their arms, horses, and
baggage” and retire to his barony of Joncy.104
Although Claude de Guise does not seem to have taken part in actual combat during the
siege of the château de Berzé in July 1591, archival evidence indicates that he played an active
role in coordinating the procurement of essential munitions from neighboring League towns for
the siege operations. In a letter sent to the échevins of Mâcon in late July 1592, Antoine de
Guillermy seigneur de L’Arthusie, commandant of the citadel at Chalon-sur-Saône, informed the
councilors that “when it was decided to go bombard the château de Berzé, monseigneur de Cluny
wrote to me that I should provide fifty cannonballs … together with two barrels of powder.”
L’Arthusie claimed to have learned that the munitions he provided for the siege “were not spent
but placed in the arsenal of your city,” thus he requested that they be returned to Chalon-surSaône.105 Mâcon’s échevins seem to have prevaricated, prompting L’Arthusie to dispatch a much
longer letter on 3 August, in which he again claimed to have supplied the duc de Nemours with
fifty cannonballs and two powder barrels “to take the château de Berzé.” Perhaps sensing that the
leaders of Mâcon doubted his claims as to the abbot’s involvement in the provision of munitions
to the duc de Nemours, L’Arthusie asserted that “monseigneur de Cluny will well assure you that
I provided [the munitions] at his solicitation.”106 This second letter appears to have persuaded
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Mâcon’s municipal authorities of the veracity of L’Arthusie’s claims regarding the provenance of
the cannonballs and powder barrels in question, since one week later L’Arthusie signed a document
certifying that the munitions had been returned from “from monsieur de Varennes and the échevins
and residents of Mâcon … to the citadel of Chalon.”107
Claude de Guise’s motivations for personally involving himself in military preparations
for the siege of the château de Berzé are not immediately apparent, though the formal terms of the
château’s capitulation suggest that Rene de Rochebaron and the abbot may have directed warfare
against each other to some extent in the preceeding months. Given the proximity of the château
de Berzé to both Cluny abbey and the château de Lourdon, the latter of which had served as the
residence of successive abbots of Cluny from roughly the eleventh century, this is a distinct
possibility.108 In addition, the third of the truce’s five articles stipulated that Rochebaron and his
wife “will not attempt or have attempted, directly or indirectly, against the person, house, goods,
servants, and subjects of monsieur the abbot of Cluny … similarly the abbot of Cluny will not
attempt or have attempted by any of his [dependents] against the subjects and servants of the sieur
de Rochebaron.”109 This particular requirement of the truce was doubtless included at the
insistence of either Rene de Rochebaron or Claude de Guise, signaling an existing measure of
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animosity between these two parties. It implies that acts of violence were likely to recur between
their clients or household members.
Claude de Guise not only involved himself in the planning of military operations in the
region around Cluny abbey but even provided weapons to ligueur forces on certain occasions. In
May 1593, after a company of around 50 troops under the command of François le Marlet sieur de
Solon and another royalist captain had some weeks before occupied the small château de Dondin
in southwestern Burgundy, a sizeable League force numbering around 1,000-1,200 soldiers
amassed under François de Damas baron de Thianges commenced a siege of the small fortress.110
Documentary accounts of the siege differ as to the precise progress of the besieging force’s actions,
with one chronicler alleging that “they encamped before the place for fifteen days without doing
anything there, as the commanders had a shortage of [military] intelligence.”111

Another

contemporary account, however, maintains that the château’s royalist occupants were subjected to
intense artillery fire from the besieging League troops. Although confirming the fifteen-day
duration of the siege, this report notes that the royalist contingent inside the château “endured
nearly 200 shots from cannon taken from [the château de] Lourdon and given by the abbot of
Cluny, Dom Claude de Guise.”112 This latter description of the artillery barrage clearly indicates
that Claude de Guise had provided Thianges with a number of field pieces from his arsenal at the
110
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nearby château de Lourdon. Guise’s control of this arsenal reflected his overall management of
the château itself, as the structure had served as the residence of successive abbots of Cluny from
roughly the eleventh century.113 His provision of artillery pieces—and probably also artillery
shot—thus permitted Thianges’s forces to besiege the château de Dondin for over two weeks,
before halting the blockade after learning of the imminent arrival of some 300-400 royalist cavalry.
Claude de Guise’s motivations in providing artillery pieces for siege operations against the
château de Dondin seem to have centered on eradicating both royalist and Huguenot forces from
southern Burgundy and thereby safeguarding League supremacy throughout the province.
Although compelled to halt their siege of the château de Dondin in late May 1593, League forces
commanded by the young Henri de Lorraine prince de Mayenne, eldest son of the League’s
lieutenant-général du royaume Charles de Lorraine duc de Mayenne, initiated another siege of the
château on 10 July 1593. The younger Mayenne appears to have had at his disposal roughly 3,000
soldiers and a small number of artillery, though it is unclear if any of these cannon were borrowed
from the abbot of Cluny. After a siege lasting five days, during which some 110 to 120 artillery
rounds were fired at the château, Mayenne’s forces succeeded in creating a breach in the château’s
defensive walls that enabled them to launch an assault on the beleaguered royalists within. The
royalist commander of the château, François le Marlet sieur de Solon, was killed in the ensuing
assault along with several of his leading officers, and the victorious Leaguers immediately set
about demolishing the structure to prevent its future use by enemy forces. According to chronicler
Jean Gregaine, the death of the sieur de Solon and the razing of the château “were all sought after
113
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by the abbot of Cluny, who, on account of the great inconveniences he had received from this
garrison, had pushed for the siege.”114 Gregaine’s remark identifies Claude de Guise as the
principal architect of this successful attack on the château de Dondin, even though the abbot does
not seem to have been physically present at the siege.
While prominent clergy such as the abbot of Cluny took an active role in the provision of
weapons and munitions to Leaguer military forces, clerics of lesser status like village curates or
church canons sometimes worked to secure munitions for local communities allied to the League.
In late 1590 canon Denis Mazet of Toulouse’s Saint-Sernin abbey church successfully petitioned
the city council to provide “fifty kilograms of arquebus powder” to the small town of Vacquiers,
some twelve miles north of Toulouse, where he concurrently served as rector of the local church.115
As Vacquiers sought this gunpowder immediately “for their defense,” being “near to the places
occupied by the enemy,” the councilors of Toulouse gave the town six months to remit payment,
on condition that both Mazet and a local consul personally vouch for its ability to do so.116 Mazet’s
position as head curate of the church in Vacquiers motivated him to ensure that the town was both
amply munitioned and could project robust military strength. Additionally, Mazet’s role in
obtaining weapons on behalf of the town in which he ministered suggests that clerics not only
envisioned themselves as the spiritual protectors of their parishioners but also as the defenders of
their physical persons and communal space.
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Secular clergy attached to cathedrals or collegiate churches sometimes participated in the
transfer of weapons and munitions between neighboring ligueur cities, an activity that—oddly
enough—could even prompt complaints from disapproving fellow clerics. In November 1585, a
priest named Scipion Garil informed the officials of Saint-Vincent cathedral chapter in Mâcon that
he had seen another canon and priest, Jean Bruin, “accompany the artillery that was being driven
down to Lyon, [while] carrying his weapons.”117 Garil evidently objected to Bruin’s involvement
in such activities, and recommended that Bruin be deprived of his distributions, the parish tithes
that were typically allocated to cathedral canons after their attendance at each divine office.118
When asked by chapter leaders if he had armed himself and helped transport ordnance to Lyon,
Bruin freely admitted to doing so but asserted that he should not forfeit his distributions because
he had participated in this undertaking “at the request of monsieur de Marbé, captain of the city of
Mâcon.”119 Bruin clearly considered his involvement in a logistics operation of this nature
appropriate, representing his participation as legitimate obedience to the military authority of the
sieur de Marbé. However, chapter leaders ordered Bruin to refrain from such activities in the
future, “on pain of privation of his benefices, seeing that a clergyman is not allowed to go to war
and to bear arms.”120 This admonition is rather intriguing, particularly in light of the diverse
martial practices in which many clerics of Mâcon’s cathedral would engage throughout the
remainder of the League period. It doubtless reflects a mounting tension between post-Tridentine
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ideals of clerical comportment on the one hand and the exigencies of incessant sectarian warfare
in late sixteenth-century France on the other.
Catholic clergy from abbots to cathedral canons, therefore, often played rather direct roles
in the provision of weapons, munitions, and logistics services to military leaders and civic
authorities preparing for armed conflict with enemy forces.

Clerics’ involvement in the

organization of violence through weapons supply and logistical support facilitated and shaped
sectarian warfare in this turbulent period, which depended heavily on siege operations, raids, and
ambushes.

COMMANDING TROOPS AND DIRECTING OPERATIONS

The severe political turmoil and societal upheaval that shook the French kingdom in the
1580s and 1590s provided a number of high-ranking Catholic clergy with new opportunities to
personally command troops and direct military operations against royalist and Huguenot forces.
Of course, bishops in particular had assumed leadership positions in military conflict since the
outbreak of religious war in France in 1562. Frederic Baumgartner’s work has shown that many
French bishops commanded military forces against the Huguenots during the initial decades of the
Wars of Religion. Baumgartner asserts, however, that prelates “who took up arms in the civil wars
after the [Saint Bartholomew’s Day] massacre were also less numerous,” and his discussion of
episcopal involvement in military command during the League focuses chiefly on bishops like
Antoine Couppes of Sisteron and François Fléard of Grenoble who led the defense of their

respective cities against the forces of Henri IV.121
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Yet many high-ranking Catholic clerics

affiliated with the League both organized and commanded armed forces on battlefields throughout
France, thereby playing key roles in the enactment of sectarian violence at this time.
Some leading Catholic prelates appear to have assumed operational command of Leaguer
armies operating throughout particular French provinces. This was especially the case for bishops
from the ranks of noble families, the male members of which were immersed from birth in a culture
of arms that celebrated martial themes and the utilization of armor and military weapons.122 One
notable prelate who obtained command of a sizeable body of troops in this period was François
cardinal de Joyeuse, the son of Guillaume maréchal de Joyeuse and brother of Anne duc de
Joyeuse, one of Henri III’s favorites. Writing from the League city of Narbonne in eastern
Languedoc, the cardinal de Joyeuse reported to his aunt, Françoise de Bartanay, in late 1590 that
“we have here some forces that the king of Spain has sent us for the defense of our religion, which
I have already begun to utilize.”123 Rather than hastily deploying his troops against royalist forces
operating in the province, however, Joyeuse claimed to be “still waiting for an advantage in order
to do better still, with God’s help.”124 The cardinal claimed in another letter shortly after the arrival
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of Spanish troops in Languedoc during August 1590 that “it has pleased the king of Spain to send
me “6,000 Germans for the preservation of our religion,” the specification of Germans reflecting
the considerable number of German landsknecht infantry regiments in the larger force of soldiers
sent to aid the League on Spain’s behalf.125 Such language seems to suggest that the cardinal
understood his command of Leaguer forces as an appropriate extension of the spiritual and pastoral
authority of his ecclesiastical office, rather than merely pertaining to his secular privileges or
seigneurial powers.126
The cardinal de Joyeuse did not passively command ligueur forces but actively sought
opportune moments to deploy them in battle against the troops of Languedoc’s foremost politique
or royalist nobleman, Henri I de Montmorency duc de Montmorency. Rather than hastily
deploying his troops against Montmorency, Joyeuse claimed to be “still waiting for an advantage
in order to do better still, with God’s help.”127 In another letter to his aunt, most likely written
around the same time, the cardinal de Joyeuse provided several details concerning Montmorency’s
troop movements in the region around Carcassonne. Joyeuse claims to have attempted to engage
Montmorency numerous times on the battlefield, only to see the duc withdraw at the last moment.
Montmorency’s avoidance of battle was particularly bewildering for Joyeuse, as the duc was
rumored to have “almost twice the number of cavalry than I, because as I planned to go engage
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him in battle the Spanish cavalry abandoned me out of fear.”128
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Despite his Spanish auxiliaries’

seeming reticence to follow him into battle against Montmorency, however, Joyeuse indicated his
resolve to keep Montmorency from taking Carcassonne, which “is near its last legs, being squeezed
by plague and by famine.”129 Similarly, in his position as the archbishop of Toulouse, the cardinal
pressed Toulouse’s city council in January 1591 to provide the nearby town of Lavaur with two
field guns as well as “the ammunition and equipage necessary to fire 200 cannon shots,”
presumably in defense against Montmorency’s forces.130
The cardinal de Joyeuse was not the only Languedocian prelate to take an active role
directing military operations against royalist and Huguenot forces in the region, as the martial
activism of Urbain de Saint-Gelais, the ligueur bishop of Comminges, makes clear. During his
stint as “governor” of the city of Toulouse during 1589-1590, Saint-Gelais oversaw the
mobilization and deployment of armed forces against both Guillaume maréchal de Joyeuse—the
de facto governor of Toulouse until Saint-Gelais’s coup in early 1589—and Henri I duc de
Montmorency.131 Saint-Gelais deployed a body of troops from Toulouse in May 1589 to oppose
several nobles “of the contrary party” who “have taken the field with sizeable forces, harassing the
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towns and fortified places of the region of Comminges in order to win them over.”132
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In August

1589, the bishop also sent a contingent of six hundred arquebusiers to reinforce the city of
Narbonne, which was being continually threatened by Montmorency’s troops.133 Saint-Gelais’s
tendency to direct the deployment of troops during his governorship of Toulouse was
foreshadowed by his previous militaristic exploits, as in 1586 when he orchestrated the successful
recapture of Saint-Bertrand-de-Comminges from the Huguenots, during which Saint-Gelais
employed several pieces of artillery that he had borrowed from the arsenal at Toulouse.134
While high-ranking clergy such as Joyeuse and Saint-Gelais could command sizeable
military forces, local clerics sometimes commanded more informal and improvised groups of
armed individuals into battle. As bands of soldiers commanded by royalist nobles ravaged the
rural areas of western Brittany in late 1590, local peasants and villagers mobilized themselves in
an effort to combat such harassment. On one occasion, inhabitants of the rural parishes just west
of the small town of Carhaix clashed with royalist troops that had just occupied the small city over
a period of several days in November 1590.135 During the first day of fighting, a contingent of
royalist soldiers under the command of Yves seigneur du Liscoët defeated a combined force of
villagers from Carhaix’s immediate parishes such as Plonévez, Cléden, Plouyé, and Landeleau,
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“each of which lost therein a great number of men.”136
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“Hearing of their neighbors’ defeat,”

several of the city’s more remote parishes such as Châteauneuf-du-Faou, Lennon, and Pleyben
rapidly organized large forces of their own to oppose the seigneur du Liscoët’s troops. According
to the clerical chronicler Jean Moreau, Pleyben’s armed force was commanded by “the sieur de
Bizit, their captain, and the priest of the house of Linlouët, a nobleman.”137 Upon reaching
Carhaix, the local forces launched a somewhat disorganized attack, attempting to penetrate
Liscoët’s improvised defenses but hindered by sustained arquebus fire from the defenders. A sortie
of Liscoët’s cavalry from Carhaix overwhelmed the attacking forces, which were poorly equipped
and in the open, “killing most of them, including the sieur de Bizit and the priest Linlouët of
Pleyben.”138 Despite this negative outcome for the local forces, Moreau found some reasons for
optimism:
Nevertheless, [the royalists’] victory was not without loss, because, in addition to some
that were killed, the siegneur de Liscoët, leader of the company, maréchal de camp of the
king’s army in Brittany, had his right hand completely severed by an axe blow to the wrist,
and the hand fell to the ground, and it is assured that it was the priest Linlouët who gave
139
him this blow.

The symbolism of this account is remarkable; in cutting off the seigneur de Liscoët’s right hand,
with which a noble normally drew his sword and thus the mark of his strength and power, the priest
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emblematically reduced both the noble’s own personal potency and that of Henri IV, whom Liscoët
represented in western Brittany.140 In light of the actualities that Moreau did not personally witness
this battle and that a later chronicler attributes the severing of Liscoët’s hand to a citizen of Carhaix,
one must consider the possibility that the event did not occur precisely as Moreau has indicated.141
Yet the image of a battle axe-wielding priest helping to lead a contingent of villagers and peasants
against a better-equipped and better-trained royalist force is particularly striking. The priest’s
noble extraction doubtless contributed to his selection as one of the leaders of Pleyben’s armed
company, but his position as a cleric likely helped convince many of the parish’s inhabitants of
the legitimacy of their undertaking against Liscoët.
In addition to commanding armies or leading small bands of soldiers into battle, prominent
clerics were sometimes called upon to prevent the deployment of enemy forces or impede their
operations by directing the weapons and soldiers of their respective châteaux. After receiving
word in March 1589 that a sizeable Huguenot cavalry force had just been mobilized in Haute
Dauphiné under the direction of François de Bonne duc de Lesdiguières with the intention of
battling League forces in Lyonnais, Auvergne, and Languedoc, the échevins of Lyon took steps to
disrupt their movement westward. In addition to “having all boats found in the Rhône river
between this city and Condrieu placed on the high bank on the opposite side of the river,” Lyon’s
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leaders enlisted the aid of the archbishop of nearby Vienne, Pierre II de Villars, as well as the
town’s council.142 According to city council registers, the échevins jointly determined to write to
Vienne’s archbishop and municipal authorities “in order to induce them … to obstruct, by any
means, the crossing of the [Rhône] river in their region by the troops of Dauphiné.”143 Although
Lyon’s échevins did not specify the precise course of action they hoped that Vienne’s archbishop
would take against the Huguenot cavalry, Villars’s position as a high-ranking cleric with control
of at least two fortified château in the immediate vicinity of his archiepiscopal see suggests that
municipal leaders in Lyon envisioned him deploying cannon against any enemy force that
attempted to cross over the Rhône near Vienne.144 Villars’s affinity for the League as well as his
extensive family connections in the region also meant that he could call on relatives in positions
of military command to help obstruct the movement of Lesdiguières’s force.145
Clergy with control of fortified châteaux at times personally directed defensive and
counter-siege operations at these structures against an attack by enemy forces. Claude de Guise,
the abbot of Cluny, personally managed the defense of the château de Lourdon against raids and
assaults by royalist troops in 1593 and 1594. In June 1593, Guise successfully defended the
château against a nighttime raid by troops from the nearby château de Dondin, repulsing the
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attackers with “great salvos of his artillery and strong musket fire.”146
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On another occasion in

1593, royalist troops under René de Rochebaron managed to capture one of the château’s lower
courtyards, prompting Guise to withdraw “into the donjon with twelve soldiers,” from which they
succeeded in fighting off the attackers.147 With military assistance from the municipal authorities
of both Mâcon and Cluny, Claude de Guise seems to have repulsed additional attacks on the
château de Lourdon.148

CONCLUSION

This chapter has explored the multifaceted roles that clergy played in the pervasive
sectarian warfare of the League period, assessing the degree to which Catholic clergy intervened
both directly and indirectly in organized sectarian violence. The intense religio-political conflict
and social disruption of the League era presented a host of new opportunities to Catholic clerics
seeking to participate in war against their Huguenot and politique opponents. While clerics’
extensive participation in military operations during the League appears to corroborate the
contentions of Pierre-Jean Souriac and other historians that the Wars of Religion effectively
militarized French society to an extent previously unseen in the sixteenth century, these activities
also indicate that organized violence against hated sectarian opponents possessed something of a
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sacral nature for militant clerics.149

236
Clergy comprehended military action as a suitable means to

accomplish their religious and political objectives, and often justified their participation in warfare
in distinctly religious terms. Through their direct engagement in the organization and prosecution
of sectarian warfare, Catholic clergy challenged a number of conventional taboos on clerical
involvement in armed conflict and arms-bearing and became significant military actors in their
own right. The martial practices of Catholic clergy during the League offer a clearer picture of
clerics’ options for martial engagement during periods of pervasive religious and civil conflict,
and reveal much about the dynamics of sectarian violence during the most divisive and tumultuous
period of the Wars of Religion.

149

Pierre-Jean Souriac, “Comprendre une société confrontée à la guerre civile: Le Midi toulousain entre 1562
et 1596,” Histoire, économie et société 2 (2004): 261-272, here at 262.

CHAPTER 5
‘FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE CITY GATES’:
ARMED DEFENSE OF CITIES AND CHÂTEAUX

On 7 January 1589, just days after receiving word of the assassination at Blois of Henri de
Lorraine duc de Guise and his brother Louis II de Lorraine cardinal de Guise at the hands of Henri
III’s royal bodyguards, the Saint-Étienne cathedral provost and vicar-general of the archbishopric
of Toulouse, Jean Daffis, informed Toulouse’s city council that the canons of the cathedral chapter
and the clergy of its parish churches had assembled together “to offer guidance concerning our
conservation, because it is feared that there have been major communications in all the principal
cities of this realm in order to exterminate the good Catholics, and to seize and take hold of these
cities and finally render them heretical.” While Daffis asserted that “we must betake ourselves to
God with prayers and orations, that it would be pleasing to his divine will to appease his ire towards
us,” he also recommended securing the city gates by stationing there a “very great number of
bourgeois, and with them the clergy … both by night and by day.”1 The next morning, the city
council of Toulouse enacted new regulations for the civic guard, concluding that “for the defense
of the city gates there shall be placed there a great number of bourgeois, and with them the clergy.”2
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Catholic clerics were to play a key role in securing the city of Toulouse and defending its
inhabitants against their Huguenot and politique opponents during what would later be seen as one
of the most critical junctures of the protracted French Wars of Religion.3
This chapter explores the varied ways in which Catholic clerics in cities and towns
throughout France took up arms and participated directly in a range of organized efforts to defend
their communities against religious and political opponents during the intense sectarian conflict of
the Catholic League period of the Wars of Religion. Drawing on archival records such as city
council deliberations, cathedral chapter registers, police committee proceedings, and memoir
accounts, I argue that Catholic clergy in cities such as Toulouse, Aix-en-Provence, Mâcon,
Beaune, and Dijon performed new and vital roles in civic defense initiatives throughout the
pervasive civil conflict of the 1580s and 1590s, shouldering weapons of all kinds and conducting
round-the-clock patrol and sentry operations traditionally considered incongruous with the clerical
profession.4 Clerical participation in defensive activities was not confined to the ramparts and
gates of their respective cities, however, but also extended to châteaux in which clergy were
sometimes based or which stood on ecclesiastical landholdings. The fortification and defense of
ecclesiastical châteaux could at times form part of local military leaders’ overall defense strategies,
especially when such structures were situated in the immediate vicinity of a particular town, as
was the case for the city of Mâcon in southern Burgundy. Yet clerics in possession of châteaux
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grasped their strategic importance, taking an active part in their military protection. Clerics’
extensive involvement in the defense of both cities and châteaux during the turbulent League era
associated them with a culture of arms-bearing that urged resort to arms and displays of weapons
capability in preparation for sectarian violence.

DEFENDING CITIES AND TOWNS

The most conspicuous way in which clerics participated in defense activities during the
intense sectarian conflict of the Catholic League era was through personal involvement in civic
militia duty, the primary occupation of which was typically referred to in French as guet et garde.
The performance of guet et garde within urban areas took on fresh urgency during the profound
upheaval of the League period, as countless municipalities across France decisively rebelled
against the authority of successive French kings Henri III and Henri IV. Since the League was
largely an urban phenomenon, cities and towns constituted anchors of vital political and financial
support for the wider League movement, despite the fact that municipal authorities were often
more occupied with local issues and concerns.5 As Michael Wolfe and others have contended,
walled towns were of critical importance from a strategic perspective, since partisans on all sides
fought constantly to retain fortified cities or capture those held by their opponents.6 Because of
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continuous external and internal threats to urban security in this period, municipal authorities
throughout the French kingdom significantly augmented traditional civilian defense systems in
terms of both operations and manpower, establishing round-the-clock patrols and ordering all ablebodied men to shoulder arms.7

While clergy had traditionally been exempted from such

requirements on account of their ecclesiastical status, the exigencies of the 1580s and 1590s
impelled local authorities to arm their cities’ clerics and incorporate them into the civilian militias
that served as each town’s first line of defense against attack. Clerics in urban areas therefore
performed critical defensive functions alongside their fellow townsmen, whether standing watch
on city ramparts, patrolling streets and open areas, or appearing armed and ready in civic
emergencies.
It should also be noted at the outset that clerical participation in the performance of guet et
garde during the League era in some ways solidified—albeit temporarily—clerics’ status as
“citizens,” notwithstanding ongoing contemporary debates concerning the extent to which clerics
could be deemed citizens from a legal and political standpoint and yet be immune from both
taxation and criminal prosecution in civil courts.8 In the South German cities of the Holy Roman
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Empire, for instance, paying taxes and standing watch were the two principal responsibilities of
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century urban citizenship, according to B. Ann Tlusty; clergy there
were typically exempt from each, on account of their customary legal status as “members of an
estate separate from that of citizens.”9 Canon law also prohibited clergy from bearing arms, even
in many defensive circumstances, as the spilling of blood was considered utterly inappropriate to
the clerical calling.10 Clergy were only to fight enemies “with sadness, weeping, tears, and
prayers,” according to Italian soldier and jurist Pierino Belli, whose 1563 treatise De re militari et
de bello (On Military Matters and Warfare) drew on patristic authors and canon law to
delegitimize the participation of all clerics in arms-bearing.11 Despite such restrictions on clerical
arms-bearing, municipal authorities in late sixteenth-century France seem to have had few qualms
asking local Catholic clergy to shoulder arms and thus heighten their communities’ martial
readiness, while clergy themselves by and large complied with such requests. The pervasive
involvement of Catholic clerics in civic defense activities during the League period thus exposes
the tensions and contradictions inherent in notions of clerical citizenship as well as the
phenomenon of clerical arms-bearing more generally.
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Arming Clergy for Civic Defense

While many sixteenth-century urban residents were permitted to keep private arms in their
homes for the purpose of civic defense, Catholic clergy in cities and towns often did not possess
such weapons and were therefore either issued them by municipal leaders or instructed to purchase
arms when mobilized for participation in defense activities.12 Urban religious communities, in
particular, typically forbade their members from keeping weapons within conventual premises, as
illustrated by the extant statutes of Dijon’s Saint-Bénigne abbey, which prohibited the possession
of “any offensive or defensive arms, or other swords to this effect” within rooms and dormitories.13
The provision of weapons to civilians for civic defense functions varied from city to city in late
sixteenth-century France, as each municipality had specific customs regarding the ownership and
use of arms within city walls. The cheapest and most easily obtainable arms, of course, were the
diverse types of lances, pole-arms, and bladed weapons that could be locally produced and which
municipal armories usually stocked in sufficient numbers.14 Firearms such as the arquebus and
the musket, and the gunpowder necessary to fire them, were far more costly and thus somewhat
harder to come by, though clerics such as cathedral canons often had more financial means to draw
upon than some of their fellow urban residents.15 Municipal leaders and military governors
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throughout France appear by and large to have appreciated this predicament, and took steps to
ensure that clergy obtained the firearms, pole-arms, and edged weapons needed to effectively
contribute to communal defense operations.
Municipal leaders in Dijon began systematically providing the city’s regular and secular
clergy with weapons and armor near the outset of the League era, as the increased movement of
troops across Burgundy prompted them to augment the city’s security. Just before the untimely
death of the last Catholic heir to the French throne, François duc d’Anjou, triggered the formation
of ultra-Catholic ligues across the kingdom, the outbreak of plague in nearby Val-Suzon as well
as reports that Swiss mercenaries returning home from Paris would soon pass through the region
prompted Dijon’s civic leaders to shore up defensive efforts and tighten the city’s security. Among
other measures, the city council appears to have attempted to more effectively monitor the weapons
and armor it had begun doling out for the purposes of civic defense. At a meeting in mid-April
1584 of the clergy of Dijon’s royal church of Sainte-Chapelle, the former chapel of the dukes of
Burgundy noted for both its music and its custody of a miraculous Host that Pope Eugene IV had
given to Philip the Good in 1434, chapter officers declared that “each canon that has previously
been given a corselet and weapons is to return and yield them to the chapter.”16 While no other
evidence exists as to when or where the canons of Saint-Chapelle had been issued weapons and
armor, the order for all clerics to give back these items suggests that city leaders had previously
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distributed armament in a somewhat haphazard manner but now wanted it returned as part of an
initiative to more effectively regulate its allocation. Yet a directive such as this could also signal
that chapter officials merely wished to consolidate the armament its clergy had been issued from
the municipal armory in preparation for anticipated defense duties. Regardless of the precise
reasons for the recall, this episode confirms the provision of weapons and protective armor to
Catholic clerics in Dijon for defensive purposes near the onset of the League era.
Clergy in cities such as Toulouse appear to have had somewhat permanent access to
firearms that municipal authorities had issued to them for the purposes of civic defense. In
December 1584, after persistent refusals by Henri I de Montmorency duc de Montmorency and
his Huguenot allies to suspend their military operations in Bas Languedoc against royal forces, the
city council of Toulouse took a number of measures to tighten the city’s security in the event that
the Huguenot troops expanded their maneuvers westward into Haut Languedoc. As part of their
efforts to strengthen the city’s defenses, Toulouse’s council appointed several of its members—
known locally as capitouls—to inspect the monasteries of the Cordeliers, Jacobins, and Minim
friars in an effort “to ascertain in what condition are the arms and munitions that they have
previously been given.”17 The delegation of capitouls received further instructions “to provide
them with whatever will be needed, with regard to the number of monks.”18 Clearly, municipal
authorities in Toulouse intended for the size of the arsenal at each of these monasteries to
correspond precisely to the number of clerics in residence there, in order to maximize the number
of individuals within the conventual walls that could shoulder arms during times of crisis. An
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almost identical directive concerning the clergy of these three monasteries appears in city council
deliberations from mid-December 1589 as well, shortly after the Huguenot troops of Jean de Lévis
vicomte de Mirepoix seized several towns and châteaux in the nearby diocese of Mirepoix in
contravention of a truce signed two months prior that halted fighting between the Henri I duc de
Montmorency and Guillaume maréchal de Joyeuse.19 The capitouls’ repeated inspection of
armories within each of these monasteries confirms not only that weapons and ammunition had
been stockpiled there on a rather permanent basis but also that authorities expected all of the
monasteries’ occupants to arm themselves and wield their allotted firearms in times of civic
emergency.
Fears of an imminent attack by enemy forces often motivated municipal authorities to
enlarge their clergy’s defensive capabilities through increased armament. Reports in the summer
of 1588 that a force of several thousand Huguenot troops was assembling at Nîmes in preparation
for an offensive against Catholic strongholds in western Provence unsettled municipal leaders in
Aix-en-Provence, prompting them to progressively shore up the city’s defenses over the
subsequent months. While measures were taken to strengthen the city’s defensive walls and ensure
that the moat encircling the city was of sufficient depth, Aix’s leaders augmented the civic guard
and ensured that all militiamen were properly armed and munitioned. They also appear to have
instructed the clerics of Saint-Sauveur cathedral chapter to procure additional weapons that could
be used in communal defense. At a meeting in August 1588, chapter officials discussed the
purchase of three halberds and three arquebuses, one of which seems to have formerly belonged
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to the late uncle of the cathedral’s capiscol, or choirmaster.20
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It is unclear what type of weapons

the clerics of Saint-Sauveur cathedral had previously utilized while performing militia functions,
as there is no further mention of this subject in extant chapter minutes or municipal deliberations
aside from a reference in May 1585 to a cathedral canon named Pierre de Cadenet being
reprimanded for “having taken up a halberd in order to prevent the execution of justice” by
authorities attempting to fine him for failing to participate in guard duty,” an intriguing incident
that I will subsequently discuss.21 Evidently, the clergy of Saint-Sauveur had ready access to both
pole-arms and firearms for participation in civic defense from the mid-1580s onward.
The strategic nature of churches and monasteries located just beyond a city’s walls could
sometimes prompt municipal leaders to arm the clergy that inhabited these structures, effectively
incorporating the resident clerics into a town’s overall defensive system. Fearing an imminent
attack by Huguenot forces, Aix-en-Provence’s bureau de police, a newly created administrative
body charged with civic defense and law enforcement, issued quantities of gunpowder and
arquebuses to the captains of the city’s five quartiers on 3 October 1588.22 The very next day, the
bureau issued eight livres of small-grain gunpowder to the city’s Minim friars “for the protection
of their monastery,” which stood just outside the city’s fortified walls in the faubourg of Ville des
Tours.23 The issuance of poudre fine—small-grained gunpowder that was suitable chiefly for
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small arms—to the Minims suggests that the friars had already been provided with arquebuses or
other firearms, as well as lead shot, for defensive purposes. In addition, the bureau de police’s
regard for the Minims’ capacity to defend their monastery in the event of attack indicates that
municipal leaders in Aix viewed strategic buildings in the faubourgs, along with their occupants,
as key components of the city’s comprehensive network of defense.
Clergy were not always able to obtain firearms for use in civilian militia duties, and
sometimes had to use swords, pole-arms, or other staff weapons distributed to them from municipal
armories. When the échevins of Dijon took a number of measures to strengthen the city’s security
in May 1589, not long after Dijon had formalized its adherence to the Catholic League, they
provided to Bénigne Rigaut, a priest of Notre-Dame parish church who also served as one of three
clerical delegates to the city council, “five halberds, one pike, and three swords, to be delivered to
the Jacobins for the defense of this city.”24 In this particular instance, surviving municipal records
do not indicate whether the Jacobins had previously been issued weapons by city leaders or
whether the échevins were merely now augmenting a quantity of arms already in the monks’
possession. Yet despite the lack of evidence in city council deliberations that Dijon’s Jacobins
had participated in civic guard duties prior to May 1589, the involvement of clergy from not only
Sainte-Chapelle but also the abbey of Saint-Bénigne in guard operations from at least 1585 on
suggests that the Jacobins may have participated as well.
The provision of weapons to ever-larger numbers of urban residents—whether clerical or
lay—posed continuing problems for civic authorities charged with maintaining public order and
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safety during the pervasive civil conflict and social upheaval of the League period. Even as they
armed greater numbers of their citizens for defensive purposes, town leaders issued uneven and
variable regulations concerning the possession and use of weapons within city walls. Councilors
in the Burgundian city of Beaune, for example, prohibited in March 1585 “all persons of any
circumstance to go about the city at night past the ninth hour, as well as to carry arms, on pain of
fine and prison,” a rather commonplace injunction aimed at preventing nocturnal crime or
conspiracies.25 Yet less than two weeks later, Beaune’s councilors ordered all residents “to stay
ready and prepare their weapons” for use in all possible scenarios, on the advice of the commander
of the city’s château, the sieur de Saint-Privan.26 Similarly, municipal authorities in Toulouse
ordered all inhabitants in late 1587 “to equip themselves with arms, gunpowder, bullets, fuses, and
other war munitions,” yet frequently issued other injunctions against assembling under arms
without their express permission.27 During the widespread disorder that convulsed France in the
wake of the Guise assassinations in December 1588, authorities in numerous towns instructed their
citizens, as in Beaune, to “carry their swords and daggers whether traversing the city or leaving it,
and to keep ready their other arms,” thereby creating fully militarized cityscapes throughout the
kingdom.28
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On Guard

Constant sectarian warfare and military operations convulsed practically every French
province during the violent League period. Rumors of troop movements, military action, and
subversive plots kept cities and towns in a perpetual state of alarm and obliged municipal
authorities to mobilize all available persons for participation in defense duties. While it is at times
difficult to distinguish between more organized civic militia functions and the customary night
watch known as guet et garde, which typically involved a handful of townsmen exercising
nighttime police functions such as walking city streets and detaining unruly residents or suspicious
persons, both involved arms-bearing civilians in the coordinated protective activities of
surveillance, patrol, and—if need be—armed force. Municipal leaders throughout the kingdom of
France habitually called on regular and secular Catholic clergy to take part in urban defense
operations, incorporating them into the civilian militias that served as each town’s first line of
defense against attack. Clerics thus performed critical defensive functions alongside their fellow
townsmen by standing watch on fortified ramparts or city gates, patrolling urban spaces such as
streets and open areas, and appearing armed and ready in recurrent civic emergencies. In all of
these activities, Catholic clergy formed an integral part of cities’ armed deterrence against both
external and internal threats to security.
Catholic clerics were routinely mobilized for civic defense operations in substantial
numbers, signaling the overall importance of their contribution to such activites. In October 1585,
after having been menaced by a Protestant army for several weeks, municipal leaders in Mâcon
received a reinforcement of some 300 arquebusiers from nearby Lyon and decided to take
additional measures to strengthen the city guard. On 20 October, Mâcon’s authorities requested
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that the canons of Saint-Vincent cathedral chapter “form a corps de garde each night of twelve
men for the city watch.”29 As the city’s cathedral chapter was typically composed of just fifteen
clerics during the latter half of the sixteenth century, this is in no way an insignificant figure.
Before long, the cathedral clergy of Mâcon were standing guard on a round-the-clock basis in an
effort to deter military attacks. By the spring of 1586 the canons of the cathedral chapter were
mobilized for the civic watch “both day and night,” a situation that would surely have impacted
their ability to conduct regular religious services in the cathedral.30 Possibly due to the sheer
number of clerics requested for guard duty and the frequency with which they were mustered,
chapter officials appointed canon Philibert Montaudry “to command the guard that messieurs [the
canons] and all beneficed clerics and habitués of the church presently form.”31 Thus, the entire
capitular body of Mâcon’s Saint-Vincent cathedral, including beneficed as well as unbeneficed
priests, was continually under arms by late 1585 and early 1586 because of the imminent threat of
Huguenot and royalist attacks.
As the case of Mâcon suggests, clerical leaders grasped the necessity of organizing their
clergy’s involvement in civic defense duties rather than simply allowing it to proceed haphazardly.
Chapter officials of Notre-Dame collegiate church in Beaune drew up in July 1590 a detailed
roster, organized by days of the week, of all canons, habitué priests, and vicars-choral “for the
guard of Beaune’s city gates and the night guard,” in response to municipal leaders’ request that
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they contribute to defense functions on a round-the-clock basis.32
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Interestingly, authorities had

given the individual clergy of Notre-Dame, Beaune’s principal church, the option of paying for
exemption from guard duties in place of personal participation.33 Yet the roster that chapter leaders
created in July 1590 allocated four to five clerics per day—Sundays included—to the civic guard,
with no cleric’s name appearing more than once.

This detail signals not only the ready

participation of the majority of Beaune’s clergy in defense activities but also the seriousness with
which chapter leaders approached their involvement in the armed defense of Beaune from external
and internal threats.
Clerics frequently contributed to civic defense systems by manning the city gates, which
represented the most strategic points of access to urban centers and symbolized the strength—or
lack thereof—of a town’s defenses. That municipal authorities sometimes permanently closed all
but one city gate during times of acute crisis underscores the strategic value of gates to cities’
overall security.34 As this chapter’s opening vignette suggests, prominent clerics themselves
grasped the importance of involving clergy in the defense of city gates during times of crisis. When
news of the Blois assassinations reached Toulouse in January 1589, the cathedral prévôt and vicargeneral of the archbishopric of Toulouse, Jean Daffis, informed the city council that the cathedral
canons and parish clergy had assembled “to offer guidance concerning our conservation, because
it is feared that there have been major communications in all the principal cities of this realm in
order to exterminate the bon catholiques, and to seize and take hold of these cities and finally
render them heretical.” Declaring that “we must betake ourselves to God with prayers and
32
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orations, that it would be pleasing to his divine will to appease his ire towards us,” Daffis also
advised reinforcing the city gates with a “very great number of bourgeois, and with them the clergy
… both by night and by day.”35 Daffis clearly envisioned both prayer and force of arms as key
components of the city’s defense against both Huguenot and politique opponents. The next
morning, Toulouse’s councilors enacted new civic guard regulations, ordaining that “for the
defense of the city gates there shall be placed there a great number of bourgeois, and with them
the clergy.”36 Clergy in other towns likewise manned city gates during the crisis months of early
1589. As councilors in Dijon reacted angrily to the Blois assassinations and worked to augment
the city’s defenses in February 1589, they asked Catholic clerics to guard the Saint-Nicolas gate
along the northern edge of the city walls on at least one occasion.37 Dijon’s clerics guarded one
of the city gates again during the intensified warfare the raged across the region in the summer of
1594.38
Clerical involvement in the protection of strategic structures just beyond the city walls
mirrored their defense of city gates in notable ways. In April 1585, the échevins of Mâcon
entreated the city’s Franco-Italian bishop, Luc Alemanni, “to station several ecclesiastics at the
gate of the city’s bridge,” a structure with towered fortifications traversing the Saône river and
connecting French domain on the river’s western bank to territory at that time controlled by the
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duke of Savoy, Charles-Emmanuel.39
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While the precise extent of the bishop of Mâcon’s

involvement in this particular episode is unclear from extant archival evidence, it is possible that
the city council sought the absentee prelate’s permission for such initiatives on the rare occasions
that he was actually in town.40 The canons of Saint-Vincent cathedral chapter were again stationed
at the bridge on two occasions in October 1588, once in an effort to double the number of
guardsmen on the bridge and subsequently to man the fortified tower gate at the bridge’s
midpoint.41 In repeatedly guarding the fortified bridge separating Mâcon from the territory of the
duke of Savoy, the clergy of Mâcon fulfilled integral functions in their city’s military defense
strategy.
In addition to guarding strategic access points to their towns, clergy served as lookouts that
observed key avenues of approach and fired warning shots to signal the presence of enemy troops.
Regular clergy in Toulouse performed important surveillance actions from the bell towers of
churches and monasteries with commanding views of the surrounding area. In December 1584
Toulouse’s city council asked the friars of the Minim monastery, which stood just beyond the city
walls near the North gate, “to post someone in the belfry both in the evening and from midnight
onwards, and, [if] any troop approaches the city, to discharge a musket in order to signal the
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As their church’s bell tower afforded an unobstructed view of the largely undeveloped

area north and east of the city, the Minims were well positioned to spot light emanating from the
hand-held torches and lanterns that troops would have been forced to utilize when travelling on a
dark moonless night. The city council reiterated this directive to the Minims in December 1589,
asking the friars again “to post someone in their bell tower by night” and fire an arquebus or musket
to warn of imminent danger.43 These two episodes suggest that throughout this entire period at
least one Minim friar performed armed watch in their church’s belfry on a nightly basis, ready to
alert Toulouse’s authorities in the event of attack or subversion. Similarly, the clerics of Beaune’s
Notre-Dame collegiate chapter appear to have taken turns manning their church’s bell tower by
night whenever municipal leaders deemed the city to be at increased risk of attack. On one
occasion in May 1591, the chapter reimbursed two of its clerics eight sous “for having spent the
night in the belfry, in order to conduct surveillance while the enemy was in the environs of this
city.”44 Likewise, on at least two occasions in July 1594 cathedral canons of Mâcon manned SaintVincent’s bell tower, from which they could effectively observe the area just beyond the Saône
river bridge as well as the northerly expanse immediately outside the city’s fortified walls.45
Conducting surveillance from the belfries of their churches and monasteries was thus a key
component of clerics’ involvement in local defense systems. Furthermore, clerics’ duty to watch
for signs of impending attack and sound necessary alarms is particularly striking when considered
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in light of work done on the role of tocsin-ringing in episodes of religious violence throughout the
Wars of Religion.46
Clerics mobilized for civic defense duties were often assigned to patrol the battlement walk
on the city walls, from which they could observe anyone attempting to slip in or out of the city.
The clergy of Dijon’s Sainte-Chapelle in particular were regularly tasked by municipal leaders to
conduct armed watch on the battlements, both during the daytime and at night. In June 1591, the
échevins instructed the clergy to conduct “the watch on the walls and ramparts, along with half of
the Swiss [troops],” a contingent of which had recently arrived to reinforce the château garrison.47
At a council meeting in January 1593, during which échevins also requested that Gaspard de Saulx
vicomte de Tavannes add another thirty to forty cuirasses to the city’s arsenal “in order to make
war against our enemies and disrupt their schemes and ravages,” clerics were again asked to patrol
the battlements at two specific times each day. Specifically, clergy were to organize themselves
into “several dizaines to walk the rounds on the wall every day, from the closing of the gates [at
night] until the night guard can be positioned on the towers … and each morning from the hour of
morning Mass until the opening of the gates.” The reason that the échevins gave for asking the
clergy to patrol the battlements at the opening and closing of the city gates each day, when the
city’s defenses were doubtless most vulnerable, was “to preempt the surprises and escalades of the
enemies.”48 Clearly, the échevins of Dijon considered clerics’ patrolling of the battlement walk at
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critical points throughout the day a crucial augmentation of the city’s overall defenses. The clergy
themselves appear to have grasped the necessity of this requirement, as municipal records indicate
their ready assent and performance of twice-daily rounds over the course of the next several
weeks.49
To protect their cities and towns from internal threats on the part of royalist sympathizers
or suspected Huguenots, clerical contingents also carried out nighttime patrols of urban spaces
such as the large open areas that often surrounded churches and monasteries, thereby asserting
control of the urban environment. In early 1585 Toulouse’s city council asked the clerics of the
abbey chapter of Saint-Sernin to “organize a guard detachment around [its] church,” a vast basilica
at the intersection of several main thoroughfares not far from the city’s northern walls.50 As they
took measures to tighten security in June 1590, councilors in Toulouse directed the cathedral
canons to “execute an effective watch near the church of Saint-Étienne,” which was located just
inside the Saint-Étienne gate near the eastern end of the main east-west thoroughfare of the city.51
Similarly, clergy in Dijon were often asked to patrol a number of open areas adjacent to their
churches such as the Place de la Sainte-Chapelle and Place Saint-Médard, the latter of which was
located near the city center and abutted a large cemetery. Clerics on guard near Saint-Médard
cemetery in March 1594 were responsible for the arrest of a printer with royalist sympathies named
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Jean Desplanches, who “passed and re-passed the guard detachment several times under pretext of
wanting to enter his printing house, but [instead] counted all of the weapons [the clergy had] on
hand.”52 Despite having voiced anti-League opinions on previous occasions, Desplanches appears
to have gotten off in this particular instance. Dijon’s authorities issued Desplanches a stern
warning “to contain himself without speaking or communicating with suspect persons, or uttering
words to the advantage of the king of Navarre against the party of the Union and the peace of this
city, on pain of bodily punishment.”53 However, Desplanches’s brother Maximilien, a printer who
had had prior run-ins with the Leaguer city council, was promptly expelled from Dijon, probably
on suspicion of involvement in Jean’s undertaking on the night of his arrest.54 The efforts of clergy
to patrol urban spaces with force of arms could play a key role in disrupting plots aimed at
destabilizing Leaguer control of a strategic city such as Dijon.
The guarding of civic buildings formed another key component of clerical participation in
civil defense operations intended to counteract internal threats from would-be conspirators with
anti-League sympathies as well as suspicious strangers found within the city. The clergy of Dijon,
in particular, guarded the city’s hôtel de ville, or city hall, during several points of intensified
warfare in 1589 and 1590. In February 1589, the clerical guard contingent was transferred from
its appointed station at the Saint-Nicolas gate to the hôtel de ville, the seat of Dijon’s mayor and
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échevins from which local governance had been exercised as far back as the twelfth century.55
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The

impetus for transferring the clergy from the Saint-Nicolas gate to the hôtel de ville seems to have
come from Jean Bégat, a leading canon of Sainte-Chappelle, who had made “remonstrances” to
the échevins concerning the necessity of relocating the clergy’s guard station. While sources do
not permit us to establish the precise nature of Bégat’s forceful argument as to why the clergy
should guard the hôtel de ville instead of the Saint-Nicolas gate, the hôtel de ville was centrally
located and thus closer to the city’s churches and cloisters. However, one should not discount the
possibility that Bégat considered guarding the hôtel de ville a far more prestigious and worthwhile
endeavor, as opposed to being stationed at a far-flung city gate. Whatever Bégat’s rationale, the
clergy appear to have guarded the hôtel de ville throughout the remainder of 1589 and into the fall
of 1590. Interestingly, at least a portion of the city’s clergy was requested in September 1590 to
stand guard “each day in the great hall of this hôtel de ville … beginning today,” a decision
prompted at least in part by the interception of a letter from the nearby royalist stronghold of SaintJean-de-Losne indicating that parties there had formulated an elaborate plot against Dijon.56 The
use of clerics as armed guards both inside and outside the hôtel de ville could signal the dire straits
engendered by a general shortage of weapons-capable individuals beyond those already manning
the city gates and ramparts. Yet there is also a highly symbolic element to Catholic clerics’ armed
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protection of the hôtel de ville, which is suggestive not only of divine protection for the early
civitas but also of the sacral character of civic governance itself.57
Catholic clergy even appear to have assumed leadership roles within militia command
structures at times, exercising authority over a portion of the civic guard. At Aix-en-Provence, a
canon named Michel Fournier of Saint-Sauveur cathedral was appointed to the position of
vingtenier in the civic militia for the town’s Bourg quarter, in which stood the cathedral.58 As one
of the Bourg quarter’s numerous vingteniers, Fournier had command of a group of twenty
guardsmen and would have reported directly to one of the handful of centeniers, who had overall
responsibility for 100 militia guards.59 Although existing records do not affirm whether any of the
guardsmen that Fournier commanded were clergy as well, we can safely surmise that at least a few
of his subordinates were clerics, as the Saint-Sauveur cathedral chapter was often asked to take
part in militia duties during this period.60 While the appointment of clergy to positions of
command within militia hierarchies seems to have been the exception rather than the rule, this
factor testifies to the profound extent to which clerics were integrated into civilian defense systems
during this period. Fournier’s leadership position also suggests that municipal authorities and
military officers with overall command and control of urban militias could view cathedral canons
both as reliable members of militia organizations and as possessing the requisite traits to
effectively direct a squad of armed civilians.
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Apart from the organized performance of militia and watch duties at set times and in
particular locations throughout the city, clergy were also expected to appear armed and ready at a
moment’s notice during civic emergencies. Many clerics grasped the life-and-death nature of civic
defense throughout the League, keeping their weapons and armor close at hand and meeting at
assigned rendezvous points in times of extremity. Throughout the summer of 1594, Dijon in
particular was in a constant state of alert owing to the constant operation of royalist armies
throughout the province of Burgundy. On one occasion in early July 1594, fresh rumors of an
imminent attack prompted Dijon’s leaders to sound the alarm, close the city gates, and mobilize
the garrison of troops stationed within its château. According to contemporary chronicler Gabriel
Breunot, the entire city took up arms as quickly as possible, including the regular and secular
clergy. “The priests and monks went to their rendezvous,” Breunot explained, while a priest named
Bressin, curé of Saint-Nicolas de Dijon, “came out into the street wearing … leg armor and
doublet, sword at this side, [with] a colored hat and a partisan in his hand.” The striking nature of
Bressin’s attire, which included not only weapons but clothing typical of well-to-do citizens and
professional soldiers, was not lost on his fellow townsmen, one of whom seems to have remarked
that the cleric resembled “some brash captain.”61 While Bressin’s dress may or may not have been
purposefully selected, the sword and partisan he carried were almost certainly issued to him on a
previous occasion by Dijon’s leaders, during their initial efforts to arm the secular clergy in 1584
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His timely appearance in the street, armed with both weapons, implies an extreme

readiness on Bressin’s part to defend Dijon and his fellow citizens from impending military assault.

Contesting Civic Defense

Despite the urgency of civic defense activities during the persistent warfare and civil
disorder of the 1580s and 1590s, clerical participation in defense operations was at times highly
contested, even by Catholic clergy themselves. Like a number of their fellow townsmen, clergy
in several cities and towns did not always regard civic defense obligations with unqualified
enthusiasm and sometimes avoided having to take part altogether. While some clergy collectively
sought exemption from militia duties on the basis of clerical prerogatives or liturgical
responsibilities, other individual clerics appear to have developed specific objections with respect
to command hierarchies or equipment requirements. In taking issue with particular aspects of
defense duties in this period, clergy were hardly alone; avoidance of or objection to the strenuous
obligations of civic defense were common occurrences in many French cities during the League,
as resources were stretched thin and increasing numbers of townspeople were being asked by
municipal leaders and military governors to participate in round-the-clock defense and police
functions. Despite instances of noncompliance on the part of a surprising number of clerics and
lay citizens alike, most clergy seem to have grasped the seriousness of their personal involvement
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in civic defense activities and described their participation in these operations in terms of “duty”
and “obligation.”
Perhaps the most predictable reason for clergy to request exemption from militia service
or guard duties was that such requirements interfered with the fundamental responsibilities of their
religious vocation, such as celebrating Mass, observing canonical hours, hearing confession, and
ministering to the sick and dying. When mobilized by the authorities of Beaune for guard duties
in August 1586, chapter officials of Notre-Dame collegiate church decided to take part in the gate
guard but not the night watch, “owing to the insufficient number of ecclesiastics” and the need “to
provide for the poor sick people afflicted with the plague.”63 While recognizing the necessity of
providing at least a few clerics for defense duties, Beaune’s clergy also grasped the need to confess
and perform last rites for plague-stricken citizens. Several Beaunois clerics ministered widely to
citizens suffering during outbreaks of plague in subsequent years, especially canon Jean Philippes,
who dispensed the sacraments to afflicted townspeople in 1596 and 1597.64 Liturgical and pastoral
responsibilities similarly motivated the clergy of Mâcon to rebuff municipal leaders’ demands that
they participate in defense duties, even during times of intensified warfare and civil unrest. When
ordered to guard the gate in the middle of the fortified Saône river bridge in October 1588, the
officers of Saint-Vincent cathedral chapter informed Mâcon’s councilors that “they cannot do so
until after this Feast of All Saints,” which, together with All Souls Day, marked an intense
liturgical season honoring the martyrs and saints of the Church together with the saying of requiem
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In the wake of news of the assassination at Blois of

the duc de Guise and cardinal de Guise by royal bodyguards in late December 1588, Mâcon’s
council, perceiving the necessity of reinforcing the city’s security “more than ever,” ordered the
cathedral canons “to form a corps de garde, as they are accustomed [to do] in cases of danger.”66
Chapter officials again protested that “they are occupied with their celebrations of divine service,
but [when] these are over they will heed their duty [to stand watch].”67 Framing their participation
in defense activities in terms of “duty” (devoir) reveals that clergy in Mâcon considered standing
guard a key civic obligation, even as they struggled to balance such requirements with those of the
clerical vocation.
Clergy occasionally sought exemption from civic defense obligations on the basis of
traditional immunities and special concessions previously granted to them by the French king or
royal officials. When a militia captain named Jean Jusberti of Aix-en-Provence’s Bourg quarter
complained to the local bureau de police in May 1585 that “the officials, canons, beneficed priests,
and others of the [cathedral] chapter in no way wish to be summoned for the watch,” municipal
authorities were displeased and subsequently reiterated their directive that all clergy of Saint-
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Sauveur cathedral must take part in defense duties.68
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Two days later, Jusberti again informed the

police committee that “messieurs of the chapter, both in general and in particular, do not wish to
serve on the watch, which is the reason that the guard of this quarter is small.”69 Summoned to
appear before the police committee and account for their failure to participate in militia duties,
several canons protested that “the king, the Grand Prior, and the court [of the parlement de
Provence] had declared the chapter and [its] priests exempt from the guard” and consequently the
committee should honor these privileges.70 Interestingly, the canons of Saint-Sauveur do not seem
to have presented the police committee or city council with documentation confirming their
purported exemptions from militia duties, and later sources from Aix-en-Provence reveal that
cathedral canons were eventually involved in these functions.

Yet authorities’ unyielding

insistence in May 1585 that the canons of Saint-Sauveur take part in defense activities infuriated
one cleric in particular, a canon named Pierre de Cadenet, who—when Jusberti attempted to fine
him for refusing to participate—“took up a halberd in order to prevent the execution of justice,” a
daring act that police committee members viewed as “rebellion” and “a thing beneath someone of
his profession.”71 Cadenet evidently felt strongly that the chapter’s alleged exemption from
defense duties should be upheld, though his willingness to threaten militia leaders with armed force
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indicates that he was not opposed in principal to the use of violence in defensive situations. He
likely considered his position as a cathedral canon sufficiently exalted to merit exemption from
the arguably undignified requirements of guard duty.
While the particular exemptions extended to cathedral canons in Aix-en-Provence may
have been in dispute during this period, clergy in other cities obtained exemption not only from
guard duties but also requirements that they quarter troops in churches or cloisters. PhilippeEmmanuel de Lorraine duc de Mercoeur, governor of Brittany from 1582 to 1589, excused the
secular clergy of Nantes in May 1585 “from all guet et garde both by night as well as by day” as
well as requirements “to lodge any soldiers in their ecclesiastical houses or rectories,” citing a
similar immunity granted by his predecessor, Louis III de Bourbon-Vendôme duc de
Montpensier.72 A subsequent immunity granted by Henri IV in 1598 exempted the clerics of
Nantes from war-related financial contributions for repairs to fortifications and the maintenance
of garrisons, while not making any explicit reference to civic militia functions such as guet et
garde.73 Likewise, the clergy of Beaune sent a delegation in June 1585 to speak with Gaspard de
Saulx vicomte de Tavannes as well as the city’s mayor “regarding the exemption given and granted
by His Majesty and the governors of his duchy of Burgundy to the church of Beaune, that soldiers
shall neither be lodged in the cloister of their church nor in any of the houses of Beaune’s clerics.”74
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The outcome of this particular episode is unclear, but clerics in nearby cities like Mâcon similarly
clashed with city councilors over repeated demands that they quarter troops in the cathedral
cloister.75
If clergy sometimes sought exemption from militia service and guard duty from the king
or powerful nobles, they did so at other times on the basis of social status. By the mid-1590s the
clergy of Dijon had taken part in militia operations countless times over the past nine years. Yet,
in July 1594 a delegation of the Saint-Bénigne abbey church, the monks of Saint-Étienne abbey,
and the clerics of Sainte-Chapelle informed the city council “that they do not want to go execute
the guard, excepting that messieurs of the court [of parlement] and [the chamber] of accounts do
the same, no longer being subject to perform the duty of the aforesaid guard.”76 Many of Dijon’s
clergy understandably felt that they were entitled to the same sort of special treatment afforded to
local parlementaires and officials of the Chambre des Comptes, several of whom doubtless came
from some of the same Burgundian noble families as they themselves.77 Despite this clever bid
for exemption from defense duties, Dijon’s échevins appear only to have approved the clergy’s
request on an extremely provisional basis, provided they agree to perform guard duties at “the city
gate that will be open extraordinarily during the present harvests,” when some of the soldiers or
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townsmen who might otherwise have stood watch would be engaged in agricultural activities in
the surrounding vineyards or the associated commercial undertakings so essential at harvest time.78
Whatever reprieve Dijon’s clerics received from militia duty seems to have been short-lived, as
they were back patrolling the battlements of the city’s fortified walls and guarding open areas
within the city such as the Place Sainte-Chapelle by September 1595.79 Prominent citizens in
Dijon were not alone in seeking immunity from defense duties, as evidence from Mâcon suggests.
At a general assembly of municipal leaders, military officers, and leading citizens in May 1588,
heated discussion centered on the civic guard and its failure to properly carry out its duties. An
officer named Pierre Quinson, known as “capitaine Paradis,” articulated the main problem: “the
richest and most prominent persons of this city … do not wish to perform guet et garde.”80 In
seeking exemption from guard duties at times, some clergy simply laid claim to their privileged
upbringing and family background in a manner similar to that of other social elites.
Despite the complaints that many clergy voiced regarding their social status or privileged
vocation, the exacting efforts of clerical leaders to enforce maximum participation in defense
duties at this time indicate both the seriousness with which they approached involvement in such
requirements and the importance of clerics’ defensive arms-bearing to the safety and security of
their wider communities. The officials of Saint-Vincent cathedral in Mâcon stipulated in July
1585 that all canons who defaulted on their obligation to stand guard would be fined 5 sous per
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infraction and deprived of alms distributions for a period of eight days.81
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In April 1587, chapter

officials instructed canon Philibert Montaudry, commander of the clerics participating in militia
duty, “to report the defaulters to the chapter every Friday, so that they may be punished by fines.”82
The threat of monetary penalty may not to have effectively checked all clerics prone to
delinquency, since in September 1592 chapter leaders increased the stated fine to 10 sous per
violation for regular canons, while habitué priests would be penalized only 5 sous but forbidden
to enter the chancel or receive distributions until their fines had been paid.83 Chapter officials
lamented again in June 1594 “the slight commitment shown regarding the duty of the guard that
they promised to execute by night,” reiterating the fine of 10 sous for nonparticipation.84 The
exertions of clerical leaders in Mâcon to ensure full participation in civic defense duties were
mirrored by chapter officials in Beaune, who in July 1590 spelled out monetary punishments for
all affiliated canons, habitué priests, and vicars-choral that failed either to personally take part in
“guet et garde” or to pay the requisite amount for a substitute.85 Thus, if some clergy considered
guard duty an annoying inconvenience that interfered with their liturgical duties, restricted their
sleep, and limited the already slight amount of leisure time they were afforded on a day-to-day
basis, chapter leaders in particular seem to have grasped more fully the urgent nature of defense
activities.
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Instances of clerical non-compliance with civic defense obligations may have stemmed
from personal antipathy toward the more senior clerics often tasked with commanding contingents
of clerical guardsmen. Regarding Mâcon, archival evidence suggests that at least several of the
rank-and-file clerics of Saint-Vincent cathedral chapter shirked aspects of guard duty merely out
of aversion to being ordered about by canon Philibert Montaudry, the cleric appointed to command
the cathedral’s guard detachment from mid-1585 until he resigned the post in late 1594. The first
signs of trivial noncompliance with Montaudry’s directives emerge in capitular deliberations from
June 1588, when he complained to chapter officials that some of the clergy on watch duty refused
to learn the appropriate countersign or password.86 Montaudry informed chapter leaders in June
1594 that four clerics in particular, one of whom was the curate of Saint-Étienne parish, “will not
go stand guard,” and that when he commanded them to do so they responded “that there was no
wood, coal, or candles” available, a quantity of which municipal authorities required each
guardsmen to personally furnish when standing watch.87 In September 1594, Montaudry asked
his superiors to replace him as commander of the clergy on guard duty because “the majority of
canons and habitué priests mock him with insults,” simultaneously asserting that “the indisposition
of his person necessitates him to be discharged from the aforementioned commission.”88
Regrettably, sources do not specify the precise nature of Montaudry’s ailment, but the verbal
ridicule to which some canons appear to have subjected him most likely concerned a physical
impairment or similar impediment to the robust exercise of his charge as detachment commander.
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Consequently, opposition to Philibert Montaudry in particular, rather than aversion to guard duty
in general, seems to have been a substantial reason for some of Mâcon’s clerics’ less than stellar
performance of defense duties at certain times.
Participation in civic defense duties therefore prepared Catholic clerics for engaging in
diverse forms of sectarian conflict during the League period. The round-the-clock nature of civic
militia and guard obligations meant that urban clergy were continually under arms, despite their
ongoing attempts to reconcile liturgical and pastoral obligations with the exigencies of civic
defense. Clerics’ contestation of defense obligations seems to have stemmed less from aversion
to defensive arms-bearing than from cultural notions of clerical privilege and social distinction.
Even as they contested civic defense duties, clerics by and large grasped the significance of their
involvement in defense activities to the safety and security of their cities and towns. The
familiarity with weapons and forms of martial mobilization that civic defense duties afforded
Catholic clergy arguably affected their practices of taking up arms in defense of themselves, their
co-religionists, and their wider communities.

DEFENDING CHÂTEAUX

While Catholic clergy in cities and towns throughout France were intimately involved in
civic defense initiatives aimed at securing and protecting urban centers from religious and political
opponents, many clerics participated as well in the armed defense of fortified châteaux throughout
the pervasive warfare and civil disorder of the Catholic League period. Although some scholars
have regarded sixteenth- and seventeenth-century châteaux simply as palaces or rural mansions,
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recent work on the French Wars of Religion has called attention to the martial significance of
châteaux, their defensive architectural characteristics, and their often strategic locations.89 Some
Catholic clergy, such as those inhabiting the château de Beaujeu, which was situated in the Rhône
valley between Mâcon and Villefranche-sur-Saône, defended a fortified castle complex that
housed the small collegiate church in which they conducted religious services and ministered to
the inhabitants of the adjacent town. Other clerics, such as Mâcon’s Saint-Vincent cathedral
chapter, were responsible for the defense of numerous châteaux on ecclesiastical landholdings in
the immediate environs of the city of Mâcon. Whether protecting châteaux in which their own
churches stood or defending châteaux that stood on vast ecclesiastical seigneuries, Catholic clergy
continually shouldered arms for defensive duties during times of heightened danger. Such actions
again implicated clergy in the intense sectarian conflict that devastated the kingdom of France at
this time.

Protecting One’s Own Fortress

The clergy of the collegiate church of Notre-Dame de Beaujeu, which stood within the
château de Beaujeu in the Rhône valley between Mâcon and Villefranche-sur-Saône, present a
fascinating case of clerics personally involved in the defense of a rural château throughout the
warfare of the League. This small collegiate church (église collegiale) had been established by
Bérard sieur de Beaujeu within his château de Pierre-Aiguë during the late tenth or early eleventh
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Bérard had given the small chapter of canons attached to the collegiate church the right

to levy tithes on all grain crops, vines, fruit, and animals contained in the surrounding countryside.
Later referred to as the château de Beaujeu, probably owing to its proximity to the nearby village
of Beaujeu, this fortified structure controlled much of the Ardière valley on the western bank of
the Saône river. The château’s collegiate church was a large edifice comprising some nineteen
altars as well as a side chapel added in the early sixteenth century under the supervision of the
prominent Burgundian architect André Colomban.91 By the onset of the Catholic League wars in
1584, the chapter of Notre-Dame de Beaujeu was composed of eight clergy, the majority of whom
were in residence at the church on a fairly regular basis. The château itself, however, seems to
have been largely void of other residents, aside from several soldiers that the sieur de VarennesNagu, Mâcon’s military governor, stationed there in the summer of 1593.92 Thus, during the
intense warfare of the League period, the canons of Notre-Dame collegiate church took a
surprisingly active role in defending the château de Beaujeu, standing watch on a continual basis,
making tactical decisions concerning the château’s defense, and upgrading their arsenal of
weapons when funds or resources permitted.
Not long after the onset of the League wars, virtually all the canons of Notre-Dame de
Beaujeu began standing guard at the château’s gates and ramparts on a consistent basis. Chapter
officers mandated in July 1586 that “all resident clergy of this church will be constrained to
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perform guet et garde each in their turn, upon pain of 10 sous for the first contravention.”93 In
December of the following year, chapter leaders similarly ordered “all bénéficiers of this church
to perform, each in his turn, the guard of the gate [of the château],” which seems to indicate that
beneficed priests in particular had been exempted from the previous directive to perform guard
duty.94 From this point forward, all canons of the church were responsible for their allotted guard
rotation at the château’s main gate. In September 1588, chapter leaders increased the fine for
failure to perform guard duties to 20 sous per infraction, without specifying what prompted this
increase.95 Those who defaulted on their obligation to stand guard were assessed the stated fines,
which suggests the chapter’s resolve in enforcing the timely execution of defense duties.
Common logistical problems appear to have sometimes complicated chapter officials’
efforts to equitably distribute the obligations of the château guard, which motivated chapter leaders
to subsequently permit the practice of substituting. In September 1588, chapter leaders ordered
that the two canons on watch duty for a given period “must actually reside [here] … the day that
they perform guard duty.”96 This requirement posed problems for one canon, a young cleric named
Claude Jacquet, who appealed to chapter leaders for permission to reside “in his parish of SaintPierre,” in one of the surrounding villages, and instead send a substitute to take his place on the
watch.97 The same day that Jacquet requested authorization to provide the chapter with a
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replacement, a local landowner named Antoine Garil appeared before the chapter on behalf of his
son, a canon who had just departed for nearby Mâcon, where he was “to take his [holy] orders.”
For this reason, the elder Garil offered “to send men during his [son’s] turn to carry out the guet et
garde at the château,” a proposal that chapter leaders appear to have endorsed, since they
themselves were responsible for sending the younger Garil to Mâcon for his priestly ordination
service.98 In December 1593 chapter officials issued another directive stating that all beneficed
priests “will perform guard duty in person or at the very last send capable men to do so.”99 As
long as a sufficient number of individuals stood guard, chapter leaders seem not to have cared
whether they were clergy or laypersons from the surrounding villages.
In addition to ensuring that the château guard was adequately staffed, the canons of NotreDame implemented a number of tactical decisions regarding the château’s defense. After some
deliberation, chapter leaders decided in September 1588 that “the trees which are around the
château, that shall pose an impediment to its defense, are to be cut down.”100 While the felling of
trees adjacent to the château would undeniably improve its defenders’ ability to observe and fire
upon would-be besiegers, this undertaking would provide the garrison not only with additional
pikes but also essential building supplies that could be utilized to further shore up the building’s
fortifications. One suspects that the potential for manufacturing pikes from the downed trees was
a major factor in the decision to fell the trees, as chapter leaders promptly informed all of their
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canons “that each one will themselves acquire the arms necessary for the defense of the
château.”101
Pikes and pole-arms alone were not adequate weapons for the defense of a château, despite
their widespread use on battlefields by specialized infantry throughout sixteenth-century
Europe.102 That the clergy of Notre-Dame had been utilizing pole-arms or pikes while performing
guard duties appears to be corroborated by documentary evidence detailing their procurement of
firearms in the summer of 1592. In July 1592, the secretary of the chapter of Notre-Dame informed
his superiors that he had, after two years, finally succeeded in purchasing at Lyon the weapons that
chapter officials “had commissioned him to purchase … for the conservation of our [fortified]
house … namely ten muskets, twelve arquebuses, and eight halberds.”103 Curiously, the canon
reported that of this aggregate “an arquebus and a halberd … were lost and misplaced” somewhere
in transit from Lyon.104 From the quantity of weaponry that actually survived the journey from
Lyon, chapter officials assigned one to two weapons to each of the chapter’s nine canons, with
only one cleric—a “monsieur de la Bazone”—receiving a halberd but no firearm.105 Surplus
weapons not issued to any particular canon “remained at chapter,” suggesting that the church
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contained a small armory complete with gunpowder, cords, and musket balls, without which the
chapter’s firearms would have been useless.106 One cannot discount the possibility that the clerics
of Notre-Dame received additional weapons from Mâcon, in light of the fact that its military
governor stationed a small contingent of troops at the château on at least one occasion in 1593.

Defending Châteaux on Ecclesiastical Properties

If the clergy whose collegiate church was situated within the château de Beaujeu were
responsible for defending their fortified castle complex, urban clerics were similarly responsible
for the maintenance and defense of fortified châteaux on ecclesiastical seigneuries. These
landholdings represented a substantial source of income for bishops, cathedral chapters, and even
monasteries, and could therefore make or break clergy’s livelihoods. Understandably clerics on
the whole appear to have taken a very active interest in their management and upkeep. Also,
chapters and monastic communities “had both the time and the incentive to engage in the collective
oversight of their temporalities,” according to Joseph Bergin.107 The administration of such
properties during times of pervasive warfare usually did not involve Catholic clerics in militarytype operational planning, provided their landholdings did not encompass châteaux that could be
targeted by enemy forces. When in possession of seigneuries containing châteaux, however,
clerical bodies such as cathedral chapters continuously took measures to ensure that these
structures were adequately provisioned and defended by force of arms.
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The clergy of Saint-Vincent cathedral chapter in Mâcon provide an intriguing perspective
on one clerical organization’s management and armed defense of ecclesiastical châteaux in
southern Burgundy. By the late sixteenth century, the Saint-Vincent cathedral chapter owned
several such temporalities in the surrounding area, many of which contained small châteaux. 108
Among these were Saint-Albain, Saint-Clément, Verzé, and Viré, all of which stood at varying
distances from the city of Mâcon. Several of Mâcon’s clerics were appointed by chapter leaders
as terriers of the cathedral chapter’s landholdings, in which they enjoyed usufruct of a specific
capitular property while also bearing primary responsibility for its upkeep.109 While the terriers
leased much of the arable land on these properties, they exercised control of the respective
châteaux, coordinating defensive efforts in conjunction with chapter officers as well as Mâcon’s
military governor, the sieur de Varennes-Nagu. Brian Sandberg’s recent work on civil warfare in
southern France during the later Wars of Religion stresses the importance of châteaux as
“operational bases” for “controlling space and organizing mobilization,” integral components in
the prosecution of warfare at this time. 110 While the châteaux controlled by Mâcon’s clerics do
not appear to have been used as bases of mobilization, as fortified structures close to the city of
Mâcon they retained immense strategic value both in the city’s defensive efforts as well as for
enemy troops seeking to gain a tactical foothold in the region.
The responsibility of defending their châteaux against threats from royalist or Huguenot
troops was a significant preoccupation of Mâcon’s cathedral chapter during the ongoing warfare
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of the League. On account of “the schemes that are brewing in this region against [all] fortified
places,” chapter officials instructed canon Jean de l’Aubespin, terrier of Saint-Albain, in February
1590 “to attend to the guard of its château,” while simultaneously ordering canon Gratien
Decrinieux, terrier of Verzé, “to firmly secure and close the [respective] château until it may be
determined otherwise.”111 In taking such actions, chapter leaders acted upon intelligence obtained
from the city’s military governor or other municipal officers. In May 1594, L’Aubespin reported
to chapter officials that he had been warned by Varennes-Nagu that “the enemy wants to seize
Saint-Albain … just like the château of Virizet,” and to “advise the gentlemen [of the chapter] to
organize the defense of Saint-Albain in order to ward off the danger with which it is threatened.”112
Because of this report, chapter leaders swiftly reinforced the château guard by “three or four
soldiers in addition to those there at present.”113 Records do not indicate, however, whether this
particular reinforcement included actual soldiers from the city’s garrison or inhabitants of the
seigneury occasionally mobilized for militia duty.
While chapter officials often paid to have soldiers defend châteaux on ecclesiastical
holdings, individual clerics—terriers particularly—personally managed the protection of these
fortified structures and directly participated in defense activities. At a meeting in July 1589,
chapter officials advised Jean de l’Aubespin, terrier of Saint-Albain, to augment the château guard
“at the expense of messieurs [of the chapter], which instruction Aubespin refuses and will himself
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Aubespin reported

to the cathedral chapter on another occasion in June 1592 that he “had well organized the guard of
the aforementioned [château].”115 After persistent warnings in June 1593 that royalist troops were
planning “to seize the house and château of Verzé,” chapter leaders sent a priest named Jean Bruin
to the château “in order to command and organize the guard.”116 In this instance, capitular records
indicate that Bruin “accepted and promised to carry out his duty, and to inform messieurs of
everything that occurs.”117 At the same time, chapter officials ordered the terrier of Verzé, Jean
Buchet, to allot Bruin funds “for his nourishment and for the purchase of war munitions.”118 Thus,
clergy could and did command the defense of châteaux both operationally and logistically.
Clergy who took part in defensive operations at the cathedral chapter’s many châteaux
were vulnerable to surprise attack from both large-scale military forces as well as smaller raiding
parties. In July 1593, chapter officials received word that archdeacon François de Pise, who
appears to have been involved intermittently in guard efforts at the château de Verzé since 1590,
had been taken prisoner and was being held for ransom near the royalist stronghold of Saint-Jeande-Losne “by those of the contrary party,” sixty-four miles to the northeast of Mâcon.119 De Pise’s
letter to the chapter asked for monetary assistance in gaining “his liberty and release from the
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hands of his enemies,” without specifying the precise ransom sum his captors had demanded.120
Unfortunately for De Pise, chapter officials lamented “the misfortune that has befallen this
gentleman but for the present they have no means to help him in his necessity, seeing that there
are no deniers in the treasury, as De Pise knows.”121 While capitular records do not indicate
exactly how De Pise was captured at the château de Verzé by royalist troops, chapter officials
seemingly felt that he—in his privileged position as one of the cathedral’s archdeacons—should
be personally responsible for getting himself out of his current predicament. Given the exorbitant
ransoms assessed by captors on all sides during the Wars of Religion, the sum demanded of De
Pise was probably not trivial.122 At the same time, this episode underscores the dangers clerics
faced when venturing out of the city and taking part in defensive operations at their chapter’s
châteaux.
Clerics charged with commanding the soldiers or guardsmen stationed at ecclesiastical
châteaux involved themselves in the ongoing improvement of these structures’ fortifications.
Approximately three weeks after taking charge of the detachment at the château of Verzé in the
summer of 1593, canon Jean Bruin apprised his superiors of the expenses he had incurred since
assuming his post, making specific mention of the costs “to make the needed repairs both to the
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On a previous occasion, Gratien Decrinieux, then

terrier of Verzé, had complained to chapter officials that “it would not be reasonable for him to
make the repairs [to the château] at his expense,” something about which they apparently
disagreed.124 Similarly, Jean de l’Aubespin entreated his clerical superiors in April 1589 to excuse
him “if he had not yet begun to carry out the repairs with which he has been charged to the château
of Saint-Albain, because it is not his fault but [that of] the great disorders that have occurred.”125
Clearly, persistent warfare in Burgundy and surrounding provinces during the League constrained
both the abundance and accessibility of essential building materials needed for improving the
defensive capabilities of fortified châteaux.
The costs of outfitting clerics and sending them outside the city walls to defend châteaux
on ecclesiastical lands could be quite prohibitive. The officers of Saint-Vincent chapter often
struggled to keep up with ongoing expenditures incurred in the defense of its châteaux. They
complained to Varennes-Nagu in August 1589 that the outlay for protecting the château at SaintAlbain was unaffordable, owing to “immense costs that exceed the property’s revenue.”126 One
week later, having received word that the comte de Cruzille was planning to attack the château at
Verzé and pillage its décimes, chapter officials urged Varennes-Nagu to immediately station in the
château “at public expense if possible” a garrison of troops, “seeing that the soldiers there at
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The chapter

continued to have problems financing guards for its many châteaux, such that by mid-1590
L’Aubespin “had maintained two soldiers at the château de Saint-Albain for its defense at his own
expense.” 128 Interestingly, L’Aubespin did not ask to be repaid for his outlay of funds, but only
that the chapter take over the expenses of maintaining these soldiers in the future.
Faced with enduring problems of finance and manpower, the leaders of Saint-Vincent
cathedral chapter sometimes weighed rather distressing strategic options with regard to its
châteaux. Fearing that the château at Saint-Clément was likely to be overrun by royalist troops
loyal to the comte de Cruzille “just as they have already done to that of Verzé,” chapter officials
considered in May 1594 the possibility of strategically demolishing the château so that it might
not be utilized as a base from which Cruzille could attack the city of Mâcon. In this particular
instance, however, the chapter ultimately opted against demolishing the château, instead ordering
archdeacon Jean Ligeret to “have all of the doors of the château removed, together with the
drawbridge, and have them transported to this city, and to wall up the aforesaid portals as diligently
as possible.”129 Retaining ownership and control over the chapter’s fortified châteaux was far
preferable to demolishing them, even if the latter was perhaps the most convenient tactical decision
at that point in time.
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Fortifying and protecting their châteaux thus provided the clergy of Mâcon with another
opportunity to engage in martial activism of a principally defensive character. If some clerics were
not overly enthusiastic about civic militia duty, many of them eagerly participated in the defense
of châteaux on ecclesiastical seigneuries, most of which housed weapons, armor, and other
essential munitions. That these châteaux were outfitted to function as operational bases is attested
to by the actuality that when Mâcon’s clergy perceived that they could not adequately defend one
of their châteaux, they considered razing it rather than allowing the structure to fall into enemy
hands and be used as a base from which attacks against Mâcon could be launched. The clergy of
Mâcon recognized the strategic and military importance of their châteaux in the defense of their
city and its immediate vicinity, and acted to protect these critical fortified sites.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has examined the varied and multifaceted ways in which Catholic clergy
throughout France actively participated in civic defense operations and protected fortified châteaux
during the tumultuous League period. Despite customary taboos on clerical involvement in armed
conflict and arms-bearing more generally, Catholic clergy in cities and towns across France
performed vital new roles in civic defense initiatives throughout the intense civil conflict of the
1580s and 1590s, shouldering weapons of all kinds and conducting round-the-clock patrol and
sentry operations in the highly contested urban spaces of the French kingdom.

Clerical

participation in defensive activities was not confined to the ramparts of their cities, but often
extended to châteaux in which clergy were permanently based or which stood on ecclesiastical
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landholdings close to cities. Clerics’ extensive participation in the martial defense of both cities
and châteaux during the turbulent League era associated them with a culture of arms-bearing that
emphasized force of arms and displays of weapons capability in preparation for the enactment of
sectarian violence. Interestingly, the language of religious zeal is often absent from clerics’
discussions of their participation in defensive activities within cities and châteaux. Yet these
soldierly practices on the part of Catholic clergy during the League offer us a clearer picture of
clerics’ options for civic and martial engagement during a period of pervasive religious and civil
conflict, affording a more nuanced picture of the protracted Wars of Religion.

CHAPTER 6
‘TO SET THE CHURCH AND THE PEOPLE FREE’:
REGICIDAL PLOTS

As the French king Henri III was lodged with one of his armies on 1 August 1589 at the
château de Saint-Cloud, just seven miles west of the League-controlled capital of Paris, a young
Dominican friar named Jacques Clément arrived in camp and asked to be admitted into the king’s
presence on a vital errand of extreme urgency. Having been granted an audience with the king,
Clément seems to have insisted upon the confidential nature of his message, which prompted Henri
to momentarily dismiss his bodyguards. Asked by the king to come closer and deliver the message,
Clément quickly pulled a dagger that he had concealed beneath his cassock and plunged it deep
into Henri’s abdomen. As the king cried out and began to grapple with his assailant, his guards
rushed back in and immediately killed the young cleric. Henri’s wound did not initially appear
fatal, but when he began hemorrhaging uncontrollably later that evening the king sensed that he
would not recover from the trauma. Accordingly, he summoned his foremost officials and
attendants, and ordered them—in case he did not survive—to dutifully serve his Protestant cousin
and designated heir, Henri de Navarre. Early the following morning, the day on which he had
planned to launch an assault to recapture the city of Paris, the last Valois king of France died.1
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The assassination of Henri III at the hands of Jacques Clément touched off a wave of
reactions across the divided French kingdom, both laudatory and condemnatory. One anti-League
pamphleteer lambasted Clément as a “wretched apostate provoked by the Devil,” while a proLeague pamphlet praised the Dominican as a “poor monk” who “employed himself for our
deliverance, not fearing to die in order to set the Church and the people free.”2 Clément’s killing
of Henri III, a monarch that ardent ligueurs deemed appallingly lax in his attachment to the
Catholic faith, seems to have inspired a similar attack five years later on the king’s embattled
successor, Henri IV. Jean Chastel, a young man who had been educated at the Jesuit-administered
Collège de Clermont in Paris, gained access to the king’s chamber on 27 December 1594 in
possession of a concealed dagger. Henri IV escaped Chastel’s assassination attempt with minor
injuries to his face, and Chastel was put to death several days later by breaking on the wheel. One
of Chastel’s former teachers, a Jesuit named Jean Guignard, was hanged on suspicion of collusion,
and the Jesuit order itself was formally expelled from the kingdom in 1595.3
Aside from these two well-known cases, however, we still know comparatively little about
the participation of Catholic clergy in plots to assassinate the successive French kings Henri III
and Henri IV during the tumultuous sectarian conflict of the League era. Historian Denis Crouzet
has called attention to the singularity of Clément’s regicide in his monumental Les guerriers de
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Dieu, characterizing it as an “operative act of a collective mysticism,” which—among other
things—provided a fitting climax to “the [sixteenth] century’s massive intensification of
eschatological anguish.”4 Nicolas Le Roux, in his detailed study of the assassination of Henri III,
similarly describes Clément as “having been moved to the regicide by the force of this immense
collective hope” in the imminent Second Coming of Christ and the decisive defeat of Satan.5
While both Crouzet’s and Le Roux’s characterization of the killing of Henri III could be seen as
minimizing the agency of Clément by emphasizing the intense eschatological fervor of late
sixteenth-century French Catholic religiosity, their work highlights the confessional politics and
religious ideas that could motivate Catholic clerics such as Clément to carry out an assassination
attempt on the life of their king. Admittedly, Crouzet’s work mentions the involvement of several
other regular and secular clergy in plots to assassinate Henri IV during the League period, though
his exclusive reliance on printed sources yields a somewhat incomplete picture of the full scale
and implications of clerical involvement in regicidal conspiracies and plots at the height of the
French Wars of Religion.
This chapter examines the participation of Catholic clergy in assassination plots targeting
Henri III and Henri IV. I argue that, in this period, the concept of regicide accrued immense
significance for zealous Catholic clerics who perceived themselves as valorous pastoral defenders
of the Catholic faithful against the scourges of both “tyranny” and “heresy,” embodied respectively
in the figures of Henri III and Henri IV. Beginning with the case of Jacques Clément, I explore
the extensive support on the part of Catholic clergy for the regicide of Henri III as well as the
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specific reasons that clerics as a particular social and cultural group supported such extreme
violence against the embattled Valois king. I then turn to consider the wide-ranging participation
of Catholic clerics in a range of diverse ventures to assassinate the Valois king’s Protestant
successor, Henri IV, who claimed the crown in early August 1589. Inspired by the self-sacrificial
act of Clément, both secular clerics and clergy from Counter-Reformation religious orders—orders
explicitly dedicated to the reconversion of Protestants and the elimination of “heresy”—formulated
and encouraged plans to personally assassinate these two kings.6 This dramatic expansion of
clerical involvement in regicidal plots appears to have coincided with the emergence of new
cultural associations that closely linked Catholic clerics, and the members of religious orders in
particular, with the phenomenon of regicide. Clerics’ participation in and conspicuous support for
regicide shaped the bitter sectarian antagonism and confessional violence of this tumultuous
period, while simultaneously altering the fundamental character of the French monarchy.

HENRI III AS TARGET OF CLERICAL REGICIDE

Despite the increasing antipathy of militant Catholics toward Henri III between the renewal
of sectarian warfare in 1585 and his humiliating flight from Paris during the Journée des

6
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barricades in May 1588, the king did not become an obvious target of assassination until his fateful
decision in December 1588 to orchestrate the extra-judicial killings of Henri duc de Guise and
Louis cardinal de Guise at the Estates General of Blois.7 As numerous historians of the Wars of
Religion have acknowledged, the king’s desperate attempt to reclaim his authority by having his
bodyguards murder the Guise brothers backfired terribly.8 What slender credit Henri III still
possessed among devout Catholics quickly evaporated, and militants soon clamored for the
Guises’ deaths to be avenged. The theologians of the Sorbonne forcefully condemned the king’s
actions, and in time Pope Sixtus V excommunicated him for having so blatantly violated the
cardinal de Guise’s ecclesiastical dignity.9 Catholics’ revulsion at the king intensified in the
months following the Blois assassinations, and further amplified in April 1589 when Henri III
concluded an alliance with his Protestant cousin Henri de Navarre that recognized the latter’s status
as heir to the French throne. When the armies of Henri III and the future Henri IV began
preparations for the siege of Paris in July of that year, a Dominican friar named Jacques Clément
began preparing himself to assassinate a king that militant Leaguers were now referring to as the
vilain hérode—a near anagram for Henri de Valois referencing the biblical king Herod the Great’s
infamous Massacre of the Innocents.10 Historians such as Denis Crouzet and Nicolas Le Roux
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have carefully—indeed exhaustively—studied Clément’s momentous regicide of Henri III on 1
August 1589, thus it is not my intent here to rehearse or synthesize these scholars’ work. Rather,
I aim to underscore not only the wide-ranging support on the part of Catholic clergy for the regicide
but also the particular reasons that clerics as a distinct social and cultural group furthered such
extreme violence against Henri III.
While clerical discontent with the Valois monarch mounted in the increasingly fractious
months following the Barricades of May 1588, there is no indication that Catholic clergy at any
level of the ecclesiastical hierarchy had begun to consider assassinating Henri III. The journal of
Pierre de L’Estoile in particular records no instances of aggressive preaching or regicidal plotting
by clergy in Paris at this time. Prominent ligueur clergy like Pierre d’Épinac, archbishop of Lyon,
as well as several Parisian curés and Cordelier friars even took part in a number of delegations to
the king at his provisional base in Chartres during late May and early June, one of which yielded
the formal renewal of the 1585 Edict of Nemours banning Protestantism and committing to adopt
the Tridentine decrees.11 The opening of the Estates General at Blois in mid-October was
admittedly tense, and the king took the opportunity to denounce the League in clear if tactful
language. Renaud de Beaune, archbishop of Bourges and Sens, seems to have delivered a brief
and unremarkable harangue on the part of the clerical deputies, as did the deputies of the other
two estates.12 An arranged ceremony of reconciliation involving Henri III and Henri duc de Guise
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at the Estates in early December did little to extinguish the personal animosity between the king
and the duc, even if it displayed a semblance of rapprochement between royalists and ligueurs.13
Thus, by mid-December 1588, the overwhelming majority of Catholic clergy in France could
believe that Henri III had begun to recognize the sacral nature of the League’s program and would
soon take concrete steps to ensure both the exclusion of Henri de Navarre from the succession and
the decisive subjugation of the Huguenots.
News that Henri III’s bodyguards—the Quarante-Cinq—had murdered both the duc and
cardinal de Guise at the royal château de Blois on 23 December and 24 December, respectively,
shocked devout Catholic clerics, prompting many of them to believe that the treacherous king had
now launched an all-out war on zealous Catholics. Clergy throughout France attended emergency
meetings called when stunned local authorities learned of the Blois assassinations. At Mâcon, the
city’s bishop, Luca Alemanni, convened an impromptu assembly of civil and clerical officials in
his residence on 28 December to inform them that “the king had the duc de Guise slain in his
cabinet at Blois two days before Christmas.” In the ensuing uproar, an échevin named Pierre Boton
urged that “it is necessary to guard protect ourselves more than ever,” proposing—among other
measures—that the city’s clergy be mobilized for the civic militia “as they have been accustomed
in cases of great peril.”14 In Toulouse, where news of the assassinations took longer to arrive, the
cathedral provost and archiepiscopal vicar-general, Jean Daffis, informed the capitouls on 7
January 1589 that the clergy had assembled together “to give counsel concerning our conservation,
because it is feared that there are have been major communications in all principal cities of this

13
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realm in order to exterminate the good Catholics, and to seize and take hold of these cities and
finally give them over to the heretics.”15 In Beaune, the clergy of Notre-Dame collegiate church
attended an emergency meeting called by the mayor and échevins on 30 December regarding “the
death and massacre of the duc de Guise,” where they were then mobilized “for the guard … that
operates nightly upon the walls for the preservation and defense of this city’s inhabitants.”16
Clerics thus experienced the immediate news of the Guises’ killings as a seismic event portending
horrific violence and cruelty against all persons resolute in their attachment to the Catholic faith.
The Blois assassinations were all the more troubling for Catholic clergy because one of the
Guise brothers was a high-ranking cleric. A pamphlet published in the early months of 1589
disseminated the apparent reaction of Pope Sixtus V, emphasizing that “a cardinal has been
assassinated, a cardinal-priest, who was also the archbishop of Reims … without legal procedure,
without judgment, without law, without legitimate power, and with the weapons of laypersons.”17
This particular pamphlet also warned French Catholics, somewhat ominously, that if the slayings
of cardinals are “left unpunished, the same can happen to other cardinals.”18 Another League
pamphlet recapitulated the decrees of thirteenth-century pope Boniface VIII regarding physical
violence against cardinals, which declared that anyone who assaulted or killed a cardinal was
15

City council deliberations, 7 January 1589, AM Toulouse, BB 16, fº 230: “pour adviser à notre conservation
car il est a craindre qu’il y ait de grandes intelligences en toutes les principalles villes de ce royaulme pour exterminer
les bons catholicques se saisir et emparer desdites villes pour les rendre en fin heretiques.”
16

Cathedral chapter deliberations, 30 December 1588, AD Côte-d’Or, G 2508, fº 252: “la mort et masacre
de la personne de monseigneur le duc de Guise”; “à la garde … qui se fait nuitemment sur les murailles pour la
conservation et tintion du corps d’icelle ville.”
17

Proposition faicte par nostre Sainct Père le Pape au consistoire tenu à Rome, le vingt-septiesme janvier
1589, sur le sacrilege et assassinat, commis en la personne de defunct illustrissime, et reverendissime cardinal de
Guyse, archevesque et duc de Reims, legat nay du sainct Siege, et premier Pair de France (N.p: n.p, 1589), 3-4: “un
Cardinal a esté assassiné, un Cardinal Prebstre, qui estoit encores Archevesque de Reims … sans forme de procès,
sans jugement, sans loy, sans legitime puissance, et avec armes de personnes layes.”
18

Proposition faicte par nostre Sainct Père le Pape au consistoire tenu à Rome, 12: “laissez impunis, le
semblable pourra advenir aux autres Cardinaulx.”

293
excommunicated, subject to banishment, and could only be absolved of such a monstrous and
sacrilegious offense by the pope himself.19 A lengthier and more vividly illustrated pamphlet
presented several woodcuts depicting the chief sacrileges of Henri III, two of which portrayed the
duc de Guise and cardinal Guise at the moment of their assassinations. While both images of the
brothers could only have appalled zealous Catholics, the woodcut of the cardinal de Guise would
have been particularly disturbing, as the cardinal is depicted supine, in his clerical cassock, with
the points on six halberds cruelly piercing his body.20 The message of such pamphlets was
unmistakable: Henri III’s violation of the cardinal de Guise’s clerical dignity was an egregious
desacralization that devout Catholics must avenge if they wished to forestall further violence
against Catholic clergy by the king or his agents.
Clerics’ organization of religious services resembling funerals for the duc and cardinal de
Guise doubtless heightened their animosity toward Henri III, as they publicly denounced the king’s
malevolence and celebrated the slain brothers as martyrs. Clergy in Paris organized a massive
memorial service for the Guises in Notre-Dame cathedral on 30 January 1589, at which the bishop
of Rennes, Aymar Hennequin, performed Mass and the curé of Saint-Nicolas-des-Champs,
François Pigenat, solemnly eulogized the “martyrs.”21 In Rouen, Jesuit Jacques Commolet and
other clerics defied an order from the city’s governor, Tanneguy Le Veneur seigneur de Carrouges,
that forbade preachers to mention the Blois assassinations out of concern for public order.
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According to an English nun in attendance at an emotional sermon on 29 December 1588,
Commolet “had no sooner named the slaughter of the two princes but that all fell out into
weeping.”22 Similarly, members of Toulouse’s confraternity of Black Penitents (Pénitents noirs)
sponsored a funeral for the Guises in the city’s Saint-Étienne cathedral, the sermon of which—
delivered by the provincial of the local Minim friary—was apparently so moving that “there was
no one who did not weep warm tears.”23 Funerary services such as these may be understood, as
Alexander Wilkinson contends, as part of a broader effort on the part of the League to radicalize
Catholic opinion against Henri III, even if clerics did not utilize these venues to explicitly call for
the king’s assassination.24
Some of the earliest indications that regular and secular clerics had begun to contemplate
regicide in the months following the Blois assassinations are found in the memoirs of Pierre de
L’Estoile. The Parisian jurist and chronicler recorded a conversation that purportedly took place
in March 1589 between the Leaguer curé of Saint-Gervais parish church, Jean Gincestre, and a
parishioner described only as an outspoken ligueur, who was inclined to skip the upcoming Easter
Mass because of the vengeful feelings “in his heart” toward the king. This conscience-stricken
parishioner could not but have been surprised to hear his curate’s reply: “that this was to be in bad
conscience about nothing, seeing that everyone—including himself most notably, who consecrated
the body of our Lord every day in the Holy Mass—had in conscience thought about killing him.”25
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Gincestre’s response clearly intended to demonstrate the surprising compatibility of priestly
sacramental piety and regicide: the hands that elevate the Eucharistic host on a daily basis, in
which it is transubstantiated into the actual substance of Christ’s body, may also be used to
assassinate one’s king.26 Similarly, in July 1589 the city’s Cordelier friars performed a symbolic
decapitation of Henri III in the church attached to their friary, “cutting off the head” of a portrait
of the king that hung over the main altar before a small crowd of sympathetic onlookers.27 Megan
Armstrong has interpreted the Cordeliers’ mock beheading of Henri III as a political act that
“reflected a long term orientation of Franciscan spirituality.”28 Yet the friars’ symbolic execution
of the king may also be understood as a performative gesture exhibiting not just the sacral nature
of regicide but also the appropriateness of clerical involvement in regicidal violence.
When the Dominican Jacques Clément began formulating plans to assassinate Henri III in
the summer of 1589, he therefore operated within an embryonic culture of clerical regicide and
likely received support from fellow clerics eager to see the Valois king punished for killing the
Guise brothers and admitting a notorious heretic to the succession. Predictably, members of
Clément’s friary that were captured and interrogated in the months and years following his killing
of Henri III tried to distance themselves from the friar by portraying him as both unintelligent and
a laughingstock. One Dominican, Michel Mergey, questioned before the présidial de Langres in
1590 and again before the parlement de Tours in 1592, testified to hearing Clément tell other friars
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in July 1589 that the king “would die by his hand alone, at which all the friars laughed, since
Clément was reputed to be merely a fool and a scatterbrain.”29 Even Clément’s superior, Edme
Bourgoing, reportedly remarked to another Parisian cleric, Jean Boucher, that Henri III’s
assassination was carried out “by the most idiotic, most stupid, most dull-witted monk in his
convent, and possibly in all the Dominican order.”30 Despite such strategically dismissive
statements, Clément seems to have enjoyed the moral and material support of fellow Dominicans,
including Bourgoing, who many historians consider to have authored one of the key ligueur
pamphlets of late 1589 praising the regicide, the Discours veritable de l’estrange et subite mort de
Henry de Valois.31 Bourgoing’s role in superintending Clément’s regicidal plans was something
his interrogators clearly took for granted, as did the chronicler Pierre-Victor Palma Cayet, though
it remains unclear whether the prior’s support of Clément was so comprehensive.32 In addition,
Mergey testified in a subsequent deposition—during which he retracted some of his previous
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testimony—that he had accompanied Clément when the friar purchased the knife he later used to
kill the king, suggesting a degree of complicity.33
Clement’s assassination of Henri III at Saint-Cloud on 1 August 1589 challenged royalist
and politique assumptions about Catholic clerics’ capacity for regicidal violence in profound ways.
While he was not an eyewitness to the regicide, Pierre de L’Estoile noted in fascinating detail the
Quarante-Cinq’s incredulity towards the king’s clerical assassin. After they rushed back into
Henri III’s presence and struck down his assailant, the royal bodyguards immediately took
Clément to another room for further inspection and then stripped him of his cassock, because
“some thought he must be a soldier in disguise, as it was too bold an act for a monk.” However,
“he was soon seen to be just as he was,” L’Estoile relates, “a real monk, from whom one must
guard oneself on all sides as from a mad animal.”34 L’Estoile’s description of the bodyguards’
astonishment may well reflect his own incredulity that a member of a mendicant religious order
could perpetrate such a daring and brutal act. His likening of Clément to a “mad animal” further
underscores his own disdain for clerical militancy and also attempts to nullify the friar’s religiopolitical motivations, suggesting that Clément could only have been spurred on by frenzied,
animalistic passions. In a similar way, one of the most forceful royalist pamphlets published in
the weeks following Henri III’s death condemned Clément as a demonically inspired apostate who
exploited the king’s proclivity “to grant free access to all those who, under the monastic habit, are
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Clément’s shameless violation of norms of clerical

conduct, the pamphlet’s author implies, confirmed his status as nothing more than a wicked and
faithless renegade.
Royalist commentators expanded their shock at Clément’s killing of Henri III into a more
fully developed critique of ecclesiastical involvement in not just regicide but all forms of armed
violence. In one of the lengthiest popular works denouncing Henri III’s assassination, the royalist
jurist Pierre Ayrault argued that the Catholic Church as a whole had discarded its spiritual
vocations of prayer and ministration to take part in all kinds of political, judicial, and martial
violence, to its utter discredit. Speaking of Catholic clerics in general, Ayrault asserted that, in
former days, “their arms were tears; their acts of vengeance, sighs; their uprising, prayers; their
secret assemblies and agitations, fasts.”36 While he critized clerics at all levels of the ecclesiastical
hierarchy, contrasting their conventional duties and responsibilities with the bellicose activities in
which ligueur clergy engaged, Ayrault was particularly troubled by the implications of a
Dominican’s slaying of the king. “What change, what alteration is this,” he asked rhetorically,
“that the Monk, who was formerly the most humble, in place of paternosters and breviaries now
has the knife in [his] hand?”37 Clément’s killing of the Valois king thus signified, for royalists like
Ayrault, the depravity and lawlessness into which the Church in its entirety had now descended.
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Should the Catholic Church wish to more faithfully emulate the piety of the early Church, it should
pray for its kings rather than assassinate them.
Leaguers, on the other hand, immediately celebrated the killing of Henri III as an act of
divine providence in which Clément had operated as God’s chosen instrument. Historian Nicolas
Le Roux has characterized this outpouring of praise for the regicide as a “vast offensive of
justification” that functioned both cathartically “as a kind of confession” and as a way “to ward
off the fear of revenge by the supporters of the late king and of the Béarnais,” Henri de Navarre.38
While there was undoubtedly an element of catharsis in much of the pamphlet literature and public
spectacle produced in Paris and other ligueur cities in the weeks and months following the regicide,
far more striking is the degree to which such activities sacralized Clément’s regicidal act and
celebrated the dead friar as a heroic martyr. The pamphlet attributed to Edme Bourgoing, the prior
of Clément’s convent, described a vision that Clément had received one night as he lay in bed,
during which an angel had shown the friar “a naked sword” and told him that God had appointed
him to put “the Tyrant of France” to death. The angel also instructed Clément to “prepare yourself”
for the act of regicide, “just as the crown of martyrdom is being prepared for you.”39 Bourgoing’s
pamphlet depicts Clément as conceptualizing his mission as an emulation of the deuterocanonical
figure of Judith, who killed the Assyrian general Holofernes as his army besieged her native
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Israelite city of Bethulia.40
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References to Judith abounded in other pamphlets and broadsheets as

well as in public sermons, one of which was delivered by Bourgoing in mid-August 1589.41
By comparing Clément with Judith, rather than with the robust figure of Ehud, ligueur
clerics’ underscored the surprising status of Henri III’s killer.42 As a young Jewish widow of the
Second Temple period, when the Israelite community had returned from its Babylonian captivity
and reestablished temple worship in Jerusalem, Judith clearly acted against accepted norms of
female conduct when she entered Holofernes’s bedchamber and beheaded the Assyrian general
with his own sword. Scholars such as Kathleen Llewellyn have demonstrated the prominence of
the figure of Judith in sixteenth-century French religious discourse, emphasizing the ways in which
she—however pious—was not an unequivocal model for feminine behavior.43 While comparisons
of Clément to Judith do not appear to have feminized the young friar, they stressed his status as a
young cleric and thus as someone unfamiliar with warfare and martial arts. A pro-League
pamphlet purporting to contain the remarks of Pope Sixtus V to the College of Cardinals on the
topic of Henri III’s assassination stressed that the king was slain “by the hands of a monk,” an
event so astonishing that it could only have been brought about by God’s miraculous
intervention.44 The pope’s remarks alluded as well to Judith’s slaying of Holofernes, though the
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aged pontiff seemed more concerned to emphasize that Clément “was a monk, unaccustomed to
war or to combat.”45 In calling attention to the fact that Clément was neither a trained swordsman
nor a battle-hardened soldier, Leaguers sought to further demonstrate the providential nature of
Henri III’s assassination.
In addition to emphasizing the providential characteristics of Clément’s regicidal act,
several pro-League publications celebrated the friar as a martyr who had been killed because of
his steadfast devotion to the Catholic faith. One of the lengthiest and most widely circulated of
these pamphlets, attributed to the Parisian cleric Charles Pinselet of Saint-Germain-l’Auxerrois,
argued that Clément’s killing of Henri III was done chiefly in the service of “the Christian,
Catholic, Apostolic and Roman Church.”46 While Pinselet narrates in surprising detail Clément’s
lengthy preparation for the act of regicide as well as his attack on Henri III at the château de SaintCloud, he also focuses on the injuries sustained by Clément as he grappled with the king and as
the royal bodyguards—alerted to the struggle—sprang into action and attacked the friar. The
pamphlet tells how the Quarante-Cinq, “knocking the poor martyr down,” then thrust “their
halberds through his body,” all while Clément “thanked God that … he had so happily succeeded
in his task.”47 Then, while the king received medical treatment from his physicians, “the poor
monastic martyr was pummeled by kicks from each” of the royal bodyguards, which prolonged
Clément’s suffering and further signified their contempt for the king’s assailant.48 Finally, the
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pamphlet’s author describes Henri de Navarre condemning Clément “to be drawn and quartered,
and then to be consumed by flame, burned, and turned to ashes,” common forms of capital
punishment designed to immobilize the victim’s soul, prevent his or her body from receiving a
proper Christian burial, and purify the community from the taint of sacrilegious, blasphemous, or
heretical behavior.49 To underscore the multiple forms of violence to which Clément was
subjected, the pamphlet’s final page contained woodcut illustrations depicting all of the
aforementioned events. As a cleric himself, Pinselet presented the actions of his fellow ligueur
cleric as a heroic defense of the Catholic faith against its mortal enemy, for which Clément suffered
the agonizing death of a righteous martyr.
Clément’s killing of Henri III also provoked intense debate among Catholic theorists
seeking to clarify their as yet unformed ideologies of regicide and political resistance, both within
France and elsewhere in Catholic Europe. Although ligueurs vehemently denounced Henri III as
a “tyrant” in the wake of the Blois assassinations, none of them could draw on well-developed
theories of resistance written from an explicitly Catholic perspective. Indeed, Protestant clergy
had been the most articulate originators of resistance theories during the first decades of the Wars
of Religion. While Genevan reformer Jean Calvin stressed the sanctity of the royal person and the
duty of obedience to temporal rulers, he conceded that God at times “raises up avengers from
among his servants to punish the wicked government and deliver his people,” citing the ancient
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Israelites’ deliverance from “the tyranny of Pharoah.”50
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Calvin’s successor, Théodore de Bèze,

published Du droit des magistrats sur leurs sujets shortly after the Saint Bartholomew’s Day
Massacre of 1572, denouncing the tyranny of French kings in religious matters and sanctioning
the overthrow of ungodly rulers in certain cases.51 An anonymous Huguenot treatise of 1579—
entitled Vindiciae contra tyrannos and attributed to Philippe Duplessis-Mornay and Hubert
Languet—outlined both the limits of royal rule and the principles of lawful resistance to tyranny.52
Yet Protestants stopped short of advocating the murder of a reigning monarch for religious or
political reasons, opting instead to develop sustained criticism of cruel or arbitrary uses of royal
power. As Catholic theologians and philosophers, especially Jesuits like Roberto Bellarmino and
Juan de Mariana, began formulating comprehensive theories of governance and statecraft in the
1590s, the assassination of Henri III supplied an example of tyrannicide that was anything but
hypothetical.53 Mariana seemed to justify Clément’s killing of Henri III in his controversial De
rege et regis institutione, dedicated to the young Philip III of Spain, in which he narrated the
demise of Henri III and implicitly praised the courage and self-confidence of Clément. And while
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Mariana claimed that “there is no consensus about the deed of the friar,” he also declared the
following with respect to tyrannical and depraved rulers:
If princes oppress the commonwealth and are intolerable because of their vice and foulness,
it is a good idea to remind them that they can be killed not only lawfully but also with
54
praise and glory, if they continue to live in this evil way.

If Catholic theorists such as Mariana did not explicitly weigh the legitimacy of clerical
participation in regicide, their apparent eulogizing of Henri III’s assassin suggests that they had
few qualms with a Catholic cleric taking the life of a monarch that had been placed under a ban of
papal excommunication and had forfeited the allegiance of his Catholic subjects.
A Dominican friar’s assassination of Henri III, therefore, demonstrated the extreme and
unforeseen lengths to which militant Catholic clerics could take their unmitigated opposition to a
ruler they viewed as corrupt, villainous, and malevolent in every respect. For zealous Leaguers
Jacques Clément’s killing of Henri III was an act of divinely ordained justice intended to punish
the Valois king for orchestrating the killings of the Guise brothers and admitting a Protestant prince
to the succession, the latter of which was considered in particular to have jeopardized the souls of
all French Catholics. In taking the life of Henri III and losing his own life in the process, Clément
performed what might be seen as the ultimate act of priestly mediation, sacrificing his physical
body in order to save French Catholics from the twin scourges of tyranny and heresy. The
sacerdotal aspects of Clément’s killing of Henri III prompted ligueur clergy across France to
celebrate the friar as a holy martyr and imitate his act of pious violence.
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HENRI IV AS TARGET OF CLERICAL REGICIDE

The dramatic assassination of Henri III by Jacques Clément suddenly alerted royal officials
and administrative officers throughout France to the possibility—even probability—that Catholic
clergy were key formulators of plots to kill any monarch perceived as insufficiently zealous in his
defense of French Catholicism. This new awareness could only have been heightened by the
obvious realization that Henri III’s cousin and presumptive heir, Henri de Navarre, was himself a
Protestant prince who had led Huguenot forces in battle against both royalist Catholic and Leaguer
armies for the better part of the last two decades.55 Militant ligueurs had been united by the
common goal of preventing the French crown from passing to a Calvinist “heretic” since the
premature death in June 1584 of François duc d’Anjou, the childless Henri III’s younger brother.
To many Catholics, Henri de Navarre’s accession signaled, as Mack P. Holt argues, “not only the
end of the Gallican monarchy, but perhaps the demise of Catholic culture altogether.”56 If a
Catholic cleric would conspire to take the life of a king that had long professed his devotion to the
Catholic faith, clerics’ involvement in plots to assassinate a Protestant ruler seemed all but assured.
While historian Denis Crouzet has characterized the capitulation of Paris to Henri IV in late March
1594 as “a catalyst of regicidal tension, or, at least, of the obsession of a regicidal tension,”
evidence from archival sources and contemporary memoirs indicates a proliferation of plots to
assassinate the “heretic” king during a much broader period between his contested accession to the
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throne in late 1589 and the League’s gradual dissipation throughout the later 1590s.57
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Leading

nobles and royalist officials in particular reported the details of numerous plots and conspiracies
involving both regular and secular clerics intent on taking the new king’s life. These accounts
reveal a pervasive common belief in the untiring determination of militant Catholic clergy
throughout France to formulate, enact, or encourage plans to assassinate Henri IV.

Attempting Assassination

In the storm of violence and discord that only intensified upon the regicide of Henri III, a
host of Catholic clergy in sympathy with the League mobilized themselves in preparation for the
enactment of sacred violence against an individual they could not even begin to countenance
bearing the title of the “Most Christian King.” In order to equip themselves and fund such
endeavors, both regular and secular clergy seem to have obtained the financial support of wealthy
backers who appear to have been quite willing to subsidize them. Once outfitted, many clerics
travelled immense distances in order to get near enough to Henri IV to carry out an attempt on his
life. Admittedly, all of these alleged clerical conspirators were either apprehended by royal agents
before they could gain proximity to the king or abandoned their missions after depleting their
financial resources or losing their resolve. The vast number of French clergy who both formulated
and enacted plans to kill Henri IV indicates an astonishing comfort with the personal use of deadly
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violence as well as a manifest disregard for conventional norms of clerical behavior at the apex of
France’s Wars of Religion.
Henri IV himself rapidly acknowledged the regicidal potential of Catholic clerics—monks
and friars especially—in the immediate wake of his predecessor’s assassination, which suggests
the cultural potency of the idea of the armed cleric. An incident recorded in the journal of Pierre
de L’Estoile is particularly revealing of the embattled king’s newfound suspicion of the members
of particular religious communities. Wishing to survey the defenses at the southwestern edge of
the League-controlled capital of Paris on 1 November 1589, Henri IV climbed up the bell tower
of the abbey church of Saint-Germain-des-Prés, “led by a monk, with whom he found himself all
alone.” Having finished observing the city and descended the belfry stairs, the king remarked to
Charles de Gontaut duc de Biron, one of his closest friends and allies, that an apprehension had
seized him when he was alone with the monk, “remembering the knife of frère Clément,” and thus
“he would never [again] be accompanied by a monk without first having him searched, to see if
he has a knife.”58 As L’Estoile himself remained inside the capital for most of this period and
likely did not witness this event in person but learned of it secondhand, one has reason to suspect
that Henri IV did not utter these words precisely as they are recorded in L’Estoile’s journal. Yet
considering that this episode occurred a mere twelve weeks after Henri III’s assassination at the
hands of a Dominican friar as well as the undisguised and strident animosity of zealous Catholics
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toward the “heretic” king, Henri IV almost certainly developed suspicions such as these regarding
male professed religious in the weeks and months following the regicide.59
Given the vehemence with which Parisian clergy in particular are known to have
denounced both Henri III and his embattled successor, it is perhaps least surprising that a number
of militant clerics based inside the capital appear to have actively formulated designs on Henri
IV’s life. While I discuss the aggressive preaching of ligueur clerics like Jean Boucher, Christophe
d’Aubray, and Jean-François Pigenat in more detail elsewhere, the communication of militant
rhetoric from church pulpits across Paris as well as in the cloistered deliberations of clerical bodies
such as cathedral chapters and religious orders doubtless inspired extremist clergy to attempt to
rid their city of a heretical king, who in July 1593 had merely confirmed his hypocrisy by
feigning—so they said—conversion to Catholicism in the royal abbey at Saint-Denis.60 On 2 April
1594, just days after a special Mass was celebrated in the cathedral of Notre-Dame to mark the
city’s peaceful submission to Henri IV and the downfall of the Seize, a Capuchin friar dressed in
non-clerical attire was apprehended inside the Louvre palace complex on suspicion of plotting to
harm the king. When interrogated about his precise intentions and his atypical garb, the friar rather
bizarrely claimed that “the other Capuchins, his companions, had beaten him outrageously for
having proposed that their chapter recognize the king, and that they had stripped him of his
Capuchins’ habit and dressed him in this manner, in which he has come to ask the king for justice.”
While mistrustful of this account, Henri IV apparently directed that the Capuchin be released
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Yet both leaders

and rank-and-file members of Paris’s religious establishments seem to have persisted in
formulating plots against Henri IV’s life in subsequent months. Two months later, royal officers
arrested the gardien of the Cordeliers’ monastery along with several unspecified accomplices, all
of whom were “accused of conspiracy against the king and his state.”62 While L’Estoile does not
elaborate on whether the individuals arrested alongside the Cordelier prior were themselves clerics,
one may safely surmise that they were not, in light of the precision with which clerical conspirators
are normally indicated in extant documents. This suggests, therefore, the degree to which militant
clergy may have collaborated with non-clerical ligueurs within the city to plot the king’s
assassination.
While a number of Parisian clerics seem to have energetically devised plans to assassinate
Henri IV, other clergy in the capital appear to have been falsely accused of regicidal intent out of
revenge or spite in the knowledge that such accusations would be readily believed and result in
their imprisonment and interrogation. The prévôt de l’hôtel du roi, Lugoli, ordered the arrest of a
friar within the city’s Cordelier convent in late January 1599, after a tavern keeper denounced him
“for having wished to kill the king with a sword and a pistol.”63 This unnamed Cordelier spent
only one night in the prisons of the Petit Chatelêt, however, after authorities discovered that the
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tavern keeper, a man named Macé Roger, had deceitfully accused the cleric of regicidal intent over
an outstanding debt. Interestingly, the Cordelier appears to have given Roger both an inoperable
pistol missing its wheel and a “completely rusted” sword on previous occasion, in an ostensible
attempt to partially satisfy his debt of six écus.64 Doubtless angered at his failure to fully discharge
the debt, Roger likely hoped to convince royal officials of the cleric’s malicious intent while
buying time to repair the weapons in question, in the event authorities later wished to obtain them
as evidence. In an atmosphere of heightened disparagement of Henri IV by Parisian clerics
enraged at his promulgation of the Edict of Nantes the previous year, Roger’s accusation was
readily accepted by the prévôt de l’hôtel, even if the ensuing investigation quickly determined it
to have been baseless.65
Secular clerics such as cathedral canons with connections to wealthy family members or
influential patrons took advantage of the resources such bonds afforded and outfitted themselves
for expeditions against the king. In a dispatch sent to Henri IV in the early 1590s, Maximilien de
Béthune duc de Sully, one of his closest advisors, reported a plot involving “a desperate canon”
from Saint-Quentin who intended to assassinate the king.66 Sully informed the king that this cleric,
whose name he claimed to know but did not reveal in the letter, had recently been chased out of
Saint-Quentin “on account of his evil life” and that he left “with intent of undertaking against Your
Majesty’s life.”67 While he did not reveal the canon’s name, Sully described his physical
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characteristics and attire. The canon was fairly tall, slim-faced with a somewhat dark complexion,
dressed in a black doublet and mantle with brown and purple shoes. What seems to have concerned
Sully most, however, was the fact that this canon had obtained significant financial backing. “He
has received,” Sully asserted, “800 écus to these ends, of which he has well organized and equipped
himself, with the promise of receiving 10,000 more.”68 Sully seems to have feared that the cleric’s
regicidal designs might come to fruition, given the considerable monetary contributions to which
he had access. In addition, Sully indicated that the individuals who funded the canon’s endeavor
planned to soon dispatch “a priest and a Jacobin for the same deed, whom they captivate with their
promises and smooth words.”69 While this statement suggests that the chief impetus for these plots
originated not with the clerics in question but with their financial backers, this does not appear to
have been the case with the canon from Saint-Quentin.
Some regular clergy from provincial cities appear to have defied the authority of their
superiors and departed their monasteries or convents, making their way toward Paris in the hope
of carrying out an attempt on Henri IV’s life. Guillaume de Gadagne sieur de Bouthéon, writing
from Lyon in July 1595, notified the king of a plot that he had discovered involving a Cordelier
named Innocent Gasparin who was planning “to carry out a wretched scheme upon your person.”70
Gadagne claimed to have been informed of this plot by the gardien, or prior, of the Cordeliers’
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convent in Lyon, Père Margat, who had received two letters from the head of the Franciscan order
at Rome calling for Gasparin’s arrest. The order’s leadership had previously attempted to summon
Gasparin to Rome without success, and had now come to regard him “as a deserted soldier.”71
With regard to Gasparin’s whereabouts, Gadagne specified that he “was lately captured by the
garrison of Verdun, from where he escaped … and since having escaped from Verdun has retired
to Châlons, where he is with the Spanish.”72 Considering Gasparin’s relative proximity to the
capital, Gadagne felt a considerable degree of urgency about the matter. In addition, Gasparin’s
admission to the encampment of Spanish troops at Châlons almost certainly facilitated access to
resources—material and financial—otherwise difficult for a renegade monk to obtain without the
help of a wealthy patron or family member.
Other provincial clerics that set out on their own obtained material assistance in the form
of shelter and lodging from sympathetic members of their respective orders in the cities and towns
through which they traveled. Pomponne de Bellièvre, one of Henri IV’s trusted officials and the
future chancelier, wrote to the king from Lyon in July 1595 to report uncovering an assassination
plot involving a Capuchin friar hiding within the city.73 Bellièvre claimed that the Capuchin
provincial for Lyonnais, Père Abondio de Milan, had recently sent a letter to the gardien of the
order’s monastery in Lyon attempting to ascertain the whereabouts of a Capuchin from Arles
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called Chérubin, who “has proclaimed himself resolved to attempt upon Your Majesty’s life.”74
When Bellièvre and his officers visited the Capuchin convent and questioned the gardien, the latter
forcefully denied even knowing a cleric by that name. Upon repeated questioning and a threat of
imprisonment, the gardien admitted to his presence within the convent but then asserted that
Chérubin had been made a prisoner at the provincial’s direction. When pressed as to why he
initially concealed Chérubin’s presence at the monastery, the gardien claimed that his superiors
“had forbidden him from allowing [the monk] to speak with anyone.”75 Regardless of whether he
had received such a directive from his provincial, the gardien’s readiness to mislead royal officials
attempting to establish the whereabouts of Chérubin suggests that he was in sympathy with the
cleric’s plan and intended to assist Chérubin in slipping out of the city undetected. At Bellièvre’s
insistence, however, the gardien finally handed Chérubin over for interrogation.
The record of Bellièvre’s interrogation of Chérubin exposes the lengths to which extremist
clerics might employ dissimulation and misdirection to conceal their actual intentions and evade
arrest or imprisonment.76 After the gardien was forced to hand him over to Bellièvre for
questioning, Chérubin was interrogated on 29 July 1595 but resolutely denied harboring animosity
toward Henri IV or nurturing any plans to harm him. Rather, in an apparent effort to deflect
scrutiny, Chérubin implicated at least fifteen other French and Italian Capuchins throughout
eastern and southeastern France in nascent plots to either assassinate the king or conspire against
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him in some way. One of the more intriguing conspirators that Chérubin confessed to knowing
was a French Capuchin called Pius who had recently fled the kingdom and was hiding out
somewhere in Sicily, presumably within the order’s friary at Palermo. Pius had “left the monastic
life for six months, dressed himself as a soldier, [and] joined an army unit in the king’s service
where he intended to kill the king.”77 When several royal troops saw Pius position an arquebus in
Henri IV’s direction, “he was beaten by the soldiers and escaped through the aid of his friends,
who said that he had no intention of doing such an evil act.”78 While we have no means of verifying
Chérubin’s assertions regarding his fellow cleric in the absence of precise details as to when and
where this alleged incident transpired, his account of Pius’s abortive attempt to assassinate Henri
IV is plausible to at least some extent because of the similarities it shares with reports of other
would-be assassins.
Aside from uncovering the details of numerous other supposed clerical plots, the
interrogation of Chérubin reveals the centrality of the concept of martyrdom as a motivating force
for clergy eager to kill Henri IV. Toward the end of his deposition, the friar claimed that Père
Abondio de Milan, the Capuchin provincial, had confided to him of suffering “a great tribulation
in recent days, having learned that two Capuchins had come from Italy to kill the king.” The
provincial also told him that there were “many [other] Italian Capuchins who professed to wanting
to come to France in order to endure martyrdom,” sacrificing their own lives to take the life of
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This understanding of martyrdom is consistent with ligueur celebrations of Jacques

Clément as a martyr that suffered violent death as he risked his life in the service of God and the
Church.80 Historian Brad Gregory, while not explicitly treating Clément as a martyr, nevertheless
describes a martyrdom “ethos” that inspired devout Catholics throughout Counter-Reformation
Europe to resist “heretical seduction” and endure persecution, torture, and even death in imitation
of Christ.81 Clerics that managed to get close enough to the king to carry out an assassination
attempt would certainly face violent death, either at the hands of royal bodyguards or—if captured
alive—through the experience of judicial torture and execution.
As the interrogation of Chérubin as well as other archival sources suggest, some clerics
targeting Henri IV for assassination may have had connections with a broader “Catholic
international” aimed at suppressing heresy and strengthening papal authority throughout Europe.82
In 1591 Pope Gregory XIV issued a formal brief permitting all clergy “to take up arms against
heretics and those who attack the Catholic religion,” which doubtless inspired militant clergy in
neighboring Catholic countries like Spain and Italy to formulate plans to attack the “heretic” king
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Thus, an anonymous informant warned a royal official sometime in 1595 of a plot

against Henri IV involving a Spanish noble and a Franciscan friar who had recently passed through
the southwestern city of Bordeaux.84 The friar in question was apparently named Martin de
Guerin, spoke Italian, and was a member of the household of another nobleman serving as privy
councilor to the Spanish king, Philip II. He was also “dressed as a soldier,” presumably as a way
of blending more discreetly into his noble companion’s entourage.85 The author assumed that the
pair had been sent into France at the Spanish king’s directive, in order to carry out an attempt on
Henri IV through “poisoning him, by giving him some papers [laced with poison] or some other
thing.”86 While this assertion may reflect the informant’s fanciful imagination more than the actual
plans of these two individuals, it reveals a suspicion that clerical conspirators from outside France
might use more subtle means with which to murder the king and thereby improve their chances of
escape. Whatever the pair’s exact plans, however, the informant urged his associate to write to
Henri IV and “warn him to only speak to them through a third party,” again reflecting his strong
suspicion that they intended the king bodily harm.87 Similarly, a Gascon officer of the garrison in
Bayonne named Jean-Denis de Polastron-Lahillière apprised Henri IV in February 1595 of “two
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Jesuits named Père Guillaume and Père Quayan” presently in the Spanish capital of Madrid, who
were planning on carrying out an attempt on his life at the behest of Philip II.88 PolastronLahillière’s brief letter reveals no other details about these two Jesuits other than his impression
that they would soon commence their anticipated expedition into France.
Reports such as Polastron-Lahillière’s regarding foreign Jesuits intent on killing Henri IV
clearly reflected wider suspicions of the Society of Jesus and its members’ stubborn penchant for
taking part in assassination plots targeted at kings and high-ranking officials. The Jesuit order had
been the object of deep suspicion throughout the Wars of Religion, perceived as a threat to French
law and a staunch opponent of peace in the kingdom. The Jesuits’ reputation as sponsors of
regicide was partially solidified in February 1593 when Jesuit Jacques Commolet preached a
sermon in Paris calling for the assassination of Henri IV.89 Within hours of Jean Chastel’s
assassination attempt on the king in December 1594, the Parlement de Paris ordered all Jesuits in
Paris arrested and their foundations searched for evidence of complicity.90 Across the northern
frontier, the order was strongly suspected of plotting to kill the Protestant prince Maurice of
Nassau, son of William of Orange and stadholder of the Dutch Republic.91 A pamphlet published
in 1598 accusing the Jesuits of Douai of plotting to assassinate Maurice featured a woodcut
depiction of a menacing four-edged dagger they purportedly invented for the would-be assassin’s
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This rather essentialized notion of Jesuits as regicides doubtless contributed to the

seriousness with which royal officials across France treated rumors of Jesuit participation in plots
to assassinate the king.
A number of clergy intent on assassinating Henri IV had reputations as misbehaving or
wayward ecclesiastics, which could imply that their particular motivations for wishing to murder
the king were other than religious. A young priest from Sens, for example, was executed by
hanging on the Place de Grève in Paris in March 1595 for a number of offenses, one of which
included “having had some evil design against the king’s person.”93 While Pierre de L’Estoile
gives little precise information concerning this individual, he indicates that the cleric had made
himself into something of a local League captain and had “ravaged and robbed everyone” in the
area around the town of Montereau, forty-six miles southeast of Paris.94 The cleric had also “styled
himself Captain Merleau,” which may have been a surname or simply a moniker he had either
adopted or earned in the course of his bellicose exploits on behalf of the League.95 Thus, his
intention to assassinate Henri IV may simply have constituted a logical outgrowth of his apparent
penchant for the use of armed force in raiding operations against local sectarian opponents.
Similarly, after receiving an urgent report from one of his provincial officials, the king in January
1599 alerted authorities in Paris to be on the lookout for a renegade Capuchin friar “who has come
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here straight from [the region of] Lorraine in order to kill him.” The Capuchin, who was also
wanted for the crime of sodomizing a young child, had allegedly confessed to his prior “that he
was possessed by the Devil and intended to kill the king.”96 In light of this friar’s sexual depravity
and self-declared demonic possession, we can surmise that his regicidal intentions were either
entirely impious or the product of mental illness.97
The impulse to formulate and enact plots to assassinate Henri IV was certainly not limited
to Catholic clergy, as the participation of many other militant ligueurs in regicidal intrigues during
this period makes clear. Two examples suffice to demonstrate this point. Writing from Vienne in
January 1590, Guillaume de Gadagne sieur de Bouthéon apprised the king of the recent departure
of three men from nearby Lyon, “who have promised to put you to death.”98 While Gadagne did
not indicate the social status, occupation, or background of these three conspirators in his dispatch
to Henri IV, it is unlikely that they were ecclesiastics, in view of the precision with which clerical
conspirators were usually described in official reports to the crown. Similarly, Charles de Mailly
seigneur de Bongenoult wrote from Gisors in August 1590 to notify Henri IV of two separate
individuals who had recently set out from different locales with the intention of assassinating the
king. The first conspirator appears to have been the son of a physician from the king’s native
region of Navarre. According to Mailly, the physician’s son was last spotted near the small Picard
town of La Fère but had apparently departed the region “yesterday for the purpose of making an
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attempt upon Your Majesty’s life.” The second person of concern to Mailly was an apothecary
who had recently set out from Gisors with the intention of assassinating Henri IV. Mailly informed
the king that this apothecary “is dressed as a gentleman,” and while he claimed not to know the
apothecary’s name he promised to make further inquiries and ascertain every particular.99 Detailed
reports written by other royal officials and administrative officers demonstrate the considerable
number of non-clerical conspirators thought to have devised and set in motion plans to assassinate
Henri IV, while simultaneously hinting at the social diversity of individuals that took part in such
intrigues.
Even if they were not the only social group to target Henri IV for regicide, Catholic clergy
were vital actors in an array of assassination plots targeting the embattled Bourbon king during
this tempestuous period. A complex mixture of motives inspired both regular and secular clerics
from within and without France to mobilize themselves in preparation for the enactment of sacred
violence against an individual whom they could not countenance bearing the title of “Most
Christian King.” At the same time, the culturally potent figure of the regicidal cleric—with a
dagger, a vial of poison, or other sinister implement concealed under his cassock—so thoroughly
preoccupied royal officeholders and administrative officials that they seem to have given credence
to the slightest rumor of a nascent plot involving Catholic clerics, immediately alerting the king
and taking steps to track down the clerics in question.
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Encouraging Assassination

While many Catholic clerics personally undertook to assassinate Henri IV, other clergy
played critical roles in encouraging and motivating others to commit regicide. Although preaching
is perhaps the most obvious and well-studied communicative activity by which militant clergy
throughout the League period expressed radical ideas and attempted to inspire ordinary Catholic
parishioners to combat heresy with personal acts of sacred violence, clerics appear to have readily
utilized more subtle and informal means to induce willing individuals to summon the requisite
courage and risk their lives by attempting to murder the king.100 To accomplish this objective,
clergy seem to have deployed verbal persuasion, emphasizing the religious merits of assassinating
a heretical monarch unfit to rule the kingdom of France. Clerics with access to significant
monetary resources offered would-be assassins considerable financial support in such
undertakings. Similarly, clergy provided material support and shelter to conspirators—clerical
and lay—at significant risk to their own lives. These subsidiary actions furthered the development
of many regicidal plots targeting Henri IV, while affording Catholic clerics yet another active role
in the Holy League’s momentous battle against both Calvinists and politique Catholics.
Although Catholic clergy typically attempted to persuade impressionable laypersons to
assassinate Henri IV, there are noteworthy instances of clergy encouraging their fellow clerics to
murder the king. The capacity of high-ranking Catholic clerics to inspire other ecclesiastics to
carry out an attempt against Henri IV is aptly demonstrated in the little-known case of Charles
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Ridicauve, a young Dominican friar attached to a convent in Ghent, situated in the Spanishcontrolled region of Flanders.101 The papal nuncio in Flanders, Nicolas Malvaisie, selected
Ridicauve for such a mission in 1596, after sensing that the friar “deplored the miserable state of
Christendom with all his heart, as it was … infected with heresy, particularly in France.”
Ridicauve had also apparently declared to his fellow friars that he wished to kill Henri IV “if this
act would be agreeable to God,” because the king “has devoured the flocks of this most Christian
realm like a ravishing wolf.”102 Hearing of Ridicauve’s professed militancy, Malvaisie summoned
him to Brussels for an interview, during which the nuncio assured him of the support of Pope
Clement VIII and the College of Cardinals, promised to finance all requisite expenses, and pledged
to help him obtain the passports necessary for admission into Henri IV’s presence. The nuncio
also seems to have procured for Ridicauve “a dagger and a pistol loaded with a balle ramée,” a
projectile comprised of two musket balls attached by half an inch of iron rod, sometimes used by
infantry at short range.103 Malvaisie then dispatched Ridicauve into France, where the friar made
his way as far as the small Picard town of La Fère before turning back.
The nuncio’s subsequent actions with respect to Ridicauve further illustrate the lengths to
which some senior ecclesiastics would go to pressure junior clerics into carrying out an attempt on
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Henri IV’s life. One of the factors that prompted Ridicauve to turn back at La Fère was his
discovery that Clement VIII had in fact formally absolved the king in September 1595, which a
rather incredulous Ridicauve pointed out to the nuncio upon returning to Brussels.104 Malvaisie’s
response reveals his continued manipulation of the pliable young friar: “Do you not know that le
Béarnais [Leaguers’ derisive nickname for Henri IV, referencing his natal region of Béarn] has
been excommunicated by the pope, as have all those who adhere to his party?”105 The nuncio
clearly hoped to convince Ridicauve that the king had not received absolution, and was therefore
still an excommunicant meriting death. When a dubious Ridicauve answered that he would return
to France if he could see the papal bull upholding the excommunication of Henri IV, Malvaisie’s
attendant intervened, coercing the friar into resuming his mission in the guise of a nobleman’s
valet. Ridicauve either consented or feigned consent, and after a series of errands—one of which
included a trip to Rome where he took holy orders—journeyed once more into France, traveling
as far as Amiens before the city’s lieutenant governor learned of the plot, imprisoned Ridicauve,
and informed Henri IV. Imprisoned in Paris for over a year, Ridicauve escaped in mid-1598 after
“having suborned the jailor” and made his way into Spanish-controlled Franche-Comté, where he
visited the exiled parents of Jacques Clément before returning to Ghent.106

Months later,

Ridicauve seems to have decided anew to assassinate Henri IV, trekking yet again into France
before royal agents apprehended him at Saint-Denis.

Under interrogation, which probably
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involved torture, Ridicauve confessed to having been deeply influenced not only by sermons and
writings praising Clément “as a glorious martyr” but also by the nuncio, “who set before his eyes
the glory of God and the authority of the pope.”107 Thus, while Ridicauve seems to have taken
ownership of his assassination plans at several points during his wide-ranging travels, he attributed
much of the impetus for his initial choice to become a regicide directly to Malvaisie.
While senior clerics sometimes pressured junior clergy to become regicides, clerics of
militant Counter-Reformation religious orders like the Jesuits appear to have persuaded the
members of monastic orders to carry out attempts on Henri IV, even after the Society was expelled
from much of the kingdom in early 1595.108 For instance, the influential Jesuit Antonio Possevino
testified in a letter to Pierre de Gondi cardinal de Retz in May 1595 about unrest in the provincial
League town of Le Puy-en-Velay directed at the local Jesuit community. Among other matters,
Possevino told of hearing a report that Jesuits affiliated with the order’s college at Le Puy “had
raised Spain’s heraldic banner in the center of the town … and that they had persuaded three monks
to kill the king.”109 As Le Puy was still firmly in the hands of the League in mid-1595, it is difficult
to imagine that many Ponots would have been considerably upset with these Jesuits for inducing
a number of local monks from an unspecified order to assassinate Henri IV, if such encouragement
had indeed taken place.110 More probable is the actuality that some Ponots, notwithstanding their
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opposition to Henri IV, were agitated that resident Jesuits desired Le Puy to swear allegiance to
Spain and permit a small contingent of Spanish soldiers to enter the town. For his part, Possevino
claimed to be “more than assured that our colleagues [in Le Puy]” were not culpable of either
offense, although he promised to “write to the college of Le Puy, so they will send either letters or
individuals in order to explain themselves.”111 Thus, while Possevino maintained the innocence
of Le Puy’s Jesuits to the cardinal de Retz, he at least acknowledged the possibility that they were
involved in persuading local monks to murder the king or conspiring to give Spanish troops control
of the town.
Whereas papal legates and Jesuits sometimes encouraged fellow clergy to plot against
Henri IV, clerics by and large focused their persuasive efforts on laypersons, presumably because
clerics perceived themselves as holding the upper hand in all clerical-lay relations. Once more,
the Jesuits may have predominated in deploying inspirational pressure on malleable prospective
assassins, especially the students of their many collèges.112 Henri IV received a report in February
1595 from Louis de Gonzague duc de Nevers concerning seven young pupils of the Jesuits in
Dijon, “the oldest among them being nineteen years old,” who had recently departed the
Burgundian capital after “each one had sworn to kill him.”113

Although Nevers’

brief dispatch gives

no other details concerning these Jesuits or their radicalized students, other accounts of the League
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period in Dijon suggest that the city’s Jesuits preached fiery sermons against Henri IV and
prohibited the pupils of their collège from praying for the king’s soul.114 Likewise, Pierre de
L’Estoile noted in March 1595 that Henri IV had been warned of a plot involving seven unnamed
individuals presently in Paris who “had been suborned by the Jesuits.”115 L’Estoile either did not
know or did not care to mention the specific region in which these conspirators’ apparent
provocation at the hands of Jesuits occurred, but the numerical and chronological consonances
suggest that this group of individuals was indeed same band of students described in Nevers’
earlier report to the king. If they had travelled together from Dijon to Paris in the space of nine
days, the students’ persistence is confirmation of the extent to which teachers in some Jesuit
collèges could convince malleable youth that Henri IV needed to die by their hand.
If pliant young students were somewhat easy to persuade, clergy hoping to convince an
older, more independent member of the aristocracy to murder the king needed to deploy a
combination of religious persuasion and financial inducement. Shortly after the assassination of
Henri III in August 1589, royalist agents captured a penurious minor nobleman, the sieur de
Rougemont, whom they strongly suspected of plotting to kill the late king’s designated successor,
Henri de Navarre.

According to chronicler Pierre-Victor Palma Cayet, officers arrested

Rougemont near a military encampment on the outskirts of Paris and then transported him to the
conciergerie of the royalist stronghold of Tours. Rougemont confessed to being a recent convert
to Catholicism and to having been persuaded by Bernard de Montgaillard, a Paris-based member
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of the Feuillant religious order and well-known League zealot, to take the life of the new king.116
Upon meeting Montgaillard—also known as le petit Feuillant—sometime during the previous
year, Rougemont communicated his newfound desire “to perform a service unto God and to the
Church,” soliciting the monk’s advice in choosing an appropriate act.117 In response, Montgaillard
suggested that Rougemont kill Henri de Navarre, assuring him the deed would be easy to
accomplish and that, if his attempt were successful, he would never again experience poverty.
Montgaillard also advised Rougement to join the royal army, where “he would find a way to kill
the king of Navarre with a pistol shot.”118 When Rougemont protested that he lacked the money
to outfit himself in preparation for joining the army, Montgaillard gave him roughly 400 écus to
purchase the requisite equipment.119 Shortly after the funds changed hands, however, Rougement
retired to his house near Corbeil with misgivings about going through with Montgaillard’s plan.
The monk wrote Rougemont several letters in the subsequent months “urging him to execute their
scheme,” a revealing turn of phrase implying that Rougemont had as much responsibility for the
plot’s formation as Montgaillard.120 Yet the noble’s reservations persisted, and he soon denounced
Montgaillard to one of Navarre’s leading officers, François de La Noue. La Noue ordered
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Rougement’s arrest in an attempt to uncover the full details of the plot, but, after having examined
substantiating letters provided him by Rougement, later released the noble under condition that he
not come within ten leagues of Navarre.121

Within the walls of the League-held capital,

Montgaillard remained beyond the reach of La Noue and thus was never interrogated about his full
involvement in this particular intrigue.
While many clerics preferred to encourage would-be assassins behind closed doors, some
clergy opted for more dramatic and public forms of persuasion, sometimes at considerable personal
risk. The curé of Paris’s Saint-Nicolas-des-Champs parish church, Pierre-François Pigenat, was
executed by hanging in January 1595 for reportedly taking a knife in hand and declaring to
numerous observers “that he wished to perform again a stabbing [like] Saint Clément.”122 While
the curate’s remark was an unmistakable reference to Jacques Clément’s fatal knifing of Henri III,
it simultaneously reinforced Leaguers’ popular depiction of Clément as a holy martyr meriting
sainthood for carrying out his divinely commissioned slaying of a depraved and tyrannical
monarch.123 When questioned before royal magistrates as to the precise reasons for openly
articulating a desire to assassinate Henri IV, Pigenat downplayed the seriousness of his act by
“blam[ing] it on the wine, of which he had been full.”124 Judicial authorities had misgivings about
Pigenat’s explanation, probably on account of his reputation for having been an impassioned
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Since he was accustomed to using the pulpit of Saint-Nicolas-des-Champs to

rail against Protestant heresy as well as politique attempts at moderation, Pigenat’s performative
display was doubtless intended to inspire devout onlookers to emulate Clément’s act of pious
violence.
A number of clergy provided more implicit forms of encouragement to conspirators,
including critical material support and shelter. As specified by an anonymous correspondent in a
letter to one of the daughters of Guillaume de Gadagne sieur de Bouthéon in September 1594, a
party of individuals with designs on the king’s life had in recent weeks set out from Turin and
Chambéry in the nearby duchy of Savoy and travelled to Lyon, where they were provided with
lodging at the Capuchins’ monastery.126 The plotters remained with the Capuchins for a period of
time, presumably using the convent as a base in which to finalize their plans and embark on the
final phase of their collective pursuit.127 While the letter’s author gave little indication as to the
precise connection between the plotters and the Capuchins of Lyon, it is possible that one or more
of the conspirators had familial or communal connections with a Capuchin friar in a position of
some importance within the convent. That the conspirators remained there for some time suggests
a degree of collusion on the part of senior Capuchins with their plot.
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The ability of Catholic clerics to persuade other individuals—clerical or lay—to assassinate
Henri IV, then, appears to have been just as important in the development of regicidal plots during
the League era as their personal participation in such schemes. Clerics’ appeals to conspirators’
religious sensibilities as well as their provision of financial support played a key role in compelling
would-be assassins to act. Even in the absence of explicit encouragement, clergy’s willingness to
harbor conspirators and help them evade royal authorities for a period of time furthered the
elaboration of such plots, regardless of whether or not they ultimately succeeded.

CONCLUSION

Since the initial consolidation of what would become the French monarchy under the
Merovingian kings of the Middle Ages, not a single ruler of France had been assassinated by one
of his own subjects. Even at the onset of the Wars of Religion in the mid-sixteenth century, it
would have been unthinkable for a king of France to be assassinated by anyone under his dominion,
let alone a member of the clergy. Clerics had long sacralized the French king as le roi très chrétien
or rex christianissimus, constructing an ideological foundation for royal authority that represented
the monarch as a Christ-like mediator between God and his French subjects. Yet the intense
sectarian hostility and confessional violence of the turbulent Catholic League period created the
conditions in which militant Catholic clergy could no longer view their kings as divinely appointed
rulers that protected their subjects from temporal and spiritual harm. Perceiving Henri III and
Henri IV as monstrous threats to the body politic, countless Catholic clerics attempted to advance
the cause of French Catholicism through the enactment of sacred violence against its most salient
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opponents. While Jacques Clément’s assassination of Henri III in August 1589 represents the only
case of clerical regicide in this period to have been entirely actualized, this circumstance in no way
negates the significance of clerics’ thwarted attempts to kill Henri IV. Clerical participation in
regicidal plots reveals their capacity for violent religiosity as a radical demonstration of their
fervent beliefs.

CONCLUSION

Catholic clergy were key orchestrators of and active participants in sectarian violence and
religious conflict at the height of the protracted French Wars of Religion. Clerics supplied critical
leadership and support for the extremist Catholic League in its determined rebellion against Henri
III and Henri IV, providing religious justifications for armed revolt against the crown and for more
rigorous efforts to subjugate the Huguenots. At every level of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, clergy
were central historical actors in the bitter warfare and religious conflict that ravaged the kingdom
of France. These clerics’ bellicose actions challenge recent interpretations of the religious wars
that emphasize emerging possibilities for religious tolerance and interfaith cooperation in the late
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The practices of Catholic clerics examined in this
dissertation demonstrate that clergy considered violent and confrontational behavior as an
appropriate way to contest sacred space, oppose heresy, promote conversions, defend
coreligionaries, and wage holy war against the resolute opponents of the militant Catholic church.
The strident religious activism of Catholic clerics during the Wars of Religion shows that
clergy were vigorous proponents of an ardent and militant Catholicism throughout one of the most
fraught and complex eras of European history. Their radical visions of religious reformation and
renewal made them eager to participate in violence, persecution, and confessional coercion. The
religious ethos of ligueur Catholicism underlined the differences between Catholics and
Protestants, but also between zealous Catholics and Catholic moderates. The militant activism of
Leaguer clergy positioned them at the forefront of a climactic struggle for Catholic France, which
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encompassed both the Catholic monarchy and French Catholic culture. Clergy actively opposed
Huguenots and the royalist or politique Catholics unwilling to decisively purge the “infection of
heresy” from the French kingdom.1
Throughout the chaos and upheaval of this turbulent period, Catholic clergy were the
victims of sectarian violence almost as often as they were its agents. Urban clerics endured the
brutality and deprivation of siege warfare, while clergy at abbeys and churches in rural areas
suffered recurrent raids, pillaging, and occupation by large armies as well as smaller groups of
armed combatants. The Cistercian abbey of Cîteaux in Burgundy was pillaged by royalist troops
several times in the 1580s and 1590s, suffering on one occasion the theft of devotional objects and
religious art including “a very excellent tabernacle, a Moses, and other figures and works all
serving the adornment of the church as well as other places of the abbey.”2 Metallic religious
implements pillaged from Cîteaux in 1595 were smelted and cast into a cannon later used by
royalist forces besieging the château de Beaune.3 More dangerous than pillage was the physical
peril that confronted clerics in rural municipalities caught up in the midst of warfare. In August
1595, Guy Eder de Beaumanoir sieur de La Fontenelle, a League commander in lower Brittany,
cornered a detachment of royalist soldiers under the command of Guillaume Huet sieur de La
Villerouault within the collegiate church of the small Breton town of Pont-Croix. After holding
1
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out inside the church for some time, La Villerouault and his lieutenants surrendered. La Fontenelle
then had La Villerouault and his men hanged along with the rector of the church.4 Catholic clergy’s
recurrent experiences of sectarian violence meant that they were intimately acquainted with its
horrific effects.
Clerics’ enactment of performative violence against sectarian opponents demonstrated
their religious militancy and imparted meaning to their determined struggle for the continued
existence of French Catholicism.

These performative displays of violence conveyed the

immediacy and intensity of the threat posed to Catholic communities by Huguenots and politiques,
particularly through the exhibition and use of weapons and protective armor. Instruments of
military engagement such as swords, halberds, and cuirasses signaled clerics’ martial readiness
and encouraged lay Catholics to imitate their bellicose practices. Through these performances of
violence, ligueur clergy both fashioned and expressed identities as Catholic militants engaged in
a momentous clash, in which violent acts were not only justified but necessary. The dramatic
production of such violence by Catholic clerics across late sixteenth-century France shaped the
dynamics of sectarian conflict and transformed clerical culture.
A powerful conception of holy war motivated and sustained Catholic clergy’s participation
in religious violence and sectarian conflict during the turbulent League era. Perceiving themselves
engaged in an urgent, divinely sanctioned struggle against the enemies of God, many Catholic
clerics played direct and indirect roles in warfare and military operations in diverse local and
regional contexts. A formal remonstrance to Henri III, drafted during an assembly of French
clergy in late 1585 by Nicolas Langelier, bishop of the Breton diocese of Saint-Brieuc, urged the
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king to undertake “a holy war for the total destruction of heresy,” something which he would prove
disinclined to do.5 Ligueur notions of holy war legitimized the use of violence against their
opponents and helped produce shared attitudes toward violence among Catholic clergy, who
participated constantly in sectarian conflict. Clerics’ shared perception of holy war focused their
belligerence on heretical and conciliatory adversaries, the most salient of which were the
successive monarchs against whom the League rebelled for the better part of two decades. In
targeting Henri III and Henri IV for assassination, Catholic clergy acted as holy warriors willing
to embrace self-sacrificial violence for the greater cause and for heavenly reward.
Examining the full range of Catholic clergy’s participation in religious violence and
sectarian conflict at the height of the Wars of Religion reveals the importance of clerical militancy
in early modern French history. My dissertation has employed manuscript sources such as
correspondence, city council registers, and cathedral and collegiate chapter deliberations in
conjunction with printed pamphlets and other contemporary published sources in order to reveal
new dimensions on French Catholic clerics’ religious activism and participation in sectarian
violence. The cultural history methods utilized to analyze clerical involvement in sectarian
conflict and religious violence offer fresh perspectives on clerical violence, underscoring the
limitations of religious coexistence in early modern France.
The active immersion of Catholic clergy in sectarian warfare and confessional conflict
demonstrates that religious coexistence in late sixteenth-century France was never really
actualized, but instead remained entirely provisional. Instances of interfaith cooperation and
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compromise in this period, if they did occur, should be understood as exceptional. Religious
violence near the turn of the seventeenth century did not simmer under the surface of social life,
as some historians have suggested, but was simultaneously more overt and more constant, owing
to the stark values of ligueur Catholicism. In Catholic-dominated cities and towns, sectarian
division noticeably outweighed confessional accommodation and compromise, as Catholic clergy
heightened awareness of confessional identities and enacted violence against sectarian opponents.
Clerics’ aggressive and confrontational actions performed nothing like the “stabilizing function”
described in David Nirenberg’s work on religious violence in late medieval Spain and southern
France, but rather reflected and reinforced the deep sectarian divisions within French society.6
Throughout the turbulent 1580s and 1590s, sectarian violence and religious intolerance were thus
significant elements of the everyday, severely constraining possibilities for meaningful
coexistence in subsequent decades.
Henri IV’s gradual consolidation of power throughout France between 1595 and 1598
corresponded with the progressive dissolution of the League and a noticeable decline in clerical
militancy. The promulgation of the Edict of Nantes, signed by Henri IV in April 1598 in an attempt
to halt religious warfare and pacify a kingdom devastated by decades of sectarian violence,
initiated a new phase in the French Wars of Religion.7 While this important edict is often seen as
a document establishing permanent toleration and protection of French Protestants, it constituted
an extremely complex religious peace that provided benefits to Huguenots, Catholic moderates,
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Key provisions of the edict directed the re-establishment of Catholic

worship in cities and regions then under Protestant control. Zealous Catholic clergy moved
assertively to utilize the guarantees of the edict to promote Catholic renewal and missionary
activity, especially in the most confessionally mixed provinces.9 Capuchins and Jesuits in
particular led missionary efforts in western and southern France, aimed at converting the
Huguenots there.10 Some high-ranking clergy played important roles in military and political
initiatives during subsequent periods of warfare in southern France, though martial activism and
violent confrontation on the part of rank-and-file clerics seldom occurred.11
The evident decline of clerical militancy after the 1598 Edict of Nantes suggests that many
Catholic clergy came to regard personal participation in sectarian violence as counterproductive
or even inappropriate. Spiritual treatises and handbooks written by reform-minded bishops such
as François de Sales stressed the importance of patience, meekness, and humility, reflecting the
enhanced interiority and heightened sacramentalism of early seventeenth-century French
Catholicism.12 These changes in the nature of clerical religiosity partially confirm the conclusions
of Barbara Diefendorf, who points to the emergence of a specifically Parisian Tridentine piety of
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asceticism and penitentialism in the decades immediately following the downfall of the Catholic
League.13 The members of some religious orders in Paris, as Megan Armstrong has shown for the
Observant Franciscans, did not suddenly find “spiritual value in religious co-existence” but
adjusted to the reign of Henri IV by embracing the clement aspects of royal authority that identified
the recently converted monarch as a divinely chosen instrument of peace and order.14 More
research is needed to understand the precise contours of Catholic clerical religiosity in local
contexts during the early seventeenth century, as well as clerical attitudes toward sectarian conflict
in the aftermath of the League.
The significant political and religious changes that progressively transformed and
refocused the militancy of Leaguer clergy were by no means absolute. Fervent opposition to
Protestants and crypto-Protestants continued to shape the engagement of zealous Catholics in the
contentious politics of the later reign of Henri IV, who clashed for years with parlements across
the kingdom over the implementation of certain provisions of the Edict of Nantes.15 Catholics
were also dismayed at the king’s decision, however reluctant, to renew the edict’s clause
guaranteeing continued Huguenot control of a number of fortified towns. Henri IV’s assassination
in May 1610 by François Ravaillac, a failed aspirant to the Jesuit and Feuillant orders, raised the
spectre of a resurgence of the strident clerical militancy that characterized the tumultuous League
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period.16
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As holy warriors, Catholic clergy across France had taken up arms to confront their

opponents and wage a determined struggle, enacting a violent vision of reform in the face of
profound threats to the health of the social body. The legacies of clerics’ militant activism were
profound, shaping irreversibly the connections between religion, politics, and violence in early
modern France.
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